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1. Introduction and summary of recommendations 
The South African sugar industry has long been one of South Africa’s most substantial agro-
industries. The South African Sugar Association (SASA) estimates that around R16bn in value is 
annually created by 85,000 directly employed and 350,000 indirectly employed persons, and 
ultimately with approximately one million rural lives dependant on these jobs. Every 1,000 hectares 
(ha) in sugarcane land, the industry estimates, carries an average of 133 permanent and 210 
seasonal jobs (SASA 2019; SASA 2019 pers. comm.).1 2 
In addition to its sheer magnitude, the sugar industry is distinct from other agro-industries by the 
inclusion in the 1970s of substantial numbers of black small-scale sugarcane growers (SSGs), farming 
predominately under ‘communal’ or ‘customary’ tenure. The inclusion of small-scale black growers 
in a ‘formal’ value chain has been variously attributed to systems of rotating credit (SASYB 1974/5), 
the command of land resources by traditional authorities and of production processes by miller 
sugar producers (Vaughan 1992a, Vaughan 1991), and opportunities to accumulate by ‘contractors’ 
providing planting, harvest and haulage services (Vaughan 1992b, Munro 1996).  
However, SSG numbers largely peaked in the late 1990s/ early 2000s, and thereafter have a steadily 
declined; to nearly half their numbers by 2013/14 (Dubb 2016). Since the peak of SSG production, 
the sugar industry retains a number of important support structures and mechanisms (Manstrat 
2014, Hurly et al. 2015), but has gradually shifted in focus towards supporting land transfers to large-
scale black commercial farmers (Armitage et al. 2009) and managing the ever present threat of 
restitution to wide swathes of cane-land (SASA 2019), largely through Joint Venture (JV) 
arrangements. 
At the same time, the sugar industry is currently in a state of general crisis rooted in its diminishing 
share of a shrinking, tariff-protected domestic market, with approximately half of domestic 
production currently being exported to a chronically low-priced international market (SASA 2019). 
Numerous factors have driven the crisis, including the growth of duty-free imports from Eswatini – a 
South African Customs Union (SACU) partner that is expanding production and diverting existing 
exports from the European Union (EU) to South Africa; unexplained suspensions of tariff protection 
(enabling huge amounts of sugar to enter the domestic market at little to no duty); accelerated 
reductions in industrial demand with the introduction of the Health Promotion Levy (HPL), aka the 
‘Sugar Tax’; and diminishing retail sales alongside compensatory tariff increases (Kadwa 2019, SASA 
pers. comm.).  
Currently, the industry is involved in discussions with government about formulating a ‘master plan’ 
to chart its future path. With South Africa enjoying only marginal preferential access to other 
protected markets in the US (Conningarth Economists 2013) and Mozambique (DAFF 2017), current 
hopes have been focussed on diverting (or ‘diversifying’) sugarcane away from sugar-processing to 
the production of ethanol-for-fuel and industrial chemicals (Mboyisa & Maphumulo 2019) and on 
the expansion of the continental protected market (Mandela 2019) – both of which prima facie 
would need to overcome significant obstacles to have an alleviating impact.  
 
1 The methodology behind this estimation is not completely clear. As per direct jobs, this appears premised on adding all farmers, mill 
employees and estimated full-time job equivalents on large-scale farms. According to the industry directory, approximately 7,000 
employees work in sugar milling, to which 1,368 large-scale farm owners might be added. Assuming the 19,031,688 tons of cane crushed 
in 2018/19 and a South Coast large-scale employment rate of 3.12 full-time worker equivalents per 1,000 tons of cane (Visser & Ferrer 
2015), approximately 59,379 full time jobs are found in sugar cane production. This brings the total to 67,747. SSGs do not deliver cane 
consistently each year, and rarely earn sufficient incomes to subsist entirely on these earnings, but currently number 21,581 (of whom 
12,019 delivered cane in 2018/19). If 7,536 ‘beneficiaries’ of cane projects are added, this brings the total number of beneficiaries to 
96,863. It is not clear how many are employed in SASA’s regulatory structures. 
2 It would appear that estimates made by government as to the relative labour intensity of sugarcane are highly inflated. Zalk (2019) 
reports sugarcane to on average provide 1 job per hectare. By Visser & Ferrer’s (2015) estimation, this would require a sugarcane farmer 
to achieve impossible yields of 321 tons/ha. By the industry’s own multipliers, there are approximately 0.133 permanent jobs and 0.21 
seasonal jobs per hectare.  
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In more than a decade of simmering debate about reforming its regulatory structure (SACGA 2013), 
questions of the industry’s ‘transformation’ have been central in on-going discussions. So far, new 
transformation commitments have included investing R1bn over five years and the recognition of a 
new farmers’ organization centred on black growers (SASA 2018a, SASA 2018b). The relative 
capacities of the industry for ‘transformation’, and the political imperatives thereto, rest in no small 
part on demonstrating that tariff protection enables the sugar industry to make substantial national 
socio-economic contributions. The crisis facing the sugar industry is also a socio-economic crisis, one 
which includes SSGs but extends to employment in rural and mill-area towns where livelihoods are 
deeply tied to sugar. In many ways, the crisis involves a question of ‘jobs preservation’ rather than 
‘jobs expansion’.  
However, this report proposes that, even amidst this crisis (and in some ways because of it), the 
sugar industry’s protected status and peculiar regulatory structure provide opportunities to greatly 
enhance the livelihoods of SSGs in ways unavailable to other agro-commodities. Most of the 
mechanisms proposed here are based on historical precedent, but could be repurposed to build on 
the industry’s existing transformation efforts, including imperatives to land reform, while at the 
same time incentivising progress thereto as a competitively rewarded imperative with pro-poor 
implications – and at scales arguably greater than any other single agricultural commodity. Even if 
contraction occurs more broadly, such measures would secure and expand sugarcane’s livelihood 
potential for South Africa’s poorest and vulnerable citizens. Whether these opportunities might be 
seized, however, depends on mutual political commitments by the industry and government.  
The body of the report is structured as follows. Section 2.1 provides a broad overview of the general 
location of the sugar industry’s ‘Mill Supply Areas’ (MSAs), including the typical composition of 
sugarcane supply from ‘types’ of producers in the industry’s production-based classification system. 
Section 2.2 provides a broad overview of the sugar industry’s current regulatory structure. Grasping 
the sugar industry’s distinctive structure, and the position of SSGs within it, helps explain  why small-
scale production has declined over the past decade and a half, and its prospects for expansion. 
Section 2.2.1 gives a brief overview of the basic representative structure of the South African Sugar 
Association (SASA), which enjoys statutory powers of self-regulation. Section 2.2.2 reviews the 
‘Division of Proceeds’, the core mechanism that determines the terms of exchange within the 
industry, and particularly its sugarcane and sugar-processing components. Section 2.2.3 provides a 
brief review of the operation of the Dollar-Based Reference Price (DBRP), the core mechanism of 
domestic market protection that largely determines the magnitude of the domestic market. 
Section 3 provides a very brief overview of some of the most significant support mechanisms 
provided to SSGs by various actors. Not all of these mechanisms are dealt with in depth, but most 
feature throughout the rest of the report. In particular, Section 3.6, considering the progress of land 
reform, provides a brief overview of very partial national statistics (of questionable veracity). 
Section 4 provides a more detailed overview of the industry’s crises and controversies highlighted 
above. Although general in character, each issue has critical bearing on current pressures faced by 
SSGs and the imperatives for reform. Section 4.1 considers the size of the domestic market itself, 
and seeks to give a general evaluation of pressures upon it, particularly in relation to sugar imports 
from Swaziland and elsewhere (Section 4.1.1) and the Health Promotion Levy (Section 4.1.2). It then 
considers, in brief, the two dominant possible responses to these pressures: diversification into 
ethanol production (Section 4.1.3) and the formation of an expanded continental free trade area 
(Section 4.1.4). These sections also sketch the obstacles in the way of each option. 
Section 4.2 then considers the Division of Proceeds mechanism. Key concerns include the 
determination of the ‘notional price’ (Section 4.2.1) and the ‘Recoverable Value’ (RV) system of cane 
payment (Section 4.2.2). Their particular relevance to SSGs is made clearer in Section 4.2.3, where 
SSGs’ historical growth and decline are related to structural reforms in the industry. 
Section 4.3 considers the general decline in cane production over the past 15 years. This emphasizes 
how industry-wide pressures are translating into a generalized and acute pressure on sugarcane 
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supply. It proceeds with a brief review of the ‘cost-price squeeze’ facing sugarcane growers, and 
then turns to a review of regional variations and the shifting composition of cane supply by grower 
‘type’. It ends with a review of the unevenness of cane supply within the Large-Scale Grower (LSG) 
and SSG supply segments, showing how pressure results in tendencies to concentration. 
Section 5 provides summaries of four independent case-studies of SSG production in different 
historical and production contexts, in order to illustrate sugarcane’s contribution to rural livelihoods 
under different conditions. Section 5.1 reviews sugarcane’s relative contribution to SSGs under the 
regulatory conditions of the 1980s, comparing relatively ‘independent’ growers to those organized 
by miller-based agencies. Section 5.2 reviews research undertaken by the author in 2010-11 about 
SSGs in the Umfolozi supply area long after regulatory reform, where it was anticipated 
‘independent’ SSGs would emerge more sustainably, but where some of the most substantial 
declines in SSG numbers and levels of production have in fact occurred. Section 5.3 considers the 
case of irrigated SSGs in Mpumalanga, where returns to cane in general are much higher, but where 
difficulties managing irrigation infrastructure have emerged as serious impediments. This section 
offers a brief review of one irrigated ‘co-operative’ and seven irrigated restitution schemes, often 
categorized as ‘SSGs’ owing to their large beneficiary bases. These have been highly successful 
according to metrics of productivity, but less so  in relation to benefit flows to members/claimants. 
Section 5.4 reviews a study of two ‘co-operative’ models of SSG production in rain-fed areas, which 
are attempting to re-invigorate SSG production by overcoming barriers to scale. While resembling 
systems in the prior regulatory frame, the lack of effective price support has encouraged sub-
contracting and lease arrangements with questionable impacts on livelihoods and generating 
intense conflicts, raising questions about their sustainability.  
Section 6 synthesises the analysis in the previous sections to recommend reforms that would 
promote and expand SSG production even under prevailing conditions of generalised contraction. In 
Section 6.1 it is argued that the most fundamental hinge would be intra-industry price-supports 
based on domestic market realizations and potential retail market realizations, differentially 
augmented by consumer premiums similar to a Fair Trade model. These would: 
• Substantially exceed existing SSG price-support measures;  
• Reduce the ‘capture’ of industry-supporting tariff protection measures by retailers; 
• Augment LSG prices, even given a bias towards SSGs; 
• Reduce competitive undercutting by the Eswatini sugar industry to the benefit of some 
milling companies alone; 
• Insulate SSGs from the risks of the world market;  
• Remove SSGs’ effective dependence on LSGs for finance support;  
• Reduce imperatives for government to subsidise SSG production; 
• Eliminate disincentives by the current price-support model to expanded production; 
• Differentially reward ‘transformation’, as millers would receive domestic market premiums 
according to their share of SSG supply (including from restitution projects), particularly those 
millers hitherto ‘punished’ by SSG contraction; 
These interventions would incentivise millers to maintain and/or expand their share of SSG 
supply and pro-poor land reform projects. 
Section 6.2 argues that SSG production systems would be best enhanced by re-introducing 
payments for those costs associated with SSG administration (training, extension and logistical 
oversight by miller and grower agencies) as a ‘first charge’ from industry gross proceeds, according 
to SSG areas serviced, and at cost rates established and annually audited by SASA and disseminated 
to local grower structures. This would: 
• Promote cane and sugar production for the domestic market, to the benefit of both growers 
and millers, hence its defensibility as a ‘first charge’; 
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• Promote investment in personnel and equipment in order to improve efficiencies in logistics 
and services, which often act as scale-related impediments to SSG production, ahead of 
efforts at land consolidation, which are often conflictual; 
• Discourage contractors from undertaking services which are detrimental to SSG returns; 
• Promote the provision of services to SSGs by multiple agencies, including miller and grower-
based organizations; 
• Enhance SSG information and bargaining power in selecting contractual service providers. 
These measures would promote local contractors ability to operate at service and cost-
competitive levels;reduce tensions between efficient project management and SSG returns; and 
limit the capacity of millers to use SSGs as a means of ‘cost manipulation’. 
Section 6.3 describes how the above mechanisms would provide a basis to ‘rationalize’ SSG logistics 
and production in a flexible manner adaptable to a wide range of livelihood ‘portfolios’ and grower 
capabilities, at little to no risk of debt. Essentially, with enhanced premiums as described in section 
6.1 and improving logistics through the steps proposed in section  6.2, local growers’ organizations 
and co-operatives would be responsible for co-ordinating planting periods. SSGs would select 
contractual agencies to undertake planting at their own expense, including a limited rent to the SSGs 
themselves, in return for proceeds from the first cutting, less a slight share of net premium to the 
registered SSG. Subsequently, SSGs could select contractors to undertake tasks of clearing, weeding, 
top-dressing and chemical application. This would: 
• Regularize and formalize vernacular models of expansion that proceeded in the period of 
rapid SSG growth in the 1990s, and which resemble models of re-entry into cane by growers 
who had hitherto dropped out; 
• Provide a predictable basis of establishing cane without debt, hence reducing risk to 
expanding SSG production and SSGs own risk in undertaking cane production; 
• Incentivise contractors to have a direct stake in SSG’s cane quality, and hence planting and 
transport performance; 
• Reduce imperatives for SSGs to enter into group arrangements outside of commensalities of 
interest and trust which otherwise accentuate conflicts and free-rider problems; 
• Allow SSGs without substantial labour, capital and training endowments, or for whom these 
represent a substantial opportunity cost per task, to undertake and earn incomes from 
sugarcane cultivation; 
• Allow those with substantial labour, capital and training endowments, and for whom these 
do not represent a major opportunity cost per task, to earn greater premiums from directly 
undertaking production. 
Section 6.4 provides a more tentative set of recommendations (requiring further research as to its 
impact) to promote ‘green harvesting’ of cane instead of cane-burning. While potentially ultimately 
complemented (or replaced) by returns to animal feed/co-generation, it is recommended that funds 
from the HPL be utilized to subsidize ‘green’ cane at a per ton rate for both SSGs and LSGs, and paid 
either directly to growers undertaking direct labour or hire in harvesting, and otherwise to 
harvesting contractors. Benefits could include:  
• Health benefits to cane workers no longer contending with health risks from fire hazards and 
smoke inhalation; 
• Environmental benefits from the reduction of CO2 emissions; 
• Improvement in air quality and hence health of residents in areas surrounding sugarcane 
farms; 
• Incentives for higher quality employment on LSG and SSG farms; 
• Additional labour premiums to SSGs undertaking direct harvesting, and, otherwise, to 
contractors managing harvest; 
• Reduction in risk of ‘runaway’ cane fires among SSGs that interfere with logistics;  
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• Potential synergies with SSG livestock production, and a reduction in tensions faced by SSGs 
generated by choices between ‘cane or cattle’; 
• Augmenting soil health with residues from leaves and tops. 
Section 6.5 argues that these reforms would immediately benefit not only those within the existing 
boundaries of the communal areas, but also beneficiaries of large land restitution projects, which 
are already considered ‘SSGs’.  Here, reforms would further facilitate opportunities to leverage 
existing redistribution mechanisms in a pro-poor manner. In essence, government could utilize its 
PLAS programme to acquire areas adjacent to SSG supply areas to reduce land hunger; directly and 
indirectly enabling SSGs and ‘accumulating’ contractors to flexibly expand their area under cane 
according to their own capacities (and supported by mechanisms above); and grounding beneficiary 
selection in local ethical concerns for need and community, while enhancing security of tenure 
outside traditional authority jurisdictions. New cropping areas could be allocated (along with access 
to communal grazing lands) by standards of median land-size to land-poor homesteads, and then 
homesteads with children unable to establish independent homesteads, while allowing those with 
large tracts of land to expand their land portfolios under condition of surrender of existing land to 
neighbours (e.g. 1.5 new hectares in return for each hectare surrendered). Rights to land settlement 
and use would be permanent, alienable only by direct sale, and not by using land as debt-security. 
This would: 
• Reduce competition for land between grazing and sugarcane cultivation; 
• Reduce perceptions of prejudice and elite capture by privileging the relatively needy; 
• Allow ‘accumulators’ to access new lands through land reform in a manner that also 
augments the holdings of their neighbours; 
• Allow expansions of SSG land holdings and area under-cane to occur according to their 
existing capacity for marginal expansion, and without risk to socially and geographically-
embedded livelihood portfolios. 
• Strengthen the ethical elements of local communal tenure systems while de-linking security 
of tenure from traditional authority 
• Allow vernacular land markets to emerge on a ‘willing-buyer/willing seller’ basis, and not on 
debt-based forms of alienation as the result of ‘shocks’ or risky undertakings –including 
those relating to cane, which may stir resentment.  
Section 6.6 concludes with a broad illustrative estimation of the employment benefits of such an 
SSG-centred strategy. It begins with a review of changes to the DoP required for the above measures 
to take effect, and the combined pricing differentials these would imply. It then divides estimated 
net proceeds from SSG cane, under the assumption of full household labour commitments, by the 
minimum wage. This provides an indication of the value potentially created in SSG production, 
whatever its distribution between homestead and hired labour. Across rain-fed and irrigated SSGs, 
this estimate suggests that, depending on yield, current SSG production could be elevated to the 
level of between 13,000 - 31,000 ‘minimum wage equivalents’. Should SSG production expand to its 
historic level, this could result in a near doubling of employment within some of the poorest and 





2. Overview of the structure of the South African sugar industry 
2.1 Location and general characteristics of major South African Mill Supply Area (MSAs) 
The South African sugar industry is located in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. This 
geographic distribution flows from three factors. First, the high water needs of sugarcane production 
means that it is in the relatively high rain-fall areas of coastal KwaZulu-Natal, or in irrigated areas of 
Northern KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. Secondly, sugarcane’s high perishability after harvest 
requires swift transport to processing facilities, so that sugarcane farms typically are confined within 
a ±30km radius of mills. Thirdly, relative proximity to the coast is important for export.3  
In the industry, sugarcane farms are broadly sorted three ‘types’ of grower: 
• Miller-Cum-Planter (MCPs) usually refers to sugarcane estates owned directly by millers, 
but sometimes also includes ‘group’ schemes, such as in restitution cases. These account for 
approximately 8% of cane production from 2009/10-2018/19 (SACGA 2019a).  
• Large-scale growers (LSGs) denote larger independent sugarcane producers. These number 
around 1,368 and account for the vast bulk of cane supply – approximately 83% from 
2009/10 – 2018/19 (SACGA 2019a). Historically, these growers were exclusively white, but 
today their number also includes larger independent black4 sugarcane growers, usually 
beneficiaries of land reform, known variously as New Freehold Growers (NFGs) or Land 
Reform Growers (LRGs). NFGs are not consistently separated in annual statistics, but in 
2018/19 were reported to number approximately 345 and accounted for 9.17% of 
production (SASA 2019). Complicating reporting further is that the contemporary LSG 
category may also include production from large group schemes, including restitution 
(SACGA pers. comm.).  
• Small-scale growers (SSGs) historically referred to black sugarcane producers farming 
largely under customary tenure in (rainfed) KwaZulu and (irrigated) KaNgwane. While 
submission codes indicate around 18,600 registered growers (with 12,000 submitting cane 
in 2018/19), as with LSGs, these also include some group schemes. From 2009/10 – 
2018/19, those submitting under SSG codes accounted for approximately 9% of cane 
production (SACGA 2019a; pers. comm.). 
As illustrated in Map 1, the sugar industry is typically sub-divided into five agro-supply regions, or 
‘Mill Supply Areas’ (MSA). Sugarcane farms supply 14 mills owned by six sugar companies among 
which three predominate: Illovo Sugar (now a subsidiary of Associated British Foods), TSB (now a 
subsidiary of RCL) and Tongaat-Hulett. In addition, there are three ‘independent’ mills: two ‘co-
operative’ mills, the Umfolozi Sugar Mill (USM) and UCL; and the ‘BEE’ Gledhow Mill.5 In addition, 
the three major sugar companies own and/or have significant interests in sugar mills across the 




3 Historically, coastal proximity was intimately related to the British colonial roots of the sugar industry in the Natal colony. The early 
industry was centred on export-orientated plantations combining sugarcane production and sugar processing, and relying on indentured 
Indian labour. The proscribing of indentured labour and political impetus to open Zululand to white settlement following the Anglo-Zulu 
war saw the first establishment of the centralized miller-processing model, with newly settled white sugarcane farmers supplying large 
mills alongside an increasing focus on domestic supply (Richardson 1982, Halpern 2004, Minaar1992). The irrigated regions of 
Mpumalanga were established subsequently in the 1960s apartheid era with the first mainly Afrikaans sugar company, Transvaal Suger 
Beperk (Tsb) (Van Biljon 1970, Nedbank 1976). 
4 ‘Black’ is utilized in an expansive sense of those racially discriminated against under apartheid. In 2013/14, 78% (n=2817) of NFGs 
included those classified as ‘African’, 21% (n=77) ‘Indian’ and 1% (n=3) ‘Coloured’ (Ntshangase 2016). 
5 Both the Umfolozi and Gledhow sugar mills were previously owned by Illovo, but disposed of in BEE sales to entities owned by the 
Sokhela family. Subsequently, the Umfolozi mill was re-acquired by supplier sugarcane growers. Currently, the Umfolozi mill is owned  
76.87% by supplier sugarcane entities and 23.13% by NCP Alcohols (USM 2019). The Gledhow sugar mill is currently owned 34.9% by the 
Sokhela’s Ushukela Milling, 30% by Illovo, 25.1% by restitution claimants represented by the Gledhow Growers' Share Trust, and 10% by 
SAPPI (Gledhow 2019). UCL is a combined sugar and timber company owned by its farmer-suppliers. 
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Table 1 summarizes some of the key features of the different MSAs. Moving from north to south, 
these include:  
• Northern Irrigated: Theses areas include TSB’s Malelane and Komati mills in Mpumalanga, as 
well as its Pongala mill in northern Kwazulu-Natal. Because cane production here is irrigated, 
these mill-areas tend to achieve above-average yields (mean 90t/ha from 2007/08 – 2016/17) 
and cane quality, measured in terms of the industry standard of Recoverable Value (RV) (mean 
13% from 2009/10 – 2018/19). Hence, even though they comprise only 17% of the area under 
cane (AUC) from 2009/10 – 2018/19, at around 61,000 ha, they while are responsible for a mean 
of approximately 27% of sugar and cane production over the 2000/01 - 2017/8 seasons. From 
2009/10 – 2018/19, approximately 10% of cane production originated from farms using a SSG 
code. 
• Zululand: These mills include USM and Tongaat-Hulett’s Felixton and Amatikulu mills. (The 
Entumeni mill was purchased by Tongaat-Hulett before closing in the 2004/05 season.6 ) These 
mills accounted for approximately 22% of sugar production over the 2000/01 - 2017/8 seasons 
and their MSAs a somewhat lesser mean of 23% of area under cane (83,000 ha) from the 
2009/10 – 2018/19 seasons. This significantly concerns the MSA’s low average yields, of 55 t/ha 
from 2007/08 – 2016/17, particularly from those supplying Tongaat-Hulett’s Amatikulu (45 t/ha) 
and Felixton (53 t/ha), and lesser RV%. These two MSAs received lower than average rainfall, but 
also included the greatest proportions of cane supply from SSG codes (17% and 19%, 
respectively). 
• North Coast: Included here are the independent ‘BEE’ Gledhow mill and Tongaat-Hulett’s 
Maidstone and Darnall mills. These mills accounted for approximately 17% of sugar production 
over the 2000/01 - 2017/8 seasons and 21% of AUC (approximately 79,000 ha) from the 2009/10 
– 2018/19 seasons. The MSAs reached similar average yields of 55 t/ha as in Zululand, despite 
enjoying higher average rainfall, particularly at Darnall (46 t/ha) and Gledhow (49 t/ha). Notably, 
Tongaat-Hulett’s Maidstone MSA achieved high average yields of 68 t/ha. Growers submitting 
on SSG codes accounted for approximately 7% of production overall, but approximately 9% of 
production at Togaat-Hullett’s Darnall and Maidstone mills. 
• Midlands: Comprising the independent UCL mill and Illovo’s Eston and Noodsberg mills, these 
MSAs accounted for approximately 18% of sugar production over the 2000/01 - 2017/8 seasons 
and 23% of AUC (approximately 85,000 ha) from the 2009/10 – 2018/19 seasons. They are 
notably the highest performers in the rain-fed areas, achieving mean yields of 74 t/ha and RV of 
12.6% despite receiving some of the lowest average rainfall in the industry. Only about 4% of 
production emanates from submissions on SSG codes. 
• South Coast: Comprising Illovo’s Sezela and Umzimkulu mills, these MSAs accounted for 
approximately 15% of sugar production over the 2000/01 - 2017/8 seasons, and their suppliers 
16% of AUC (approximately 61,000 ha) from the 2009/10 – 2018/19 seasons, but predominately 
from the Sezela. They receive far higher than average rainfall and achieve average yields at 
around 61 t/ha. About 7% of cane production was submitted under SSG production codes, with 
Sezela claiming 9% compared to 5% at Umzimkulu.  
 
6 The Entumeni mill used to be categorized in terms of a ‘Thugela’ MSA, together with Amatikulu. Amatikulu is still sometimes considered 
to be the sole mill in a ‘Thugela’ MSA, but is also sometimes treated as incorporated into Zululand. Here, Amatikulu is placed within the 
Zululand MSA, particularly because of its similar characteristics to the Felixton MSA. 
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Map 1 South African Mill supply areas 
Source: Singels et al. (2018). 
* Added shapes indicate mill owners, ● – Independent/other   - Tongaat-Hulett ▲- Illovo ■ – Tsb. 
**Added ovals indicate predominant sugar companies in each region, namely Illovo in the South Coast and Midlands, Tongaat-Hulett in 








Table 1 Comparison of mean characteristics of different mill supply areas 
  Sugar Rainfall Cane Yield RV% AUC MCP LSG SSG 












ML 200,839 323 1,640,855 91 13.2 19,713 178,011 1,362,647 107,809 
KM 262,463 350 2,143,517 93 13.1 24,489 155,338 1,611,547 330,531 
PG 138,804 425 1,252,924 82 12.4 16,773  1,156,544 57,442 
Sub-total 602,106 362 5,037,295 90 13.0 60,975 333,350 4,130,738 495,783 
Zululand 
AK 147,259 504 1,269,229 45 11.9 37,407 71,209 1,041,987 229,504 
FX 210,565 561 1,869,479 53 11.7 28,035 164,986 881,725 248,627 
UF 124,664 524 1,108,049 67 11.9 17,915  990,305 110,407 
Sub-total 492,667 537 4,329,831 55 11.9 83,357 221,954 2,914,017 588,538 
North 
Coast 
MS 131,677 585 1,194,723 68 11.6 24,486 323,172 457,391 74,570 
DL 122,081 582 1,085,273 46 11.6 22,429 86,547 667,084 75,111 
GH 128,667 649 1,153,983 49 11.6 31,764  1,099,018 58,163 
Sub-total 375,642 601 3,376,860 55 11.6 78,680 409,719 2,223,494 207,844 
Midlands 
UCL 86,982 550 722,837 78 12.5 19,297 27,680 764,411 21,740 
ES 147,809 434 1,223,729 80 12.6 35,661 56,000 1,258,895 51,933 
NB 159,928 533 1,386,931 67 12.6 30,456  1,169,801 65,327 
Sub-total 394,719 501 3,333,497 74 12.6 85,413 83,680 3,193,107 139,000 
South 
Coast 
SZ 230,560 870 1,955,379 61 11.8 36,055 156,342 1,139,521 121,680 
UK 114,709 772 843,260 62 12.5 24,144 105,125 729,827 41,641 
Sub-total 332,523 855 2,798,639 61 12.1 60,199 261,466 1,869,348 163,321 
Total  
2,197,65
8 *605 18,876,123 61 12.3 368,624 1,310,169 14,330,704 1,594,486 
*Weighted average of rain-fed areas only, author’s calculations. 
** Compiled from ‘review of milling season’ statistics, author’s calculations. 
*** Compiled from SASA (2009, 2019), authors calculation. 
**** Compiled from ‘review of agricultural season’ statistics, author’s calculations. 
*****Compiled from SACGA 2019a, author’s calculations. 
Source: SASA (2019, 2009), SACGA (2019a). 
Figure 1 Comparison of mean (2007/08-2017/18) yield, rainfall, estimated area harvested across MSAs 
*Yields & RV compiled from ‘review of agricultural season’. 
**Average yields refer to rainfed average, weighted by proportion of cane supply in SASA (2009, 2019). 
***Rainfall compiled from ‘review of milling season’ statistics and reflects rainfall in immediate vicinity of the mill, and may not reflect 
that over cane areas. 
**** AUC estimated by dividing total cane crushed by mean yield. Does not account for cane diversions. 
Figure 2 Comparison of mean (2007/08-2017/18) sugar production and estimated sugar yield by mill supply area 
*Tons sugar compiled from ‘review of milling season’ statistics. 





























































2.2 Overview of the regulatory structure of the South African sugar industry 
The South African sugar industry is distinctive among many agro-industries for its privately 
administered regulatory structure. This structure has developed in response to the following two key 
factors. 
In the first instance, robust markets for sugarcane are largely limited by its high perishability, the 
insignificant demand for its un-processed form, and by the large centralised factories required for  
economic sugar-processing. Although millers may own sugar estates, sugar processing is not feasible 
for sugarcane growers except in co-operative ownership (such as at USM and UCL), and economic 
supply is depends on proximity. This places millers in a position of effective monoposony, making 
regulatory contestation between growers and millers  over the terms of exchange a central issue in 
the struggle of sugarcane growers to persist as an independent class (BTI 1927; Van Biljon 1070; 
Rorich 1982). 
Secondly, sugar is one of the few agro-food commodities remaining subject to significant levels of 
protection across the world. While international prices were once governed by (frequently flouted) 
International Sugar Agreements (ISAs), sugar production is generally orientated towards protected 
domestic markets. International trade is generally constituted out of ‘surplus’ production and is 
therefore considered a ‘residual’ market where prices are highly volatile, and typically at levels 
below the cost of production (Richardson 2009; Richardson 2015). Unlike many other agricultural 
commodities where opportunities for export at higher (and foreign-exchange denominated) prices 
are often coveted, sugar exports are a major industrial liability barring access to other protected 
markets (ITAC 2009, 2014, 2018). A key purpose of regulation is risk-sharing of export and domestic 
market premiums between miller processors and the sugarcane growers who supply them (Van 
Biljon 1970; Rorich 1982, SIA 2000). 
Maintenance both of protection and the terms of exchange between growers and millers has always 
been closely conditioned by the socio-economic role of sugar production –which has changed 
considerably over the years. These have been driven significantly by supporting large agribusiness; 
particularly English capital in the early years of the industry, but also Afrikaans capital in the 1960s 
with the establishment of Tsb and ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ in the case of the Gledhow mill 
(Richardson 1982; Rorich 1982; Lincoln 1980; Business Report 2005). Following the early decades of 
plantation-focused production, which was based on indentured Indian labour, ‘beneficiating’ sugar 
through differential models of cane production has also been central. Notable political drivers have 
included the consolidation of white settlement of Zululand following the Anglo-Boer War; the 
provision of income opportunities to white war veterans; the creation of income opportunities to 
remittance-reliant small black farmers and traditional authorities in the former Bantustans; the 
consolidation of populated ‘border’ areas in the context of apartheid-era regional armed conflict; 
and the need to encourage market-based land reform with medium-to-large-scale black commercial 
farmers and the success of large Restitution projects (Minaar 1992, Rorich 1982, Van Biljon 1970, BTI 
1927, Vaughan 1992b; Armitage et al 2009, Dubb et al 2017). 
The South African sugar industry’s regulatory framework is constituted by three important 
components. First, statutory self-governance is empowered by the Sugar Act (1978). This empowers 
the second critical component, the  Sugar Industry Agreement (2000) (SIA), which specifies its 
representative structure and the details of its exchange mechanisms. Thirdly, the International Trade 
Administration Commission (ITAC) determines the extent of the Dollar-Based Reference Price 
(DBRP) that governs protection of the domestic market – and which encompasses the member 
countries of member the South African Customs Union (SACU).  
2.2.1 Representative structure 
In  terms of the Sugar Act and SIA (2000), the industry’s statutory powers of self-government reside 
with the South African Sugar Association (SASA). SASA is free from direct government control, and is 
comprised of representatives from the core ‘primary’ (agricultural) and ‘secondary’ (processing) 
sectors: sugarcane farming and sugar millers (SASA 2019; Coniningrath Economists 2013). It does not 
include representatives from other ancillary or up/downstream capitals (e.g. input supply, retail, 
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finance etc.) or labour. Millers are represented by the South African Millers Association (SASMA), 
while sugarcane producers are at present represented by two organizations: the South African 
Canegrowers’ Association (SACGA) and the South African Farmers’ Development Association (SAFDA) 
– the latter representing a recently formed breakaway group  officially recognized since 2018 under 
transitional arrangements in place until 2020 (Izigi zabalimi 2018; DTI 2018). 
SASA’s core bodies include a central Council, an Administrative Board, and an Appeals Tribunal, each 
of which is comprised of equal numbers of delegates from millers and grower structures, under 
rotating chairmanship. Under the present transitional structure, grower delegates are equally shared 
by SACGA and SAFDA representatives, as illustrated in Figure 3, below.  
Figure 3 Composition of transitional structure of SASA Council
Source: SASA (2019). 
 
SASA’s affairs are administered by six main divisions (excluding Finance, IT and HR). These include: 
• Industry Affairs – The support and administration of SASA and its subsidiaries in compliance 
with the Sugar Act and SIA. 
• Sugar Markets and Logistics – Management, administration and tracking of domestic sales 
and demand, including the sale of sugar exported through SASA’s (wholly owned) Durban 
terminal and the STEM Maputo terminal in which it has a shareholder. 
• External Affairs – Strategic, media and policy engagement with external stakeholders. 
• Cane Testing Services and AutoLab – Cane testing and analytical services under contract to 
Mill Group Boards. 
• South African Sugarcane Research Institute (SASRI) – Development and improvement of 
sugarcane varieties, the control and management of diseases, pests and other biosecurity 
risks, as well extension services. 
• Shukela Training Centre (STC) – A wholly owned subsidiary providing accredited training in 
sugarcane production, research, services and management. 
At local level, millers and growers are constituted into Mill Group Boards (MGBs), comprising a 
minimum of two grower and two miller representatives with equal voting rights. These bodies are 
responsible for undertaking production estimates, administering delivery schedules in line with the 
principle of daily rateable delivery, undertaking (or contracting the undertaking) of cane testing, and 
forming a Local Pest Variety Control committee in liaison with SASRI to authorise seedcane varieties 
and administer any necessary quarantines or eradications of infested cane. 
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2.2.2 The Division of Proceeds 
As noted above, a key feature of the sugar industry’s regulatory structure is concerned with 
establishing the terms of exchange between sugarcane growers and millers (2000). 
Here the core mechanism is known as the ‘Division of Proceeds’. This is a mechanism for first pooling 
total industry revenue from domestic and export sales (including molasses but excluding other 
downstream products) and then deducting ‘industry charges’ such as the administration of SASA and 
its services. Net revenues are then divided between miller and grower segments on a pre-
determined proportional basis. Growers’ current proportion of 64.3675% has seen a gradual rise 
from 62.7327% in 2000/01 (SIA 2000; SAGCA 2010, Conningrath Economists 2013).  
As payments must be made throughout the year, demand is constantly monitored by SASA to arrive 
at a regulary updated ‘notional’ price for all brown and refined sugar (in bulk, one tone and 25kg 
packets) and molasses across domestic and export markets. This ‘notional price’ forms the basis of 
ongoing payments. 
Figure 4 The Division of Proceeds principle, SIA (2000) 
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Source: Reproduced from SASA, pers comm. 
Note: Actual figures approximate for illustrative purposes. 
 
The pool of revenue accruing to growers is then divided according to the total production of 
‘Recoverable Value (RV)’, a measure that estimates the content of cane that is economically valuable 
in the production of sugar and molasses, to arrive at an RV price (BFAP 2014, Conningrath 
Economists 2013). Growers are ultimately paid on the basis of ‘Relative Recoverable Value’ (RRV), an 
adjustment intended to counteract seasonal impacts on RV content. Seasonal differences are 
important because RV values seasonally peak in October/September, and trough in April/May, but 
mills require throughput over the course of an entire season. This is done by first taking the 
difference between a grower’s specific RV% and the mean RV% of other growers delivering in the 
same week, and then adding it to the mean RV% achieved by the entire industry for the year. In 
effect, this means that growers’ RV% will reflect the average at their mill area, adjusted by their 
relative performance to other growers delivering in the same week (Wynne et al. 2008). The 
‘relative’ RV system is intimately tied to the system of cane transport and delivery, known as ‘daily 
rateable delivery’ (DRD). In order to not prejudice particular segments growers or sections of 
growers, ticket allocations are distributed for daily mill deliveries proportional to each grower or 
grower segment’s estimated level of production (SIA 2000). 
On the millers’ side, a further mechanism is the inter-mill redistribution of proceeds, designed 
principally to ensure that all millers experience equal exposure to the export market. According to 
this principle, millers are granted quotas in proportion to the industry’s sales in different markets. 
Should a mill, say, sell a higher proportion of its sugar production in the domestic market than the 
13 
 
industry total, the difference in revenues (less a manufacturing charge) is redistributed to mills that 
sold less. In principle, this means that a mill with competitive advantage in supplying the export 
market can do so while still receiving revenues from the domestic market. The costs of export are 
deducted collectively as an ‘industry charge’ (SIA 2000, DTI 2003, Conningrath Economists 2013). 
2.2.3 The Dollar Based Reference Price (DBRP) mechanism 
As noted, tariff protection is a key mechanism for ensuring the economic viability of the industry. 
The domestic tariff is determined by the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) and 
applied as a dollar-based reference price (DBRP) applicable to all countries outside the South African 
Customs Union (SACU), i.e. South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini.  
Unlike tariffs applied at a fixed amount or rate, the DBRP is a variable tariff formula devised 
originally by ITAC’s predecessor, the Board of Tariffs and Trade (BTT). The BTT found that owing to 
the volatile and ‘distorted’ nature of long-term world prices for sugar, protection was necessary and 
needed to accommodate rapid fluctuations, including in the exchange rate. The DBRP is essentially 
intended to establish a threshold price for imported sugar, estimated at the world-price plus a 
‘distortion factor’ and minus the ‘natural protection’ cost of transport (ITAC 2009). In 2008, the 
DBRP formula was amended to include an adjustment by the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
(ITAC 2018).  
The particular rate must remain within the WTO 105% bound-rate, and is established by comparing 
the DBRP to the Sugar No. 5 price  as traded on the London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange. Adjustments to the rate are triggered if the variance in the 20-day moving 
average daily settlement price exceeds $20 for more than 20 consecutive days. Once detected, SASA 
informs ITAC of the trigger. ITAC reviews the request and forwards it first to the Minister of Trade 
and Industry and then onward to the Minister of Finance for further review and ultimately to gazette 
the adjusted duty. From its original level of $330, the DBRP was adjusted upward to $358 in in 2009, 
$566 in 2014 and $680 in 2018 (ITAC 2009, 2014, 2018, SASA pers. comm.).  
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3. Overview of current and recent transformation and assistance programmes  
3.1 South African Sugar Association (SASA) 
The Supplementary Payment Fund (SPF) and rebates 
The most direct form of assistance to Small Scale Growers comes as price support through the 
Supplementary Payment Fund (SPF),  and as VAT and Diesel rebates. The SPF was established in 
2005 at an initial fund of R25m per annum, and is funded by the sugar industry at large (effectively 
at the rate of the DoP) while the rebates are administered by the industry, but amount to a 
government subsidy. These supports are available to any grower submitting under 200 tons of cane 
(which includes upwards of 80% of SSGs), but are progressively staggered; providing the largest 
subsidies to those submitting the smallest amount of cane (Armitage et al 2009, ManStrat 2014). 
From 2008/09 to 2015, the industry spent approximately R186m on the SPF, with an even bigger 
combined sum of R192m and R31m retrieved through the VAT and diesel rebates, respectively 
(Hurly et al. 2015). In 2018, Dlamini et al estimated  that  the SPF and rebates contributed 
approximately R30 for each SSG ton of cane to SSG incomes (Dlamini et al 2018). 
Grower Development Account  
The South African Sugar Association has also put significant funding towards the development and 
administration of SSGs through the Small Grower Development Trust (SGDT) and the (somewhat 
overlapping) Grower Development Account (GDA). The SGDT was launched in 1992 to support the 
training of SSGs and their administrative structures. By 2009 it had supported the training of 20,000 
SSGs, but never achieved self-sufficiency, with SSGs contributing about R2m of its R21.6m initial 
endowment (Bates & Sokhela 2003, SASA 2009, Armitage et al. 2009) The Grower Development 
Account focuses on seedcane initiatives, supply, training, land reform support, extension and 
institutional development of consolidated grower entities. Since 1998-2010 it has disbursed R42m to 
SSG and land reform beneficiaries (ManStrat 2014; Hurly et al 2015).  
The Shukela Training Centre  
The Shukela Training Centre is a SASA subsidiary that advances a number of training programmes 
offered to SSGs, as well as other growers and farm workers. Training of SSGs is generally financed or 
subsidized by and co-ordinated with other bodies or accounts, such as the SGDT, GDA, and grower 
associations (ManStrat 2014, Armitage et al. 2009, SAFDA pers. comm.).  
The South African Sugar Research Institute (SASRI) 
SASRI is the research, seedcane development and extension arm of the sugar industry. It is focused 
on the development and improvement of sugarcane varieties and the management of pests and 
diseases and a range of bio-security issues. SASRI also offers extension services to SSGs, information 
about cane husbandry via fact-sheets and other publications, and training courses (SASA 2019). 
Since 1996, SASRI has operated a Joint Venture with provincial departments of agriculture in 
Kwazulu-Natal and Mpumalanga (Eweg 2009), which in 2014 included four extension officers at 
SASRI and 28 from the departments (ManStrat 2014). 
Umthombo Agricultural Finance (UAF) 
Umthombo Agricultural Finance is the successor of the Financial Aid Fund (FAF), an early rotating 
credit scheme widely hailed as underpinning the original expansion of small-scale production 
sugarcane (SASYB 1974/5; Bates & Sokhela 2003). FAF operated in close coordination with miller 
‘development companies’ and Bantustan development agencies in the prior regulatory regime 
(Rahman 1997, Vaughan 1992a). Credit financing stood largely at around Rm 20 (at 2010 Rands) 
between 1994-1999, but peaked briefly to nearly Rm 120 in 1997. After writing off bad grower debts 
in 2005, UAF focused on administering its savings/retention scheme, a more circumscribed loan-
book with credit advanced by the Department of Agriculture’s MAFISA programme. In the case of 
TSB, UAF administers both retention and production loans of Akwandze Agricultural Finance (AAF) 
(Armitage et al. 2009, Manstrat 2014, Hurly et al 2015). 
UAF’s Retention and Savings Scheme works by deducting a set amount of money from SSG’s gross 
revenue to be utilized for capital in the subsequent season. Use of  the retention scheme is 
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mandatory for those taking credit through UAF, but taking credit is not necessary for accessing the 
retention scheme. In 2014, UAF retained approximately R105/ ton of cane delivered, with growers 
on irrigation schemes further participating in savings for electricity and irrigation infrastructure 
maintenance, potentially extending to 25% of gross income. Interest on savings is in the region of 4.5 
– 5%, akin to a money-market account (Manstrat 2014). 
In 2014, UAF’s loan book included around R30m per annum, loaned to 10 co-operatives (a condition 
of receiving funding) with an average membership of 100 beneficiaries, and R50m on behalf of 
Akwandze, with interest rates equal to that of MAFISA (8%)  (Manstrat 2014). 
Transformation Fund 
In recent representations to Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, SASA has 
indicated that it has made a commitment to spend R1bn above its SPF, UAF, and GDA arms on 
several transformation initiatives and an improvement in its BEE scorecard. The aim is to raise black 
sugarcane cultivation in the industry as a whole to 12.8 mt (51%) by 2028, including a target of 3mt 
(12% of supply) from SSGs (SASA 2018a). Most of the transformation fund’s spending is orientated to 
SSGs. The R142m annual spending is intended to be aimed at: 
1. R60m in price support to SSG farmers (above the SPF). 
2. R35m in price support to other black farmers that do not qualify as small-scale. 
3. R20m to subsidize SSG transportation costs, and for a review of the logistical chain to these 
farmers. 
4. R20m to raise the provision of seedcane for small-scale growers. 
5. R7m to subsidise SSGs’ membership levies from cane grower organizations. 
In 2018, Dlamini et al (2018) estimated that interventions 1, 3, and 5 to amount to a per ton subsidy 
for SSGs of approximately R27.27, R10.24, and R3.59 respectively.  
3.2 Milling Companies 
Extension support & UAF administration 
Millers employ extension officers that typically act in co-ordination with those of SASRI and 
sugarcane grower organizations. Extension staff tend to offer general growing and business/financial 
advice, with more technical issues passed on to SASRI or economic units of grower representative 
organizations (ManStrat 2014). Total numbers of miller extension officers are unknown, although 
Vellema & Chamberlain (2017) indicate Tongaat-Hulett employed 71 extension officers for their SSG 
projects. 
Miller SSG-oriented projects 
Millers have also initiated a number of projects aimed at expanding SSG production, largely through 
variant group schemes that seek to overcome the limitations of SSGs’ economies of scale, and to 
grow the sugarcane supply base. Some examples include: 
• Vuselela (Tongaat-Hulett) – Initiated in 2009/10, the Vuselela programme is essentially a SSG 
land-lease arrangement targeting 3,534 ha, in which SSGs lease their land to co-operatives 
and receive 10% of gross cane proceeds from production undertaken primarily by 
contractors (ManStrat 2014, Vellema & Chamberlain 2017). Additional details are provided 
in Section 5. 
• Simamisa (Tongaat-Hulett) – Initiated in 2012, the Simamisa programme targets 6,591ha of 
consolidated SSG canelands. SSGs lease their land to Tongaat-Hulett via co-operatives in 
return for 10% of gross proceeds, with Simamisa, a contractor company, undertaking all 
production (Vellema & Chamberlain 2017). Additional details are provided in Section 5.  
• Sizanayo projects (Illovo) – Sizanayo is a joint venture between Illovo Sugar and the Sezela 
Cane Growers organization that has sought to rehabilitate 2,000ha of cane and to plant an 
additional 2000 ha, with the aim of increasing cane supply by 180,000 tons, for 
approximately 4,000 SSGs (Illovo 2011). Funding was sourced with a R60m loan from 
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Standard Bank, and SSGs were encouraged to adopt ‘mentors’ receiving RV% benefits 
(ManStrat 2014).7 
• Sokhulu Co-operative (USM) – The Sokhulu cooperative was established in 2006 for 600ha of 
contiguous land for 434 farmers, with funding by the DAEA for infrastructure and initial 
planting. After 140ha was established, funding from the DAEA was frozen in 2007 due to 
departmental administrative problems. Conflict within the co-operative saw membership fall 
to 110. Since then, USM has taken a more direct role in organizing funding and extension 
(Manstrat 2014). 
• Mansomini Irrigation Scheme (Gledhow) – The original Mansomini Irrigation Project was 
initiated in 1984 and supplied the Glendale Mill. It collapsed when the  mill closed but steps 
have recently been taken for its revitalization. Funding from MAFISA (R3.5m) and RADP 
(R2m) was used for the re-establishment of 168ha for 75 co-op members, including a five 
hectare vegetable garden. Members receive incomes in proportion to their land 
commitments. Early yields stood at around 88 t/ha at RV13.5%, with approximately Rm 1 
profit distributed as dividends. The recent industry crisis, has however  resulted in a cost-
price squeeze (ManStrat 2014, Joubert 2012).  
• Akwandze Agricultural Finance and TsGro (TSB) – Akwandze Agricultural Finance (AAF) was 
initially established as a 50:50 partnership between TSB and the Liguguletfu Co-operative 
Ltd, a body representing 889 SSGs in Mpumalanga. Each partner contributed R25m, while a 
further partnership with Khula Enterprise Finance Initiative raised its capitalisation to 
R100m. This fund was put towards loans payable from one to six years for repairs and 
replacement of capital equipment (particularly in irrigation) and replanting. AAF also 
oversees the UAF retention programme in Mpumalanga. TsGro was launched in 2013 to 
perform two broad sets of services. First, it assumes responsibility for the delivery of water 
and the maintenance of bulkwater irrigation infrastructure. Secondly it organizes full 
contracting of production on SSG farms. Although they are nominally separate, TsGro and 
AAF share personnel and TsGro may become the only vehicle for highly indebted SSGs. By 
August 2014, TsGro managed 584.4ha of SSG land, and was intending to increase this to 
1,607ha by the end of the season (James & Woodhouse 2015a, Manstrat 2014). 
3.3 Government 
Extension support 
Provincial Departments of Agriculture in Kwazulu-Natal and Mpumalanga have a complement of 
approximately 28 full-time extension officers focused on servicing SSGs, and operate a Joint Venture 
with SASRI in the support of SSGs and NFGs (Armitage et al. 2009, Eweg 2009, ManStrat 2014).  
DRDLR & DAEA fertilizer subsides 
Hurly et al. (2015) estimate government expended R117.4m on two fertilizer schemes from 2008-
2015. It is not clear if this figure includes the R71m in fertilizer disbursed by SAFDA. 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) 
The CASP programme is generally aimed at providing one-off grants for infrastructure, training, and 
management to previously disadvantaged individuals, largely in the communal areas and land-
reform projects. In 2013/14, CASP claimed 8,000 projects nationally with more than 400,000 
beneficiaries with R1.6bn in expenditure. ManStrat (2014) estimate around R35m was allocated to 
SSG projects in Kwazulu-Natal, representing between 20-30% of the provincial CASP budget. Hurly et 
al. (2015) cite instead that approximately R600,000 was expended between 2008 – 2015. 
MAFISA (Micro Agriculture Finance Scheme of South Africa) 
 
7 The Sizanayo project was initiated after several other rehabilitation projects in the Sezela area, largely premised on external funding, high 
rates of UAF retention (30%), and particular efforts to build SSG and contractor organization had witnessed higher than average yields and 
lower than average costs being incurred, which amounted to about R174/ton (Armitage et al. 2009). These included the 2005 DAEA-
funded Ifafa Mission Project in 2005 (of 300 ha), which recorded per ton costs of R113/ton; the 70%/30% DAEA/SSG-own-funded Khula 
Project (220 ha) realizing R151.50/ton and the Gjima Project, 68% funded by the EU which realized R150/ton (Landman et al 2009, Gillham 




DAFF’s MAFISA programme is the core source of funding for UAF credit. MAFISA extends loans for 
the purchase of production inputs and small equipment for previously disadvantaged individuals and 
groups with incomes of less than R20,000 per month. Typically, loans are under R25,000 and do not 
require collateral, but higher ones do, up to a maximum of R500,000. Applicants must demonstrate a 
capacity to amortize the loan at 8% interest, with a repayment period tied to the cycle of the 
enterprise (ManStrat 2014). According to Hurly et al. (2015) approximately R50m of MAFISA loan 
funding had been extended by 2015. 
In sugarcane, the repayment period is typically the lifetime of the sugarcane plant over its ratoon 
cycle (±8 years). Ability to repay is demonstrated through business plans largely drawn-up by SACGA 
economists, contingent for SSGs on co-operatization or other group schemes to achieve scale. 
Umthombo is the typical vehicle for credit (ManStrat 2014).   
Small Enterprise Finance Agency (SEFA) 
SEFA was established in 2012 with the merger of the South African Micro Apex Fund, Khula 
Enterprise Finance Ltd and the small business activities of the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC). Its Land Reform Empowerment Facility (LREF) provides funds for on-lending to commercial and 
other agricultural lenders for BEE and SMME. It is capitalized by the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform and supported by the European Union. AAF is an existing lender of 
SEFA. 
SEFA’s LREF provides a maximum R15m mortgage facility for the purchase of land, contingent on an 
equity-share scheme, to be repaid within 12 years. Production loans for agricultural input purchases 
are available at a maximum of R500,000 per production cycle, and may require an own-contributions 
of 10%. Loans for the purchase of working capital/machinery are also available at around ≤ R800 
000, per farmer, to be repaid within five years (Manstrat 2014). 
3.4 South African Cane Growers Association (SACGA) 
As a general organization representing all sugarcane growers, SACGA provides a wide range of  
economic, research and administrative services in the interests of sugarcane growers as a whole, 
including at local mill level, and from which SSGs also benefit.  
Services that are directed specifically to SSGs include: 
• Managing the training, Grower Development Account, and external funds allocated to SSGs.  
• Calculating the SARS approved VAT Flat-rate for SSGs. 
• Administering SSG cost surveys and monitoring and evaluating various SSG projects.  
• A funeral benefit scheme for SSGs affiliated to SA Canegrowers whereby members aged 
between 18-65 are provided R10,000 funeral cover on their life. 
• Providing support and economic analytical services to SACGA affiliated Mill Cane 
Committees.  
Among the economic services provided by SACGA in recent years, particular emphasis was placed on 
programmes to advance c-o-operatization of SSGs to help achieve economies of scale and credit 
assistance.From 2007-2011 this included a co-operatization pilot programme, the Phakamisa project 
(a partnership between Canegrowers, SASA, the National Development Agency and Productivity SA) 
and the Canegrowers Co-operative Program which provided a range of leadership, training and 
agronomic support services (Manstrat 2014, Armitage et al 2009, SACGA pers. comm.). 
3.5 South African Farmers Development Association (SAFDA) 
SAFDA is a recently formed sugarcane grower organization that has sought to put particular 
emphasis on advancing programmes and policies benefitting SSGs and Land Reform growers. It 
formed as an organization in 2015, and was inducted within SASA as an official grower 




• Ratoon management and cane expansion: SAFDA acquired R71m from the DRDLR for the 
bulk-buying of fertilizer for distribution to black growers. It subsequently acquired a further 
R133m in KZN and R18m in MP for ratoon management, and aims to garner more funds for 
cane expansion.  
• Training and capacity development: SAFDA invested R8.7m in agronomic and management 
training through the Shukela Training Centre. 
• Value-chain ownership: With a R28m loan from Coca-Cola, SAFDA has acquired a 75% stake 
in a fertilizer company (R14m), and around 30 haulage trucks (R14m). SAFDA’s ambition is to 
run these operations at cost, and thereby provide highly competitive input and transport 
services for SSGs and other black growers.  
• SAFDA Farm Management Services: This entity recently-launched entity seeks to offer 
complete co-ordination and production services depending on the requirements of the 
grower involved, but particularly for those unable to farm owing to age or other barriers.  
3.6 Land Reform 
In 1996, Tongaat-Hulett and Illovo initiated land transfers on their own (MCP) estates with 152 NFGs 
holding 12,525ha by 1999 (SASA 2010, SACGA 2008). Up to 2007, transfers by millers (seemingly 
inclusive of restitution) accounted for 14,829ha, with further transfers of 12,498ha from white LSGs 
bringing the total amount of land  transferred to 40,969ha (SACGA 2008). By 2018/19 land 
transferred through the redistribution programme had risen to 29,896ha and 46,896 under 
restitution – a cumulative 76,792ha (SACGA 2019). Based on the total industry estimate of the area 
under cane in 1994/5 (392,476ha (SASA 2009)), less the estimated area under small-scale production 
(73,019ha (Bates and Sokhela 2003)), this brings the total amount of land transferred to 
approximately 24% of the area under cane in 1994/5. 
3.6.1 Land Redistribution 
The South African sugar industry has long been celebrated for its early and pro-active approach to 
land redistribution. 
This was followed by the establishment of the Inkezo Land Company in 2004, an entity intended to 
streamline willing-buyer-willing-seller deals by identifying beneficiaries and sellers and partners for 
post-settlement services and support. Inkezo’s core financing services included assembling grants 
from LRAD and international donors, seeking subsidized interest rates, underwriting exchange rate 
volatility on foreign loans, and seeking the waiving or reducing of costs of subdivision and survey 
(Mona 2004, Armitage et al. 2009). Inkezo ultimately dissolved as government policy shifted towards 
the PLAS and Restitution programme. 
By 2013/14, when SASA (2014) reported a total of 28,643ha had been transferred, the industry 
claimed 367 NFG growers. Notably, the bulk of land reform growers supplied Tongaat-Hulett mills 
(41.7%) – much higher than Illovo (27.8%), TSB (15.8%) and independent mills (14.7%). Up to 
2018/19 SACGA (2019) reported 29,896ha had been transferred, but that NFGs’ numbers had fallen 
to 310. 
Table 2 Total Number of Land Reform Growers by mill supply area 2013/14 
 2013/14 Total 
Mill Region Indian Coloured African N % 
Komati   
 
28 28 7.6% 
Malelane   
 
24 24 6.5% 
Pongola   
 
6 6 1.6% 
Umfolozi   
 
16 16 4.4% 
Felixton 3 
 
25 28 7.6% 
Amatikulu 5 1 30 36 9.8% 
Darnall 26 
 
34 60 16.3% 
Gledhow 17 
 
20 37 10.1% 
Maidstone 17 1 11 29 7.9% 
Eston   
 
16 16 4.4% 
UCL   
 
1 1 0.3% 
Noodsberg 3 
 
9 12 3.3% 
Sezela 5 
 
47 52 14.2% 
Umzimkulu 1 1 20 22 6.0% 
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Total 77 3 287 367 100% 
*Reproduced from Ntshangase (2016). 
Publicly released data on redistribution from the DRDLR are difficult to square with SASA and 
SACGA’s figures in their annual reports. In one dataset, of R1,773.53m  spent between 2009-2017 on 
redistribution in KwaZulu-Natal, R195.97m  (11%) was reported as attributable to 19 sugarcane 
projects. Of this, R63.84m was spent on 7 projects with state entities listed as the registered owner. 
In a second dataset focused on PLAS transfers, some R516.39m was reported as spent on land and 
capital between 2006-2016 on 85 farms where sugarcane farming was listed as a principal activity by 
the previous owner, together covering 18,711ha. Of these, farms totalling 1,712ha were reported as 
no longer under sugarcane after transfer. Again, it is notable that the bulk of recorded land transfers 
have occurred in districts particularly close to Tongaat-Hulett mills.  
Table 3 Expenditure and transfers on the PLAS programme in KwaZulu-Natal on farms previously producing sugarcane, 
2007-2016 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Total 
Farms 4 25 23 2 4 10 4 2 6 4 1 85 100% 
% 5% 29% 27% 2% 5% 12% 5% 2% 7% 5% 1%  100% 
Rm spent 25.93 161.83 148.75 15.04 13.84 61.55 23.39 23.53 7.14 21.02 14.38 516.39 100% 
% 5% 31% 29% 3% 3% 12% 5% 5% 1% 4% 3%  100% 
Ha 985 6,230 5,201 248 633 2,541 545 465 602 949 312 18,711 100% 
% 5% 33% 28% 1% 3% 14% 3% 2% 3% 5% 2%  100% 




Farms  1   2 4   1  1 9 11% 
Rm spent  6.42   6.61 13.01   2.86  14.38 43.28 8% 
Ha  323   162 575   125  312 1,496 8% 




Farms  1   1       2 2% 
Rm spent  13.30   4.03       17.33 3% 
Ha  485   344       829 4% 




Farms  1   1  1 1    4 5% 
Rm spent  22.64   3.20  4.50 5.95    36.28 7% 
Ha  1,797   127  83 203    2,210 12% 





Farms      3   5 2  10 12% 
Rm spent      13.58   4.28 6.87  24.74 5% 
Ha      858   477 505  1,840 10% 




Farms 2 16          18 21% 
Rm spent 12.01 81.71          93.71 18% 
Ha 352 1,226          1,579 8% 




Farms 2 5 23 2  3 3 1  2  41 48% 
Rm spent 13.92 25.53 148.75 15.04  34.96 18.89 17.58  14.15  288.82 56% 
Ha 633 1,717 5,201 248  1,109 462 261  444  10,074 54% 
R/Ha 22,007 14,872 28,601 60,680  31,531 40,855 67,316  31,869  28,670 153% 
Zululand  
(Zululand) 
Farms  1          1 1% 
Rm spent  12.23          12.23 2% 
Ha  682          682 4% 
R/Ha  17,932          17,932 96% 
Source: Compiled from PMG (2017b). 
Despite the policy shift towards them, NFGs have struggled in comparison with their large-scale 
counterparts. Figure 5 illustrates the results of a SACGA cost survey among 240 SSGs, 51 NFGs and 
84 LSGs undertaken in 2006/7 and reported in Armitage et al. (2009). The most noticeable overall 
difference between the three groups are in yield of RV/ha:  SSGs yielded 4.4 tons, NFGs 5.1 tons, and 
LSGs 6.2 tons, accounting for the differences in total revenue per hectare. Absolute investments in 
working capital and contractor services were very similar, at around R5,200, although LSGs provided 
more of their own transportation and hauling than NFGs, and SSGs relied exclusively on contractors. 
A broad overview of value-added, including labour, profit, finance and administrative charges, shows 
LSGs generating 49% as compared to 35% for NFGs and 12% for SSGs. Payments to farm labour were 
higher on LSG farms and relatively even on SSG and NFG farms. Most evident, however, is that 
interest charges accounted for 51% of value added on NFG farms as opposed to 16% on LSGs and 
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less than 1% on SSGs. Assuming the survey’s respective average sizes of 3.9ha, 115ha and 220.5ha, 
net returns for SSG, NFG, and LSG segments would be R1,431; R20,355 and R209,696. 
Figure 5 Results of SACGA 2006/7 farm cost survey among SSG, NFG, and LSGs 
 
Source: Armitage et al. (2009). 
 
As a result of the difficulties faced by NFGs, SASA responded in 2010 to the public tender process for 
funding through the Recapitalization and Development Programme (RADP). Millers were accredited 
as ‘mentors’ in tripartite agreements between individual NFGs, the DRDLR and millers, with funds 
channelled through joint bank accounts. Training was conducted through the Shukela Training 
Centre, extension support was provided by SASRI, and business plans were drafted by SACGA. By 
2015, 177 growers at the Illovo, Tongaat-Hulett, Tsb, USM and Gledhow mills had received a total of 
R326.51m in funding, with R76.14m  being spent on infrastructure and equipment, R49.32m on 
ratoon management on some 6,688ha, and R110.26m  spent on establishing new cane plantings on 
2,792ha. R40.78m had yet to be spent, while Tsb spent R90,673 over-budget. SASA claimed that 
878,874 tons of cane had been delivered by 2015 (SASA 2015). The breakdown by mill area is 
provided in Figure 6, showing that Tongaat-Hulett claimed the most funding, largely for ratoon 
management in contrast with Illovo’s preference on new cane establishments. Gledhow and 
Umfolozi likely received greater funding per mill insofar as each represent a single mill.8 
Figure 6 breakdown of cumulative expenditure through RADP to 2015 by receiving company 
 
Notably, production on NFG farms had been showing signs of decline, with area under cane falling 
from a peak of 55,965ha - 51,388ha between the 2009/10 -2011/12 season and cane production 
similarly falling from a high of 2,483,912 tons of cane in 2009/10 to 2,072,114 the following season. 
 
8 Hurly et al (2015) indicate that approximately R78.8 million of RADP funding was expended on SSGs. It is not clear how this was 
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RADP funding appears to have been important to mitigating decline in the short-term, with 
production rising to 2,402,307 tons from 56,901ha in the 2012/13 season alone. However, long term 
impacts are unclear. Overall, NFG production has declined from approximately 15%-9% of all 
production, and in absolute terms to 1,745,206 tons from 310 growers in 2018/19.  
3.6.2 Land Restitution 
Land Restitution has been of considerable concern for sections of the industry, especially millers 
(who worry about maintenance of cane throughput) and LSGs (who are  concerned about their 
properties and the risks to investment.9  
The progress of the restitution process is in cane growing areas is not altogether clear, in part owing 
to contradictory time frames provided in public sources, unclarity whether claims encompass 
sugarcane and non-sugarcane land, the impact of dropped claims, and changes in area under cane in 
general. SACGA (2010) reported 52% of cane land was under claim, with less than 9.2% of claims 
having been resolved. By 2013/14, approximately 41,983ha had transferred, with about 130,400ha 
of gazetted claims unsetlled; in other words 38% of total land under cane, and 44% of land farmed 
by LSGs (BFAP 2014, SASA 2014).10 The DRDLR reported then that 29,000ha held by ‘willing sellers’ 
awaited final payments, 24,000ha were in final negotiation stages, and only 13% of outstanding 
claims were contested (albeit not accounting for the difference) (Business Day 2013). 
By 2015, SASA had entered into an MoU with the Regional Land Claims Commission to confirm 
“processes for the sustainable transfer of land; and Joint Annual Plans”, and were shortly followed 
by the transfer of 6,364ha in 2015, reducing total area under unresolved claims to 124,000ha 
(SACGA 2017). SACGA (2019) reported that 46,896ha had been restituted to date – a 1,451ha 
difference.11 
Again, publicly available data on Restitution is difficult to square with the industry’s reported 
transfers. According to the DRDLR and CRLR, between 2009-2017 approximately R598.59m was 
spent on restitution claims in Kwazulu-Natal on farms totalling 33,846ha where sugarcane 
production was listed as a key activity after transfer. However R400m (66.8%) of this budget was 
spent on one claim from Ushukela milling to Royal Shaka Estates (both owned by the Sokhela family) 
for an area of 1,567ha (4.6%), and 39% of listed land was owing to a different scheme orientated to 
game farming. The listed unevenness is further complicated by the apparent lack of correspondence 
with details published about respective cases in Lands Claim Court (LCC) documents, newspaper 
reports, and municipal land valuations, including cases not listed.12 Brief summaries of available 









9 BFAP (2015) reported Eston LSGs initially reduced investments in soil health and ratoon maintenance until realizing this impaired their 
lands’ valuation. In coastal areas some reportedly ceased re-planting, preferring to manage existing ratoons. Some nonetheless re-initiated 
planting but struggled under the combination of low RV prices (2001-2005) high input costs (2005-2008) and low rainfall. 
10 It is not clear to what degree the dropping of claim on Charl Senekal for 20,000ha in Pongola impacted these figures (Fin24 2010). 
11 It is not clear if the difference relates to findings against the claims of the Elambini community on North Coast farms totalling 
approximately 1,380ha, which included lands held by Crookes Brothers in Scottsborough (LCC 2018b, Richard 2018). 
12 For instance, the divisive and recently violent Mathulini Claim in Ugu district was not mentioned. Lands awarded in 2012 of around 





Table 4 Sugarcane-related restitution projects, KwaZulu-Natal, 2009-2017 
  District # farms Registered beneficiary R R% Reported ha Reported ha% 
Restitution  1,419,647,388 100% 404,666 100% 
 Sugarcane  598,591,051 42.2% 33,846 8.4% 
  Illembe (North Coast) 487,233,158 34.3% 12,904 3.2% 
   2 Kwacele Nhlangwini Communal Property Trust
13 59,831,158 4.2% 9,287 2.3% 
   1 Makhosikhosi Communal Property Trust
14 22,651,000 1.6% 2,042 0.5% 
   2 Nodunga Communal Property Association
15 1,376,000 0.1% 7 0.0% 
   1 Not registered yet 375,000 0.0%  0.0% 
   1 Qwabe Nkanini Communal Property Association 3,000,000 0.2%  0.0% 
   1 Royal Shaka Estates Pty LTD
16 400,000,000 28.2% 1,567 0.4% 
  Ugu (South Coast) 41,675,320 2.9% 1,289 0.3% 
   1 Insika Yamabombo Communal Property Trust
17 11,797,750 0.8% 539 0.1% 
   1 Ndwalane Communal Property Trust
18 29,877,570 2.1% 750 0.2% 
  Umgundlovu (Midlands/South Coast) 50,170,473 3.5% 6,433 1.6% 
   1 Azibuye Emasisweni Maqamu Trust
19 17,000,000 1.2% 48 0.0% 
   1 Emagcekeni Communal Property Trust 13,241,473 0.9% 868 0.2% 
   2 Embo Emfeni Community Trust
20 13,000,000 0.9% 3,233 0.8% 
   2 Embo Table Mountain Property Trust
21 5,300,000 0.4% 1,880 0.5% 
   1 Embo Thimuni Community Trust
22 1,600,000 0.1% 403 0.1% 
   1 State Land - Court Order 29,000 0.0%  0.0% 
  Zululand (Pongola) 19,512,100 1.4% 13,221 3.3% 
   2 Nkunzana Communal Property Trust
23 19,512,100 1.4% 13,221 3.3% 
 
13 The KZN DARD MEC Themba Mthembu is quoted as saying “the KwaCele Land Claim was settled in three phases between May 2008 and 
October 2010. The extent of the land restored to the Claimant community is 7,200 hectares most of which is under cane.  The  State  paid  
R118  million  purchasing  land  on  behalf  of  the Claimants.” (KZN Department of Agriculture & Rural Development 2016). The difference 
with recorded figures is not clear. At least part of the claim concerned 1,600ha of sugarcane lands held by Crookes Brothers Ltd, which 
acted as a 49% minority shareholder in joint-venture with a claimant community of around 800 households.  The JV expanded to 1.950ha 
in 2011 on lease from the community and supplied the Gledhow sugar mill (Crookes Brothers 2011). Crookes Brothers ultimately disposed 
of their interest in KwaCele Farming in 2014 at a net disposal loss of R2 million (Crookes Brothers 2014). By 2016 the trust had around 
2000ha under cane (North Coast Courer 2016). 
14 The Makhosikhosi trust was reported as having claimed and received 3,460ha before lodging a further claim of some 12,000ha. A 
gazetted claim in 2015 for approximately 9,200ha was ultimately denied in 2018 upon the appeal of the Maidstone Proactive Planters 
Association with 797ha under claim and Tongaat-Hullet with 315ha under claim and gazetted in 2015 (LCC 2018a). Tongaat-Hullet was 
already involved in joint venture with the Makhosikhosi Trust in establishing 370ha under claim. 
15 The Nondunga Communal Property Association, representing 372 households and approximately 2,256 beneficiaries successfully 
claimed approximately 2,897ha in 2012, according to Vuk'uzenzele while the Deputy Minister indicated that 685.5ha was purchased at a 
cost of R7.4m (Mkhize 2015, Mashego-Dlamini 2015). In 2015, the community entered a 10-year lease with Mondi for a rental fee of 
R507,000. The community also received R17.8m in RADP funding. However, in 2017 the community entered into a lease agreement with 
Tongaat-Hulett for 378ha under cane (Mkhize 2015, Mduli 2017). 
16 In addition to being one of the most costly claims, it has also been highly contentious and complex. A claim by the Zwelabantu Dube 
Community Property Association (ZDCPA), representing approximately 1,704 ‘families’ (LCC 2013), was gazetted in 2006. Part of the claim 
involved the New Guelderland Sugar Estate, a 1,000ha sugar cane estate and conservancy owned by the former chairman of the South 
African Sugar Association, Rodger Stewart. 134ha was initially sold to BCR for the coastal development for R194m and a 20% shareholding. 
100ha was leased back by Stewart, but ultimately cancelled following a violent encounter (City Press 2012, Dardagan 2012). Ultimately, 
dissatisfaction with the progress of development and benefits saw the deal cancelled, with the CRLR issuing R332m to purchase the 
balance of BCR's 80% shareholding in the property (Courier 2014, Mercury 2014). A second portion of the claim involved the Addington 
Farm, then held by the Sokhela family with their purchase of the Gledhow Sugar Mill (Ushukela milling) from Illovo in 2004 (Business 
Report 2005) with controversial loans from the Land Bank of around R6m-R700m that had yet to be amoritized. The terms of Ushukela's 
settlement with ZDCPA saw R400m transferred by the state to the land bank in return for ZDCPA gain 20% equity in the farm and sugar 
mill, with 80% of the farm held by Royal Shaka Estates, owned by Sokhela. Effectively, this allowed the Sokhela family to leverage the claim 
for amortization of the original purchase (Dardagan 2009). As part of the settlement, ZDCPA would also see preferential selection for 
milling employment, all proceeds from sugarcane sales plus R10 per ton, and an annual 'lease' fee of R1m (LCC 2013). 
17 According to a provincial MEC speech, in 2013, the Insika Yamabombo Community, representing approximately 150 households 
successfully claimed 545ha at a cost of R14m and entered into a joint venture with Illovo sugar (Xaba 2015). Valuations have since 
differed, with Ray Nkonyeni Municipaity valuing community lands of 969ha at R12.57m and Umuziwabantu municipality valuing 1,237ha 
at R1.93m (Umuziwabantu Municipality 2017, Ray Nkonyeni Municipaity 2017). 
18 Ray Nkonyeni Municipality differentially estimated community land at 906ha at a value of R10.93m in 2017 while Hibiscus Coast 
municipality valued it at R4.16m in 2015 (Ray Nkonyeni Municipality 2015, Hibiscus Coast Municipality 2015). 
19 Mkhambathini Local Municipality (2014) valuation roll placed community lands at 1,117ha at a value of R21.19m. Claimants remain 
highly divided (Pieterse 2018, Sithole 2011).  
20 A Lightstone (2016) commercial property report indicated the value of land transactions involving the community stood at R47.6m. A 
Genix (2018) valuation report indicated the trust holding 4,080ha valued at R111.35m 
21 Msunduzi Local Municipality (2018) listed properties held by this community to stand at 23ha, valued at Rm 1.3m 
22 Genix (2018) Lists this trust as holding 886ha at R7.74m. 
23 The LCC (2011) observes that 12,726ha valued at R182.46m was awarded to the trust, representing 472 households. The claim was 
complicated when the Usuthu Tribal Authority attempted to lay a subsequent claim which was rejected. The claim was further 
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Source: PMG (2017a) 
Government data on restitution in Mpumalanga is even more incomplete, neither specifying the 
beneficiary, less often specifying crops being produced on the land under claim, and with 
discrepancies between different databases  about funds spent on specific areas. Within the Nkomazi 
area, from 2009-2017 approximately R400m  was spent on land where ‘Sugarcane & Orchards’ were 
specified as being produced by beneficiaries, and a further R427m  was spent on lands where 
beneficiaries indicated expenditure on ‘Agriculture and Citrus’.  
Woodhouse and James (2015) observed that up to 2010, 61,202ha in the Nkomazi area  had been 
transferred to seven main trusts on behalf of 18,136 beneficiaries at a cost of R2.8bn. All were 
involved in sugarcane production, although not all land was under cane. 
While the differential may considered owing to the differences in the time frame, details of 
particular schemes also vary. In a separate data set, two CPAs involved in sugarcane-related 
restitution schemes, the Siphumelele Tenbosch Trust (STT) and the Ingwenyama Simhulu Trust (IST), 
each received total lands of 10,811ha and 5,505ha  respectively. According to Woodhouse & James 
(2015) up to 2010, STT had received 5,074ha at R270m (and encompassing 6,170 beneficiaries) while 
IST had received 8,038ha at R351m (including 5,000 beneficiaries). However, Nkomazi Municipality 
(2018) identified the STT as holding 9,949ha valued at R300.9m, and the IST as holding 2,850ha at 
R131.24m. 
Table 5 Sugarcane-related restitution projects, Mpumalanga, 2009-2017 
   R % 
Restitution           827,831.876 100% 
 Sugarcane & Orchards 3               400,581,136  13% 
  Ehlanzeni (Nkomazi) 3 Unknown              400,581,136  13% 
 Agriculture and Citrus 3  427,250,740 14% 
    Ehlanzeni (Nkomazi) 3  Unknown 427,250,740 14% 
Source: PMG (2017a) 
News sources suggest that TSB was paid R285m for the combined 8,000ha Komatidraai and 
Tenbosch sugar cane farms, subsequently managed as a joint venture (Business Report 2007). The 
particular difference between original farms transferred, and area under cane, however, is difficult 
to specify. According to Woodhouse and James (2015), in 2014 TSB estimated that restituted land 
accounted for 21,605ha of 51,054ha of canelands supplying its two mills in Malelane and Komati. 




complicated when another group attempted to subsequently join the group, and reportedly involved in threats and sabotage (Oellermann 
2015). While it appears game farming is the main concern of the group, it was also purportedly involved in a fresh vegetable marketing 
scheme assisted with RADP funding (Phillips 2014). 
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4. General pressures and controversies facing the sugar industry 
This section provides an overview of the primary drivers of the current crisis. Although not definitive, 
there is little doubt that the scope is substantial and severe. In the context of looming job losses, 
erstwhile stalled debates about ‘diversification’ of cane into ‘non-sugar’ products such as ethanol are 
being reopened (Kawdwa 2019, Mandela 2019, Mboyisa 2019). Discussions about of ‘job 
preservation’ are coming to the fore even as losses in cane production are already becoming evident 
(Nicholson 2019). At the time of writing, the industry is reportedly in ongoing negotiations with the 
DTI and DRDLR about the development of a co-ordinated ‘Master Plan’ for the industry, details of 
which are not yet available (SASA pers. comm.).   
In this paper I argue that, even in the midst of this crisis, there is substantial scope – arguably 
unparalleled among agricultural commodities – to competitively incentivise the sustainable 
preservation and expansion of SSG production and sugarcane-related land reform projects. This 
matters because SSGs represent the most significant channel for ‘pro-poor’ beneficiation in the 
sugar industry, but in spite of this earlier crisis-motivated reforms came at their expense. 
4.1 The size and share of the domestic (SACU) sugar market 
The deepest challenges facing the South African sugar industry concern the size of the tariff-
protected domestic market relative to the scale of production. 
In a general sense, this challenge is not new. Industrial crises borne of the need to export large 
quantities of sugar have given rise to struggles over rationalization’ since at least the 1980s: the 
adoption of the SIA (2000) was an outcome of the most recent set of reforms (Van Biljon 1970, 
Rorich 1982).  
Indeed, since the SIA (2000), South African sugar has tended to stay within the boundaries of the 
SACU market. Firstly, overall sugar production  declined and secondly there was substantial growth 
in sales to industrial consumers. As illustrated in Figure 7, while   total SACU sugar consumption 
2001/02 stood at near 1.4mt compared to production in that year of around 2.6mt, South African 
sales to SACU by 2011 accounted for around 1.7mt of around 1.9mt produced. Over the course of 
this period, rising commodity prices had largely rendered the DBRP moot, and South African milling 
companies were concentrating investments into regional expansion, largely by acquisition, where 
they enjoyed irrigated cane production, low wage costs, and opportunities for preferential access to 
a protected EU market (Dubb et al 2017). 
However, since 2011, the industry has faced near-constant crisis by the encroachment upon and 
diminishment of the SACU market, and the consequent displacement of domestically produced 
sugar into a low-priced world market. Overall, consumption in the SACU market has dropped from 
approximately 2.3mt to 1.7mt between 2013/14 and 2018/19. Sales from South African producers 
fell from approximately 1.7mt to 1.2mt between 2011/12 and 2018/19, with sugar displaced onto 
international export markets consequently rising from approximately 0.2mt to 1.2 mt between 




Figure 7 Comparison of South African sugar sales into SACU market, imports into South Africa, and exports from South 
Africa, 2001/02 – 2018/19 
 
*South African domestic and industrial sales compiled from SASA (2019, 2009). 
**Swazi sales into SACU from 2005/6 – 2016/17 are sourced from Wellington (2018). For the year 2017/18, the 2016/17 volumes were 
adjusted downward by 13.5% as suggested by the ESA (2018). Sales in 2018/19 were estimated by raising figures provided by TradeMap 
for Swazi exports to South Africa by the Wellington (2018) estimate of domestic Swazi sugar consumption of 54,000 tons. 
***Imports and exports refer to tonnages at Harmonized Standard (HS) category 17.01 “Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure sucrose, 
in solid form”. 
4.1.1 Sugar Imports 
The incursion of sugar imports into the SACU market has been a central crisis-point. Combined, 
sugar imports accounted for a conservative estimate of 0.5mt of SACU demand (about 30% 
overall).24 Two broad sets of imports are critical, those from eSwatini, which as a SACU member 
enjoys unfettered trade within the trade bloc, and imports from other countries (mainly Brazil and 
re-exports from UAE) subject to the DBRP. 
In regards to the latter, from the mid-2000s, imports appear to have been driven foremost by the 
effective diminishment of the DBRP. Despite the gradual weakening of the Rand, international 
imports climbed gradually from below 10 – 20,000 tons per month from 2005 to 2009 as world and 
South African prices fluctuated closely around the DBRP. The climb of world prices above the DBRP 
thereafter was attended by some diminishment of non-Swazi imports, as well as the rise of South 
African prices to just below world levels.  
However, as world prices peaked in 2011, South Africa appears to have been an increasingly 
attractive haven for non-Swazi imports. Both world and South African prices remained well above 
the DBRP, but as world prices fell faster than South African prices, non-Swazi-imports climbed – up 
to 80,000 tons per month in 2014.  
The raising of the DBRP thereafter appears to have been an important and effective deterrent to 
non-Swazi imports until 2017, when imports in excess of 80,000 tons per month poured into the 
domestic market. Allegedly owing to an ‘administrative error’ (De Wet 2018), in 2017 imports 
received a 0% duty for seven weeks, despite world prices standing below the DBRP, and, for five 
months until September, received a lower duty than prescribed by the DBRP. The result was 
particularly severe for the industry given post-2016 drought production recoveries, displacing 
particularly large volumes of sugar. From 2015/16 to 2016/17, exports increased from approximately 
210mt to 748mt.  
 
24 Comprehensive data on sugar imports is difficult to compile. Sales into SACU by South African producers are provided by SASA, but sales 
from Swaziland compiled from GAIN and eSwatini Sugar Association (ESA) documents are not complete. Import data from non-SACU 
countries was sourced from TradeMap, but inconsistently includes Swazi imports and does not include volumes sold within Swaziland. For 
this reason, other sales from Southern Africa into SACU, particularly Zimbabwe into Botswana, are not clear and excluded as unreliable.  
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Figure 8 Comparison of monthly Swazi and non-Swazi imports with the DBRP and London No.5 sugar prices 
*Swazi and non-Swazi imports refer to the South African market only, as indicated by TradeMap 
**London No. 5 price obtained from Investing.com  
*** Notional price estimated by dividing SASA (2019) reported RV price by 64% (approximate sugarcane grower’s share of the DoP) 
*** DBRP figures obtained from ITAC (2009, 2014, 2018) 
****EU sugar price obtained from European Commission (2018) 
 
More chronically critical than (even severe) spates of imports from the wider world, however, 
imports from eSwatini have been a mounting pressure point that is likely to intensify. From the early 
2000s, imports of sugar from eSwatini were capped at an agreed quota of approximately 260,000 
tons (IUF 2002), but by 2015/16 had reached 400,000 tons, before diminishing under the joint 
pressure of non-SACU imports (ESA 2018). However, Swazi imports are at high risk of supplanting 
non-SACU import volumes as a point of sustained pressure on the South African industry (Wellington 
2018). 
The growth in Swazi imports has many dimensions, but two related factors are of particular 
importance: the shifting regulation of the EU sugar market and the investment of South Africa’s 
major sugar companies in the region. Briefly, in the post-apartheid period, recently ‘unbundled’ 
South African sugar capitals leveraged investor confidence, cash windfalls from the 2002 exchange 
rate volatility, and government funded-BEE deals to invest in regional sugar milling interests, largely 
by acquisition. Regional investments were attractive not only due to highly favourable production 
conditions (with companies enjoying far lower wages and securing access to large, mainly irrigated 
cane-supplies through a variety of production models in negotiation with governments eager to 
attract foreign investment), but also enjoyed the prospects of garnering preferential access to the 
protected EU market under the ‘Everything-But Arms’ (EBA) initiative for ‘Least Developed 
Countries’ (LDCs). In this manner, South Africa’s major sugar companies were able to diminish the 
problem their exposure to the South African ‘overproduction’ and costs of ‘rationalization’ 
(Richardson 2010, Dubb et al 2017). 
Wider regional investments included securing interests in all of Swaziland’s major sugar companies, 
with Illovo acquiring Ubombo Sugar, Tsb securing a 29.1% interest in the Royal Swaziland Sugar 
Corporation, and Tongaat-Hulett retaining ownership of some 3,767ha of irrigated cane land. The 
investments and market opportunities presaged a significant expansion in Swazi sugar production 
overall, including rising SACU sales. However, ongoing liberalization of the EU sugar regime has 
witnessed the collapse of European sugar prices to world levels, and eliminated guaranteed quotas 
for LDCs like Swaziland. African sugar companies increasingly seek to supply their protected 
domestic markets. In the case of Swaziland, this has been further bolstered by substantial 
developmental investments by the EU towards adapting to the new commercial environment, 
which, while having ambiguous impacts on labour, is also promoting the expansion of the industry 
(Richardson–Ngwenya & Richardson 2014, Chisanga et al. 2014, Terry & Ogg 2017, APA 2017, 
Wellington 2018). 
As a SACU member standing outside of South African regulatory mechanisms, and owned in large 
measure by South Africa’s major milling companies, Swazi imports also represent a key point of 








































owns Ubombo sugar outright, however, it appears to be largest beneficiary. Revenues from 
Swaziland sales into the SACU market effectively ‘ring-fence’ domestic revenues that would 
otherwise be subject to the inter-mill redistribution of proceeds (effectively putting particular 
pressure on independent mills) as well as South African sugarcane growers and ‘transformation’ 
initiatives. Moreover, Swaziland’s favourable conditions of production provide an opportunity for 
these companies to undercut South African sugar, keeping prices suppressed below the DBRP (SASA 
pers. comm.). Finally, although less clear, some reports indicate sales from eSwatini are not 
projected to be significantly impacted by the ‘Sugar Tax’, both because Swazi companies do not have 
a history of contracts with beverage producers in South Africa while also supplying sugar to beverage 
manufacturers in Swaziland (Wellington 2019a).   
4.1.2 The Health Protection Levy (“Sugar Tax”) 
A related concern is the Health Promotion Levy (HPL), commonly known as the “Sugar Tax”, which 
took effect in April 2018 and stipulated a 2.1 c/gram charge for every gram of sugar per 100ml 
(above a tax-free threshold of 4g/100ml) (PMG 2017c). While amounting to an approximate 12.3% 
tax per soft drink, it amounts to an approximate 214% increase on the price of taxable sugar 
content.25 At the end of its first year in effect, the tax had generated approximately R2.7bn in state 
revenue; hence on about 128,500 tons of taxable sugar (Pilane & Green 2019). 
Proponents of the HPL stressed the deleterious health impacts of excess sugar consumption, 
particularly on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCD) and tooth decay, and highlighted sugar 
sweetened beverages (SSBs) as a key vehicle thereto. They emphasized the large and growing 
burden on the public health sector represented by these ailments, the efficacy of taxes in curbing 
consumption in Mexico and on tobacco, and the lack of any net impact on employment in those 
cases – largely owing to substitution effects. In some cases, the importance of other measures such 
as awareness campaigns, were also stressed. Opponents to the tax disputed the evidence, 
suggesting reduced consumption in SSBs did not necessarily reduce overall sugar intake, nor in 
sufficient quantities to reduce associated negative health impacts, while stressing the short-term 
potential impacts on employment in the sugar and SSB industries. In particular, SACGA emphasized 
that as Mexico had access to the US market, that displaced sugar was less economically deleterious – 
a condition not present in South Africa (PMG 2017d, 2017e, 2017f). 
The impact and efficacy of the HPL in regards to health outcomes is beyond the scope and expertise 
of this report. The economic impacts of the HPL to date are also not entirely clear, and also must 
consider related impacts on the public health sector and highly contingent questions of how revenue 
raised from the tax is utilized. Here, a brief review of limited publically available and highly 
aggregated data only provides some indication of the impacts on the beverages and sugar industries. 
In regard to the former, available evidence suggests that the impact of the HPL on production 
volumes and employment has not been highly significant, and that the tax has been ‘passed on’ to 
consumers, at least to some degree, in higher prices. To this degree, the HPL does not seem to have 
had a strongly negative economic impact. 
In regards to volumes, the DTI’s indices of physical monthly production volumes in the beverages 
sector as a whole (i.e. including non SSBs like fruit juices, waters and others) in Figure 9 below shows 
overall production volumes have continued to rise year on year after the implementation of the HPL. 
As these figures are at a high level of aggregation, it is impossible to determine to what degree 
volume growth owes to substitution effects – and hence to what degree the HPL has effectively 
incentivised consumers to opt for less drinks without sugar (e.g. water), different sugars (e.g. fruit 
juices) or artificially sweetened beverages.  
 
25 Assuming a 2 litre Coca-Cola price of R22.50 with a sugar content of 10.6g/100ml and sugar sales at the current DBRP of $680/ton.  
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Figure 9 Comparison of indices of physical production of beverages as a whole, monthly, 2014-2019 
Source: DTI (2019a) 
A somewhat more disaggregated picture on price impacts is provided by DTI indices for items 
comprising the CPI in Figure 10 – although only available at a disaggregated level from 2017. When 
deflated by the overall CPI, it is clear that a sharp uptick in real non-alcoholic beverage prices 
proceeded from April 2018 after the implementation of the tax, resulting in a real increase of 5% by 
May 2019. Less clear is whether or to what extent the increase in the DBRP in 2018 also contributed 
to the price rise. The most significant price rises occurred for ‘fizzy’ drinks in cans or bottles, which 
saw a real increase of around 10%. This suggests that the tax has at least to some degree been 
‘passed-on’ to consumers, although the extent or influence of other possible factors is not clear. Also 
notable is that the rise in non-alcoholic beverage prices in general appears to have impacted non-
fizzy drinks, particularly fruit juices, which saw reverse in a downward real price trend. Waters have 
seen some increase, although not sustained, and fruit concentrates do not show a clear trend. 
Energy drinks and ‘other’ soft drinks have meanwhile seen an ongoing albeit moderated decline.  
Figure 10 Comparison of price indices of beverage subgroups in CPI, 2014-2019 
Source: DTI (2019b) 
With largely sustained overall production volumes and price increases, employment might have 
been anticipated to have remained steady or increase. Quarterly Employment Survey (QES) data 
suggests that employment in Beverages and Tobacco as a whole, however, has declined by 
approximately 1,655 between the first quarters of 2018 and 2019. This was preceded by jobs in this 
category peaking in 2016, and having already witnessed an average drop of 1,282 between 2016 and 
2017. If related to the HPL, the shift would have to been in anticipation of the HPL rather than as an 
immediate consequence. This may also be consequent to differential labour requirements of 
different drinks, or changes in the labour processes of the same product categories owing to 
sweeteners. 
Figure 11 Number of persons employed in Beverages and Tobacco, Quarterly Employment Survey, 2013-2019Q1 
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In estimating whether the HPL has reduced overall industrial consumption of sugar in South Africa, 
the question of the relevant period of review and measure of consumption is key, particularly owing 
to simultaneous impact of imports, and changes in the DBRP.  
The core competing arguments are that: 
• The HPL has had a direct and immediate impact on sugar consumption (Wellington 2019b, 
Arthur 2018, Ensor 2019);  
• Declining sugar consumption is a long-term trend not strongly attributed to the HPL (REF);  
• Long-term declines in sugar consumption were structured by anticipation of the HPL. It is 
further argued these declines are both permanent (as manufactures adjust their production 
processes) and will deepen (as non-beverage manufactures reduce industrial sugar 
consumption to pre-empt an extension of the tax) (SASA pers. Comm.; SACGA pers. Comm.). 
The chief difficulty in evaluating these arguments is that while sales from South African sugar 
producers to the SACU market distinguish between direct and industrial sales, the same is not true 
of imports, including those from eSwatini. A related concern is that recent spikes in cheap imports 
open the possibility of sugar stockpiling that make turning points in aggregate demand fraught. 
Similarly, the intentions of industrial sugar consumers are not here evaluated. 
Publically available data support the above arguments to differential degrees, but overall suggest the 
HPL has triggered a minimum reduction of 200,000 tons of sugar consumption; itself significantly 
higher than predicted 150,000 tons (BFAP 2017)  
It is perhaps first appropriate to observe that industrial consumption of artificial sweeteners in South 
Africa is not a universal long-term tendency. Figure 12 illustrates the net-imports (imports less 
exports) of key sweetener commodities in South Africa listed by TradeMap. Although statistics on 
the manufacture of sweetners in South Africa are not readily available, in principle sudden growth in 
sweetener consumption should reflect in growing imports and/or declining exports. 
Growth in artificial sweetener imports is indeed a long term tendency for sweeteners common in the 
manufacture of sugar-free Coke and Fanta, particularly aspartame, acesulfame-k and sodium 
cylclamate. Sodium Sacchrin, however, saw net imports drop to zero following the peak in world 
sugar prices in 2010 and during import crises, and peaking again after 2018. This suggests import of 
these sweeteners has grown following the HPL.  
A similar tendency is also evident for other sweeteners commonly used in beverages, other 
manufactures and retail sales more broadly, particularly sucralose, xylitol, and sorbitol liquid. The 
exception here is stevia, which is also a commonly sold sweetener at retail level. Net stevia imports 
saw considerable growth as retail prices rose and the ‘notional’ price declined with world futures, 
with the inverse tendency predominating in 2016. This, prima facie, would appear linked to TSB 
standing as a key producer of stevia.  
Other sweeteners not known to be particularly common in beverage manufacture are more 
differentiated, with monk fruit and isomalt showing significant growth in net imports after 2018, but 
with others showing no clear trend or decline.26  Overall, this suggests that while the utilization of 
artificial sweeteners is a long-term trend, it was significantly interrupted by the incursion of cheap 
imports, and accelerated by the imposition of the HPL. 
 
 
26 The particular sweetener commodities and their closest HS codes selected were based on the list provided at 
https://www.foodchem.cn, with trade data sourced from TradeMap.  
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Figure 12 Net imports of key sweetener commodities 
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In regards to the decline in sugar consumption being a long-term trend, available data suggests this 
to be partially true. Data from the DAFF Agricultural Abstract suggest per capita sugar consumption 
to have declined considerably from the 1970s, but to have trended upward from 2000, notably as 
industrial consumption increased. However, as estimates typically divide production and imports by 
total population, the data is subject to sharp swings. 
Figure 13. Per capita sugar consumption, 1975-2016 
 
Source: DAFF 2019 
 
SASA sales data together import data from TradeMap since 2001, however, instead suggest that 
recent falls in consumption were initially driven by declines in direct sugar sales – in part owing to a 
raised DBRP deterring import. While estimated aggregate sugar consumption peaked in 2013/14 
amid raised prospects of the HPL, the peak was driven overall by a large growth in non-Swazi 
imports – raising the possibility that sugar imports were opportunistic and prospective, rather than 
reflecting a ‘true’ level of annual consumption. This is supported by the fall of direct sugar sales by 
the South African sugar industry as total imports increased to 2013/14. As such the ‘true’ peak SACU 
consumption appears to have been reached in 2011, before the HPL was pursued, and as industrial 
consumption was continuing its rise. While both imports and direct sales fell thereafter, both appear 
to have been importantly structured by the rise in the DBRP in 2014, in part precipitating a rising 
‘notional’ price with lagged reflection at the retail level. This is not to suggest that SSB 
manufacturers ignored the potential impact of a suggested HPL, only that if so these were less 
significant than rising industrial sales overall and declines in direct sales. 
The rise in sugar imports over the course of 2017 appears to have played a key role in maintaining 
the suppression of the South African industry’s direct sales in 2016/17 and industrial sales in 
2017/18.  Imports rose from by around 300,000 tons between 2015/16-2016/17, remaining inflated 
for the 2017/18 year. By 2017/18, direct and industrial sales had fallen by an approximate combined 
361,000 tons, but notably remained suppressed the following year, even as imports fell by 
approximately 220,000 tons. While it is difficult to discern precisely to what degree imports came at 
the expense of direct or industrial sales in 2017, that both markets remained suppressed even as 
imports declined from their peak suggests the HPL is responsible for the difference in industrial 



























Figure 14 Comparison of direct and industrial sales of sugar by the South African sugar industry with estimated total Swazi 
production, non-Swazi imports, 2001/02-2018/19 
Source: SASA (2019, 2009), TradeMap, Wellington (2018), ESA (2018) 
Figure 15 Comparison of real R(2016) white sugar retail, DBRP, London No.5 and estimated notional prices with Swazi 
SACU sales and non-Swazi imports to South Africa, 2001-2018 
Source: SASA (2009, 2019), StatsSA, Investing.com, ITAC (2009, 2014, 2018), SSA (2018), Wellington (2018), TradeMap 
4.1.3 The prospects of for product diversification: Biofuels 
Under the conditions of an effective contraction in demand for South African sugar sales, the 
prospects of utilizing sugarcane as a feedstock for the production of other commodities is receiving 
renewed attention (PMG 2019, PMG 2019d, Mboyisa & Maphumulo 2019).  To date, most 
prospective analyses of the prospects have rested on the cogeneration of electricity in the process of 
sugar manufacture and the production of ethanol form sugarcane as a fuel, but are considering 
additional commodities. 
Sugar mills already generate electricity in the process of sugar production, largely by harnessing the 
steam released from factory boilers, but are orientated almost entirely towards mills’ own electricity 
consumption, with little export. Potential to increase electricity producing capacities exist, by either 
reducing steam demand, installing more efficient boilers and turbines, increasing fuel supply by 
burning tops and trash, and, more prospectively, ‘gassifying’ sugarcane residue (‘baggasse’) in 
addition to steam-power (Wienese & Purchase 2004).  
The inevitable question, then, is if sugar mills are permitted to supply the electricity grid, whether 
co-generation of electricity would be a feasible and economic opportunity to increase sugar 
revenues. The highly technical nature of potential generation as well as structure of electricity tariffs 
makes any generalization of potentials difficult, and largely outside the expertise of the author. 
 200 000
 700 000
 1 200 000
 1 700 000













































Moreover, recent studies tend to include cogeneration within scenarios for larger ‘bio-refineries’ 
(Naidoo et al. 2018, Gorgens et al. 2015).  
Nonetheless, some basic estimates are made below on the basis of assumptions made by Wienese & 
Purchase (2004) for electricity co-generation. Here, only the scenarios of reduced steam demand 
and improved steam and power generation are considered, owing to the provisional nature of 
combined-cycle technology and owing to the use of tops and trash for on-farm soil-fertility. The base 
assumptions from Wienese & Purchase (2004) are presented in Table 6, below.   
Table 6 Estimations of electricity sale potential and annual operation and maintenance costs of different co-generation 
investments 




    (kWh/tc) Rm (2003) 
Base requirement of sugar mill 40   
Reduced process steam demand  28.69 3.42 
Improved steam and power generation 92.94 8.2 
Increased fuel supply with tops and 
trash  261.83 43.94 
Combined Cycle technology >400.   
Source: Wienese & Purchase (2004) 
* Wienese & Purchase (2004) presume an ‘average’ sugar mill processing around 1.5mt of cane per year at a rate of 300 t/h, and with a 
base energy requirement of 40 KWh/tc. The annualised operating and maintenance cost is taken as: “3% of the [fixed] capital 
cost minus the cost of obsolete equipment. Added to the operating and maintenance cost is the cost of loss of sucrose due 
to reduced imbibition. The annualisation of the capital cost is based on a life span of 34 years and a discount rate of 10% 
(annuity rate of 10.41%)” 
 
A crude estimate of the revenue-augmenting potential of co-generation are presented in Figure 16 
below. These were arrived at by first inflating Wienese & Purchase (2004) annualized operation and 
maintenance costs by the CPI, and then dividing them by the ‘average’ cane crush (assumed 1.5mt) 
to arrive at a basic cost per ton of cane. These are then deducted from a revenue estimation, made 
by multiplying Wienese & Purchase (2004) estimate of net electricity produced per ton of cane by 
Eskom’s (2019) annual average selling price and the annual average selling price to agriculture. 
These are then expressed as a percentage of the estimated ‘notional’ price for sugar per ton of cane 
– here estimated by dividing the RV price by 64% and multiplying the quotient by an estimated 12% 
RV. 
Although basic, the exercise suggests that above inflation electricity tariff increases as well as the 
recent fall in the RV price would render electricity co-generation increasingly attractive, with 
prospective revenue addition nearly doubling, but highly contingent on the tariff pricing regime 
selected and level of investment. Simply reducing mill steam consumption would see modest 
revenue augmenting potential of between 2-4%, depending on whether average or agricultural 
tariffs are applied. For improvement in steam and power, the potential is far more significant at 
between 8.4-15.6%. While significant, these are not sufficient to alone the offset revenue losses 
consequent to fall in domestic market realizations (at around 48%). Moreover, the substantial capital 
investments required under austere sugar market conditions, including declining cane throughput, 
uncertainty as to likely tariff regime, and potential for contraction increase the risk of investment 
(SASA pers. comm.) 
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Figure 16 Basic estimate of cogeneration potential to augment sugar revenue under different price and technology 
scenarios, 2002/03-2017/18 
Source: Wienese & Purchase (2004), Eskom’s (2019) 
The spur to ethanol production to absorb exported sugar is not altogether new. Interest in ethanol 
from sugarcane in South Africa was spurred in the 1970s amidst peak oil prices and later with the 
onset of sanctions. By the 1990s, planned investments in a pilot plants and distilleries were 
underway, and a government subsidy agreed to, but ultimately abandoned alongside the 
stabilization of fuel prices (Lewis 1990, Wienese & Purchase 2004). 
Government’s renewed interest in biofuel production occurred largely in a context rising oil and 
commodity prices, but officially centred development above the energy independence or 
environmental rationales favoured by other countries. The stated ambition was to use biofuels as a 
means to link the ‘first’ and ‘second’ economies by bringing ‘underutilized land’ into production, 
primarily in the former homelands, and growing South Africa’s field-crop subsectors without creating 
a price-depressing over-supply (DAFF 2015). However, as bemoaned by SACGA (2019), concrete 
policy “failed to materialise”. Announcements that blending mandates of 2% for ethanol and 5% for 
biodiesel would be set by 2015 lapsed, the scope of target prices or proposed subsidies remains 
unclear, and four multi-billion rand projects, including on the Makhatini flats, did not proceed 
beyond licencing (ACB 2015, Letete, T. & Blottniz 2012, Kohler 2016, Department of Energy 2014, 
West 2012). Similarly, in other Southern African contexts, a number of biofuel projects have stalled 
or collapsed. However, whereas previously interest in bio-fuels within the sugar industry was 
premised foremost on increasing demand for cane-supply in a context of factory utilization, the 
current impetus is being driven by the imperative to reduce exposure to the world sugar market. 
It is beyond the scope and expertise of this report to conduct another thorough assessment of the 
prospective viability of ethanol or other non-sugar commodities produced from sugarcane. Existing 
studies have largely pointed to ethanol-for-fuel from sugarcane either being economically unviable 
(Conningrath Economists 2013), contingent on subsidization (Kohler 2016), or utilize price estimates 
well above the market averages (Naidoo et al. 2018). The prospects of utilizing sugarcane for the 
development of ethanol and other commodities (such as lactic acid) are generally more optimistic, 
but require very large multi-billion rand upfront investments in fixed capital (Naidoo et al. 2018, 
Gorgens et al. 2015). The spectre of losing employment and income opportunities in sugarcane 
production presented by the contraction of the domestic market for sugar certainly warrants 
thorough-going investigation of the viability of all possible commodities that can be produced from 
sugarcane. Bio-based plastics are currently considered to not have premiums over bio-fuels. 
Here, however, it is worthwhile to simply illustrate the foundational barrier to economic viability of 
ethanol-for-fuel production that would need to be overcome by either (a) extensive subsidization (b) 
identification of higher value ethanol markets than basic fuel or (c) simultaneous production of more 
viable commodities. In particular, ethanol does not appear to be either a cheaper alternative to 
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Figure 17 shows that world ethanol prices (illustrated by American futures contracts), fluctuates 
closely with (World Bank average) crude oil prices, and, similarly, the South African Basic Fuel Price 
(BFP). However, as ethanol produces 66.7% of the energy content of regular petrol27, the effective 
price of ethanol must be proportionately raised, placing it above that of the BFP – or effectively 
presume that bioethanol processing to be at least 66.7% more cost-effective than refining oil. 
Raising this adjusted ethanol price by the difference between the BFP and South African petrol 
(coastal, 95 unleaded), accounted for almost entirely by taxes and retail margins, consequently finds 
fuel from ethanol largely uncompetitive, requiring an average difference of $0.39/l to come from 
price supports or tax-incentives.  
Kohler (2016) estimates a bioethanol production price of around $0.68/l for the 2005-2015 period, a 
cost at or above the BFP, suggesting that increased processing efficiency would be far from sufficient 
cover for the difference. In their review of economic prospects of sugarcane bio-refineries Naidoo et 
al (2018) estimate from a variety of sources that ethanol production could yield an Internal Rate of 
Return of 25.33% with a payback period of 16 years. However, it is notable that they estimate an 
ethanol selling price of R10.5/l, despite average monthly ethanol contracts and BFP prices from May 
2005 – Jun 2019 standing at R4.78/l and R5.53/l respectively, and never passing a maximum 
threshold of R9.82/l and R8.63/l over the same period. 
Should, hypothetically, Tongaat-Hulett’s highly optimistic scenario of establishing a 725ml 
production capacity at existing sugar mills (Tongaat Hullett 2013) be extended, this rate of subsidy 
would translate to roughly R3.96bn a year  – enough to provide annual salaries of nearly R500,000 to 
all mill employees and nearly 20-fold the industry’s own transformation commitments. Even a far 
reduced target of 200ml, half of the ambition for a 2% blend of around 400ml (ACB 2015, Kohler 
2016), would by this estimate account for R1.07bn annual loss from the fiscus.  
Figure 17 Comparison of prices for crude oil, basic fuel, ethanol and South African gasoline prices, 2005-2019 
 
Source: World Bank, Investing.com, DoE (2019) 
 
Similarly, it is not clear that ethanol for fuel would lessen the pressure of the sugar industry’s 
exposure to the world market. Figure 18 illustrates the estimated value of sugar and ethanol per ton 
of cane, at world prices (which are notably lower than London No.5 prices) - assuming 9 tons of cane 
per ton of sugar and 75 litres of ethanol per ton of cane.28 As can be seen, by this estimation, 
revenue from ethanol per ton of cane has tended to fluctuate with that of world sugar (and often 
below it). The prospects are only somewhat improved by utilizing BFP prices, and are similarly 
 
27  Ethanol produces 76,100 BTU per gallon as compared to114,100 from regular petrol. BTU are “British Thermal Units”, equivalent to the 
amount of heat energy needed to raise the temperature of a pound of water by one degree, Fahrenheit (Kohler 2016). 
28 SASA (2019) suggests an average range of between 8.35 – 9.12 tons of cane per ton of sugar between 2005/6- 2018/19 seasons. The 
USDA estimates approximately 19.5 gallons of ethanol per ton of sugarcane (USDA 2006), similar to the 74.5 litres applied by by Yamba et 
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volatile. Unsubsidized, then, ethanol sales unto the world market would closely parallel the revenues 
garnered from exporting sugar – prices which have depressed sugarcane grower revenues.  
Figure 18 Comparison of estimated value from a ton of cane from sugar and ethanol sales to the world market, 2005-2019
Source: World Bank (2019), Investing.com (2019), DoE (2019) 
 
Finally, it is notable that Fundira (2018) observes that South Africa has an underutilized quota for 
export of ethanol into the EU (11,000 tons exported of a 80,000 ton quota). The extent to which EU 
ethanol prices sell at a premium above US listed prices, however is not clear. Moreover, the end of 
EU anti-dumping duties on US ethanol may witness price convergences (Voegele 2019, Pennington 
2018). 
4.1.4 The prospects of an extended free-trade market for sugar 
In addition to the diverting sugarcane away from sugar production, a second potential area to 
absorb sugar surpluses is diverting exports to other protected markets. 
Outside of SACU, South Africa currently enjoys a limited measure of preferential access to other 
protected markets, primarily the United States and Mozambique (approximately 186,000 tons in 
2018) (DAFF 2017, TradeMap). Market access to the United States, however, is subject to a quota 
(30,000 tons according to Conningrath Economists (2013), although TradeMap indicates quantities in 
excess of 50,000 tons).  
In 2018, other exports reached 850,000 tons. While South Africa has also recently been permitted 
quota access to the EU market, ongoing liberalization of the EU sugar market is negating the price 
benefits thereto. TradeMap indicates South Africa exported 237,000 tons to the EU in 2018, 
although Fundira (2018) indicates South Africa’s quota to stand at 50,000 tons of refined sugar and 
100,000 tons of raw sugar. The balance of recent peak export tonnages have been received largely 
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Figure 19 Composition of South African sugar exports, 2001-2018
Source: TradeMap 
 
The prospects of growing continental markets has been one area of key concern. Currently, South 
African sugar only moves freely within SACU, having received special treatment in Annex VII on the 
SADC Protocol on Trade. This included a provision from 2011 that non-SACU SADC members 
producing sugar-surpluses would be granted duty-free access for a combined quota of 45,000 tons, 
with a further 20,000 ton for sugar-producing members, proportionate to their share of non-SACU 
sugar surpluses (Coningrath Economists 2013, Lincoln 2006).  
Although not in motion, a common external tariff in the SADC region could terminally exacerbate the 
crisis of local demand faced by the SACU market, owing to its inclusion of significant sugar producing 
countries, as shown in Figure 20. These include Mauritius, as well as countries in which South 
Africa’s major sugar companies have large or exclusive interests, including Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Together these countries export similar or greater volumes of 
sugar as South Africa, exceeding the net imports of remaining SADC countries. While previously 
orientated to the hitherto lucrative EU export market, since its deregulation these countries would 
similarly be placed in competition with South Africa for market share in a protected common 
market. As is the current case with eSwatini far more favourable production conditions would 
almost certainly see South African production displaced by expansions in these countries.  
Figure 20 Comparison of net sugar trade of SADC countries, SACU, non-SACU surplus producers, and other SADC 
members, 2000-2018.
Source: FAO & TradeMap 
 
Another possibility concerns ongoing negotiations for a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) 
encompassing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and East African Community (EAC). The TFTA has currently been 
signed by 23 member states, but has only been ratified by 5, South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda 
and Egypt. The stated ambition of the agreement is the phased liberalization of 90% of trade over 
five years. Discussions surrounding the liberalization of a remaining 10% encompassing ‘sensitive’ 
commodities including sugar would only begin thereafter. In the meanwhile, a common African tariff 







































utilized, are not clear. However, of 27 member countries, the International Sugar Organization (ISO) 
indicated that from 2010-2018 an approximate annual average of 10.5mt of sugar was consumed, a 
difference of 1.7mt, from an estimated 8.8mt produced by 18 sugar-producing countries. This, in 
principle, raises the prospects of insulating member countries from world market sales while also 
providing space for further growth (Mandela 2019, Coningrath Economists 2013). 
Owing to the larger number of net sugar importing countries in the proposed TFTA, a common 
externally protected market would appear capable of absorbing current surpluses from SACU and 
other sugar surplus producing countries. From available FAO and TradeMap statistics, however, the 
extent of the deficit in the first instance is heavily contingent on reporting from troubled Sudan 
region (and with statistics not available in the TradeMap dataset), and further subject to the import 
of large quantities of illegal sugar. However, as with Swailand now, a common TFTA could also be 
injurious to the specifically South African industry, which would bear a heightened prospect of being 
eventually supplanted by expanded production in regions with greater abundance of cheap labour, 
state-mediated access to land and water, as has proceeded in recent in years in Southern Africa 
(Dubb et al 2017, Sulle 2017, Terry & Ogg 2017, Chinsinga 2017, Matenga 2017). 
Figure 21 Comparison of net sugar trade of TFTA countries, SACU, non-SACU southern African sugar surplus producers, 
and other TFTA members, 2000-2018.
Source: FAO (2019) & TradeMap 
4.2 The distribution of proceeds 
A second series of controversies concerns the DoP mechanism since its reform in 2000 under new 
Sugar Industry Agreement (SIA). In principle, South African sugarcane growers enjoy one of the most 
favourable pricing mechanisms in Southern Africa. Growers’ share is notably larger than in other 
Southern African contexts, where millers’ cane supply emanates largely from a mix from their own 
plantations (‘estates’) and small-scale-growers (whether as individuals or from grouped production 
units) (Dubb 2017), and further includes sharing in molasses revenues and seasonal adjustments.  
However, the DoP is also not without controversy, and indeed remains a key are of struggle between 
millers and growers – as well as among growers themselves.  
Prior to the SIA (2000), the pricing of the domestic market and DoP were considerably different. 
Maximum industrial prices were set by national gazette, and the DoP was premised on ‘average 
costs’ and then ‘return on capital’ allocations after industry deductions (including refining costs). The 
allocation among growers was determined by sucrose, rather than RV content, and among millers by 
quotas on the domestic market. Other important mechanisms included an elaborate system of 
transport subsidies, a Price Stabilization Fund (PSF) – intended to be drawn upon during 
exceptionally poor returns from export sales – and the segmentation of returns in grower and miller 
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fetched export market returns. The pools system was itself implemented in attempts to ‘rationalize’ 
the industry, and in particular incentivise the reduction of production within the boundaries of the 
domestic market (Van Biljon 1970, Rorich 1983, Rahman 1997, DTI 2003). 
Figure 22 The Division Proceeds (1991) 
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Source: Reproduced from Jordan (1992) 
There were multiple drivers of the change to the SIA (2000) and the existing DoP, but two were 
particularly prominent. In the first instance, growers were concerned that millers were manipulating 
‘costs’ to gain a greater share of proceeds, including the maintenance of ‘non-economic’ mills, the 
maintenance of transport subsidies coming at the effective expense of those positioned closer to the 
mills, and the running of ‘development companies’ focused on extending SSG production. Secondly, 
into the post-apartheid period, particular concerns about liberalizing the industry altogether among 
broader de-regulation initiatives prompted efforts to show that the industry was serious about 
promoting a more competitive orientation (Rorich 1983, Rahman 1997, DTI 2003).  
4.2.1 The ‘notional’ price 
As observed above, the setting of the ‘notional’ price of sugar across domestic and export markets 
forms the basis on which the division of proceeds, and hence RV prices are calculated. In principle, 
moreover, the system of single-channel export and ‘flexible market shares’ equalizes millers’ pro 
rata revenue. This principle rests on the notional price accurately representing millers’ actual 
revenues, with any difference for the account of particular mill, and hence, not for redistribution to 
‘under sellers’, nor effectively entering the DoP.  
In 2003/4 the NAMC (2004)29 indicated that millers’ margins had remained relatively constant for 
the previous 5 years, while Funke (2006) indicated an asymmetric relationship between cane and 
retail prices. SACGA, however indicated concern of a growing divergence between the notional price 
and actual retail sales (Stainbank 2011). This concern essentially postulates that the notional price 
‘ring-fences’ returns to sugarcane growers, with growers effectively sharing in the risk of depressed 
economic conditions but not the benefit of millers’ bargaining advantages with downstream 
consumers.30 
 
29 By these figures, the difference between millers’ net selling price (inclusive of rebates and discounts) and retail prices from 1998/9 – 
2002/3 rose gradually from 28%-32% 
30Stainbank (2011) reports that SACGA expressed this as possibly owing to millers recouping margins in downstream-value adding 
activities, while running factories at break-even costs for the calculation of the notional price, and/or manipulating ‘handling fees’ not 
included in the notional price. 
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Millers’ sales data is not available, but a comparison of StatsSA’s (2019) estimation of the cheapest 
white retail price (2.5kg) with both the DBRP and the London No 5 price suggest that retail spreads 
have shifted considerably. Figure 23 shows that the estimated spread with DBRP to have been 
similar to that suggested by the NAMC (2004), but rose to between 50-60% as the DBRP devalued 
against the exchange rate while real retail prices remained constant. The rise of London No.5 price 
above the DBRP from 2009-2014 suggest this to be a more likely barometer of retail price spreads. 
This suggests that retail spreads may have initially declined to 2011 to around the 30% levels realized 
in the early 2000s (as world prices, and indeed real retail price, rose), but thereafter the spread again 
increased to around 50% by 2011, particularly as imports ratcheted up. That the rise of the DBRP 
was only mirrored in retail prices up to two years afterwards, alongside a spike in world prices, and 
that the DBRP was rendered largely ineffective in 2017, suggests that retail spread from London No. 
5 prices to be more reflective, and which reached highs of 70% by 2018.  
It is ambiguous as to whether, thereafter, the retail price spread has remained closer to that 
reflected in world prices (at around 70%) or the intended floor set by the DBRP (around 40%). On the 
one hand, world imports have declined, and real retail prices appear to reflect the REER adjusted 
DBRP to some degree. On the other, on-going and increasing imports from Swaziland likely play a 
role in undercutting – particularly with both South African and Swazi sugar manufactures facing 
world prices for their ‘surplus’ production.  
Figure 23 Comparison of retail prices with DBRP and London No.5 prices, 2000-2019 
Source: ITAC (2009, 2014, 2018), Investing.com, StatsSA (2019), SAGIS (2019) , authors own calculations 
Moreover, analysis by the International Sugar Organization (ISO) suggests that South Africa’s 
wholesale-retail price spread is among the largest in the world, at (or even above) the levels of 
‘developed’ sugar producing countries such as the United States and EU-28, and far above the levels 
of other major producers such as Brazil and Thailand, let alone regional producers such as Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, and Malawi. The only exception here is Swaziland, where comparison of Swazi wholesale 
prices with ‘South Africa’ retail prices suggests the spread to have been slightly higher; again 
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Figure 24 Comparison of retail-wholesale price spreads between South Africa and other select countries, 20017-2018 
Source: ISO (2019), authors own calculations 
In the absence of available data on actual sales in different markets (industrial; direct, export, 
brown, white, VHP, molasses) and the notional price, evaluating potential differences is difficult. 
Nonetheless, Figure25 below illustrates the potential extent of the problem utilizing available data, 
and given the current crisis of local demand. Five estimates of the notional price are provided: 
• In the first instance, the closest estimate of the actual notional price is based on dividing stated 
annual RV prices by the DoP. This provides a baseline of the existing price, which as illustrated, 
has fallen to a near 20 year low in real terms. This provides one of the starkest illustrations of 
the level of economic crisis faced by the industry. 
• In the ‘LOWEST’ estimate, industrial and export sales fetch the lowest international world prices 
provided by the World Bank, and direct sales are assumed to carry the highest estimated retail 
spreads from between the DBRP and London No 5 price. This basically assumes a scenario of 
total liberalization, extreme retail bargaining power, no molasses revenue, and no preferential 
trade access. Industrial charges were estimated at a constant R(2018/19) 250,000,000 This 
scenario would presage total destruction of the sugar industry, with mill-prices below prevailing 
sugarcane prices RV. 
• The ‘HIGH’ estimate also excludes molasses sales, but here presumes that exported sugar 
fetches higher London No. 5 refined prices, that industrial sugar is priced consistently at the 
DBRP, and that retailers accept a constant 30% spread. This essentially presumes lower retail 
bargaining power locally and internationally, as well as a completely effective DBRP, but again 
no revenue from molasses or preferential trade access. The ‘HIGH’ estimate is interesting 
because it maintains the current division between export and domestic consumption, but only 
assumes highly effective prevailing policy tariff policy, ‘normal’ world market international 
trading, and the maintenance of retail margins at 2000s levels. As such, it should represent an 
achievable standard that would raise prevailing divisible proceeds by 30% (around R3.3bn in 
total, R2.1bn to growers and R1.2 bn to millers by the DoP). 
• The ‘LOW’ estimate is the same as the ‘LOWEST’ except it takes the lowest retail spread from 
between the DBRP and London No 5 price. This essentially presumes that industrial and export 
consumers still retain high bargaining power, while retailers are moderated somewhat. It still 
assumes no revenue from molasses or preferential trade access. Essentially, this estimate 
illustrates that regardless of the spread margin assumed above between London No 5 and the 
DBRP, there would be little change from the LOWEST estimate. The exception is in 2009/10-
2011/12 when this estimate largely matches the estimate of the actual notional price, suggesting 
indeed that retailer’s margins likely dropped in this period. 
• The ‘MED’ estimate also assumes that assumes that industrial and export consumers realize the 
lowest World Bank prices, but that direct retailers accept a constant 30% spread. This essentially 
assumes high industrial and export bargaining power, but low retail bargaining power. It still 





























estimate is that it is the closest to the actual prevailing estimated notional price. In all likelihood, 
this is owing to a moderation of bargaining power across consumers, rather than in retail alone. 
However, it also illustrates that regulation of retail spreads alone would bring industry returns to 
current levels. 
Figure 25 Estimations of actual notional price in comparison with different pricing scenarios, 2001/02-2018/19 
 
4.2.2 The relative RV system 
A related on-going concern has been the function of the Recoverable Value system for cane 
payment. The core ambition of the RV system was to incentivise high-quality cane production, with 
growers ostensibly only receiving payment based on the content of cane that can be recovered from 
processing (and hence realized in sale) rather than on sucrose content, owing to unavoidable 
sucrose losses in processing. 
In recent years, growers have disputed the economic efficacy of the RV system. Growers have 
argued that while RV content has improved, that millers have not maintained, let alone improved, 
efficiencies in recovery – particularly at Tongaat-Hulett’s Felixton mill. The difficulty of evaluation is 
accentuated by the fact that RV content and estimations of factory extractive performance are 
highly correlated with mill capacity utilization (BFAP 2014). Further concerns have been raised about 
the exclusion of ‘downstream’ value-adding activities by millers from the DoP/RV system – 
incentivising millers to focus value recoveries in the processing of non-sugar commodities – as well 
as the ‘additive’ structure of the relative RV system (Wynne et al. 2009). 
Figure 26 Comparison of industry wide RV% and estimated sugar recovery, 2000/01 – 2018/19 
*RV% retrieved from SASA’s Review of the Milling Season, various years 
**Sugar recoveries were estimated simply by dividing tons of sugar by tons RV, estimated by multiplying tons of cane 
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Figure 27 Comparison of estimated factory utilization, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
*Sugar recoveries were estimated simply by dividing tons of sugar by tons RV, estimated by multiplying tons of cane crushed at by RV%. 
**Factory capacity was estimated by dividing cane crushed by an estimate of total factory cane-crushing capacity. This was estimated by 
taking first taking the most cane crushed over the 2000-2019 period and dividing the figure by SASTA’s estimation of total lost crushing 
time (to strikes, factory breakdowns, etc.). Secondly, this figure was further divided by taking the proportion of the number of milling days 
in the season with the most cane crushed to the longest milling season over the period for each mill.  
 
Evaluating claims that RV% has certainly improved is difficult and heavily dependent upon the 
review period, in part owing to heavy rainfall fluctuations, but also broader economic conditions. 
RV% figures compiled from SASTA’s annual ‘Review of the Milling Season’ suggest that RV% did 
towards improvement from 2000-2014, but including subsequent years shows a declining average 
trend (from approximately 12.5% - 12%). Estimations of factory recoveries (dividing sugar produced 
by tons RV) suggest, however, that factory recoveries have deteriorated more rapidly and 
consistently, from approximately 0.96 to 0.92. While estimated cane throughput has fallen 
disturbingly low, factory performance indicates have fallen in a more secular fashion. 
4.2.3 SSG decline, the consolidation of the two-pools system and closure of ‘development companies’ 
The cost-based DoP and two-pool pricing system were both considerable factors underpinning the 
original growth of small-scale production, and their removal significantly underpinned their 
subsequent rapid decline. 
While some initiatives to encourage small-scale sugarcane production prevailed in the 1950s at the 
initiative of the NAD, the accelerated expansion of sugarcane into South Africa’s bantustans was 
generally attributed to the Financial Aid Fund (FAF) rotating credit scheme, which essentially offered 
small-scale credit to establish cane and deducting costs after its delivery. FAF operated in 
partnership with KwaZulu and KaNgwane departments of agriculture and Bantustan development 
corporations, and ultimately ‘development companies’ established by millers themselves. The 
initiative largely came at the impetus of massive spikes in world prices in the 1970s prompting 
questions of how to expand sugarcane production in general, as well as to evade losses in cane lands 
from apartheid government’s attempt to ‘consolidate’ and expand the bantustans. The initiatives 
also influenced efforts to consolidate milling capacity, such as Tongaat-Huletts establishment of 
‘Felixton II’ from its existing Felixton and Empangeni mills, and which is still among the most 
significant mills for small-scale supply today (Dubb 2016, James & Woodhouse 2017, Rahman 1997, 
SASYB 1974/5, Bates & Sokhela 2003, Vaughan 1992b).  
Especially following the collapse of world prices in the 1980s, ‘development’ companies enabled 
millers’ to finance expanded SSG supply as virtual extensions of their ‘own’ sugarcane supply, at the 
expense of large-scale white growers and with subsidy from Bantustan development agencies. While 
millers’ development companies were not identical, they frequently organized, or directly 
performed, nearly the entirety of production. While SSGs’ utilization of these services were 
deducted from their deliveries, the ‘costs’ of the companies themselves were claimed by millers, and 
hence at the expense of sugarcane grower prices. The implementation of the ‘two-pool’ system of 
cane payments accentuated the benefit, particularly in a context of generalized world-price 
pressure, as SSG production was categorically given ‘A-pool’ status. Consequently, not only were 






































could raise their own share of the domestic market (Dubb 2016, Rahman 1997, SASYB 1974/5, Bates 
& Sokhela 2003, Vaughan 1992b, Jordan 1992).   
A second related underpinning of the growth in SSG production was the expanded addition of 
irrigated SSGs in Mpumalanga. Irrigated small-scale production had been extended to KaNgwane 
homeland in 1983, and expanded substantially in the mid-1990s with the Nkomazi Irrigation 
Expansion Scheme (NIES) constructed with the DBSA funded Driekoppies Dam alongside the opening 
of TSB’s second Komatipoort mill (James & Woodhouse 2017). According to Hurly et al (2015), this 
development alone inflated SSG cane production by about 4-500,000 tons. 
SSG growth was further accelerated with the official ‘de-regulation’ of SSG registration in 1989. This 
heralded a rapid increase in official numbers of SSGs, and significant although less extreme growth in 
cane production (Bates & Sokhela 2003, Rahman 1997). Up to 1997/8, UAF finance grew from two 
million rands per annum in the early 1990s to over R55m (Hurly et al. 2015). 
The subsequent removal of the ‘cost’ element of the DoP in 1994 and the consolidation of the pool 
system in 1998 precipitated the secular decline of small-scale production. Perhaps the first obvious 
signal was the sharp decline in finance advanced to small growers, with FAF/UAF ultimately closing 
its loan book and writing off millions in debt. Key elements included not only exposure to lower 
world prices alongside their large-scale counter parts, but deteriorating logistical coordination as the 
‘development’ companies were supplanted by local contractors, typically larger SSGs themselves. 
Nonetheless, contractors played a significant role in rapidly expanding SSG production, especially 
through lease-planting arrangements, particularly while still supported by A-pool prices.31 Wider 
support structures and interventions to assist SSG production remained significant, but substantially 
scaled down, particularly as transformation initiatives shifted focus to supporting market-based land 
reform and New Freehold Growers more likely to sustain commercial-scale sugarcane enterprises. 
While SSG registration and production was largely ‘triggered’ by falls in rainfall, the removal of the 
structural features of their growth have largely precluded any generalized recovery thereafter (Dubb 
2016, Munro 1996, Rahman 1997, Vaughan 1992a).  
Figure 28 SSG numbers and cane deliveries 1971/2-2017/18 
 
Source: Bates and Sokhela (2003), Lewis (1990), Rorich (1982), Review of the Milling season, SASYB (1984/5), Van Biljon (1970), and 
Vaughan (1991, 1992b), Vaughan & McIntosh (1993), SACGA (2019), SASA (2019). 
*The dotted lines show the trend between missing data. 
**The classification of small growers as ‘SSGs’ emerged only in the 1990s. Previously, racially based classification systems prevailed, 
irrespective of scale, including ‘White’, ‘Mangete’ (‘Coloured’), ‘Indian’ and ‘Black’. Only figures relating to ‘Black’ farmers are provided 
here, due to unknown levels of scale differentiation of ‘Indian’ and ‘Mangete’ farmers. 
 
31 In these arrangements, contractors would typically bear the costs of establishing cane for a registered grower but only take the returns 
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While devastating to small-growers, it is notable that the contraction also came to the effective 
benefit of sugarcane growers more broadly, and mills with lesser cane-supplies in particular, as 
small-scale growers’ rapid decline lessened the pressure of ‘surplus’ sugar exports at a greater rate 
than other grower segments. At its 1998 peak, SSG production reached some 4mt but by 2009/10 
had fallen to around 1.5mt, with upward fluctuations to 1.8mt in good rainfall years. In the same 
period, total cane production had fallen from about 23mt to 18.7mt. Indeed, despite the perennial 
problem of ‘overproduction’, the decline in small-scale production was initially paired with increases 
in cane production from other growers. However, even under the circumstances of wider declines in 
cane production, to date SSGs have still accounted for over 50% of the decline of all total cane 
production from 1998. 
Figure 29 Comparison of decline in difference in cane production from 1997/8 levels between SSGs and all other sugarcane 
growers, 1998/9-2018/19 
 
Source: SACGA (2014, pers. comm.), SACGA (2019). 
Author’s own calculations 
4.3 Declining cane production 
It is important to keep in mind that while SSGs have experienced the most disproportionately 
intense decline, that declining cane production has been a general problem facing the industry as 
well. This section gives a very broad review of some of its general underpinnings and expressions. 
The first sub-section illustrates the close association between decline and a generalized ‘cost-price 
squeeze’. The second and third sub-sections provide an indication of some of the differences in the 
decline’s expression across region and grower types. The last subsection provides an indication of 
the level of concentration in cane-supply these pressures are inducing/re-enforcing. 
4.3.1 The general cost price squeeze 
The most significant general change in cane supply has been its overall decline. Figure 30 shows that 
cane production fell from approximately 21.7mt in the 2000/01 season to a low of 14.8mt in 
2015/16, albeit witnessing a significant rebound to 19mt in 2018/19.  
Perhaps the most parsimonious driver of the generalized fall in cane production is profitability. As 
shown in Figure 30 and 31, rates of return have largely led movements in overall cane production, 
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Figure 30 Comparison of average rates of return per hectare with total cane production, 1991/2-2018/19 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2011), Nicholson (2019), SACGA (2008), SASA (2009, 2019) 
*Rates of return calculated as the percentage difference between estimates of gross income and total production costs per hectare 
Figure 31 Comparison of average rates of return per hectare with average rainfall, 1991/2-2018/19 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2011), Nicholson (2019), SACGA (2008), SASA (2009, 2019), Review of the milling season, various years 
*Average rainfall calculated using mill rainfall figures provided by Review of the Milling season, weighted by annual cane crushed. 
 
The decline in cane production as a whole is significantly related to a deepening ‘cost-price’ squeeze. 
As discussed above, growers’ RV prices are intimately related to the level of ‘surplus’ sugar diverted 
to the export market. As a general tendency, the reduction in cane production has resulted in rising 
real RV prices (with stronger upswings in drought years), and increases in cane production have 
supressed real RV prices. The ultimate sensitivity of these movements is highly contingent on the 
amount exported (and hence the differential in prices received). From 2011/12-2013/14, for 
example, when domestic demand had risen to account for the vast bulk of production, a rise in cane 
production by 3.2mt  resulted in a RV price fall of around R(2016) 200.  In 2016/17 – 2018/19, 
however, a rise in cane production by about 4mt saw a devastating real price fall of around R(2016) 
1,800. 
Figure 32 Comparison of total cane crushed to real RV price, 1997/8 – 2018/19 
 
Source: SASA (2009, 2019) 
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The import of the depressed RV price is clearer when compared to costs. Figure 33 shows estimates 
of LSGs’ real average production costs per hectare compared to real gross income per hectare, 
importantly moderated by rainfall (and hence yield). Figure 34 compares these figures to the RV 
price in index form, particularly to 2010 when domestic production had largely fallen within the 
boundaries of the domestic market. As is evident, RV price growth was largely superseded by growth 
in production costs until this period. Particular stress was experienced from 2002/03 as the 
devaluation of the rand greatly eroded the DBRP alongside falling rainfall more broadly. While RV 
prices finally matched production cost increases by around 2011, the combination of import 
competition, low rainfall, and contracting domestic demand supressed the RV price and gross 
income below costs until the end of 2017, but was immediately followed by the severe suppression 
of income heralded by the recent crisis of ‘surplus’ production. 
Figure 33 Comparison of real (2016) per hectare production costs, gross income per hectare and rainfall, 1997/8 – 2018/19 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2011), Nicholson (2019) 
Figure 34 Comparison of indices (100=2010/11) of per hectare production costs, gross income per hectare and the RV price 
1997/8 – 2018/19 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2011), Nicholson (2019), 
 
It is useful to examine the differential shifts in LSG costs themselves. Below, cost indices for key 
items provided in Nicholson (2019) from LSG cost surveys are compared with similar elements in the 
DAFF’s Agricultural Abstract (2019) and minimum wage figures provided by BFAP (2018), and 
deflated by the CPI. It is first notable that fertiliser costs provided in both NDA and LSG cost survey 
trend downward, suggesting that LSGs have continued to utilize the same level of investment in 
fertilizer, but enjoyed lowered prices. A similar tendency is evident in fuel and lubricants, although 
with the LSG survey dipping below the NDA survey from 2016, suggesting some reduction in fuel 
consumption.  
Irrigation electricity costs have seen one of the greatest increases, rising by a real 44% by 2019. 
Secondly critical is that of labour costs, which have risen by a real 26%. Here, however, it is notable 
































































That real labour cost increases attended a rise in real minimum wage from 2012-2013 suggests 
minimum wage rates to have been the key driver of labour costs in that period. A growing gap 
between real minimum wage growth and real labour costs could have several dimensions that are 
not easily discernible, such as non-compliance, retrenchment, a shift towards lesser higher paid 
agricultural labour or the failure to commensurately increase higher paid agricultural labour. 
Nonetheless, the steep growth in the gap from 2017 would appear to corroborate reports from the 
LSG survey that up to 53% of respondents had retrenched workers owing to pressure on 
profitability. 
Figure 35 Comparison of real indices of major cost components in sugarcane production with DAFF price indices, 2010-
2019 (2010=100) 
 
Source: Nicholson (2019), DAFF (2019), BFAP (2018), author’s calculations 
 
The relative exposure of LSGs to these costs is intimately related to whether they are rainfed or 
irrigated. Expressed in per-ton terms, Figure 36 and Figure 37 show the results of LSG cost surveys 
undertaken by SACGA, expressed in per ton terms (and hence sensitive to achieved yields). 
Unfortunately, they do not reflect the current crisis conditions, but are useful to review nonetheless. 
On rainfed farms, it is clear that the most significant costs are recurrent expenditure in inputs (fuel, 
fertilizer, chemicals), at around 30-32% of costs, and on labour, at around 29-31%%. 55% of the 
value is value-added, taken in an expansive definition to include labour, net farm income, insurance 
and administration costs. These estimates suggest net farm-income to have vacillated strongly 
between 4-20% of total cane value, and 9-37% of an ‘expansive’ definition of value added. 
Figure 36 Comparison of key value components of rainfed large-scale sugarcane production, 2011-2017 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2014-18) 
 
On irrigated farms, as might be expected, the pattern is substantially different. Here value added has 
declined from approximately 50%-43%, with the most substantial costs rising from approximately 
16-24% of costs, and lesser but significant proportions accounted for by fertilizer, fuels and 


































































been the prime culprit of a fall  of net farm income (more than halving) from 27%-13%, and slightly 
more gradual fall in expansive value-adding from 53%-31%. 
Figure 37 Comparison of key value components of irrigated large-scale sugarcane production, 2011-2017 
 
Source: Singels et al. (2014-18) 
4.3.2 Regional variations in declining cane supply 
The general decline in cane supply has also been uneven, witnessing significant regional variation.  
The Northern Irrigated region has been the most stable, supplying ±5mt outside of a drastic fall in 
2016/17. Decline in the midlands area has also been relatively muted, but witnessing significant 
variation. Production there has hovered around 3.5mt, punctuated by occasional falls of 0.5-1mt; 
mainly at Illovo’s Eston and Noodsberg mills.  
More significant declines have been experienced in the coastal regions and in Zululand, 
predominately in Tongaat-Hulett supply areas, albeit moderated by the relative stability of 
independent mills.  
In the North Coast, supply fell from between 4 - 4.5mt in the early 2000s to 3.1mt in 2009/10, 
followed by wide fluctuations between ±2 - 3.5mt thereafter. This was mostly attributable to the 
decline in the Maidstone mill from above 2mt to around 1mt, albeit exacerbated by the temporary 
closure of the Darnall mill’s in the 2015/16) season. Nonetheless, the Gledhow mill has seen some 
growth in recent years from 1 - 1.3mt.  
Less severely but still significantly, decline in the South Coast is attributable to instability of Illovo’s 
Umzimkulu mill which closed altogether in the 2011/12 and 2015/16 seasons and declined from 1.5 - 
0.5mt over the 2000/01-2018/19 period. The Sezela mill, by contrast, has continued to hover at 
around 2mt.  
Arguably, the most significant decline has been experienced in Zululand, from around 6 - 4mt, 
including by closure of the Entumeni mill (around 0.4mt) in 2004/05 (following its purchase by 
Tongaat-Hulett), and witnessing a stark drop in 2016/17 season to 2.7mt. The Felixton mill has 
struggled to remain above 1.5mt after a high of 2.5mt in 2000/01, while the Amatikulu mill has 
struggled to remain above 1mt, with a drop by 0.38mt in 2016/17 largely responsible for the general 



































Figure 38 Gross tonnage of cane crushed by major mill supply region, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
Source: SASA (2009, 2019) 
 
The decline in cane production has resulted in a severe drop in throughput for sugar millers. Figures 
39 and 40 show that throughput (as a proportion of estimated maximum capacity) has declined from 
around 70% to between 50-60%.32 Northern Irrigated and Midlands mills have experienced the least 
severe drops, remaining at around 70% outside of years of substantial falls in rainfall. Remaining 
North Coast, South Coast and Zululand mills, meanwhile, have all witnessed a more severe falls, 
fluctuating largely within a declining band of 30-60%.  
In regards to ownership, TSB’s mills correspond directly with the Northern Irrigated region, and 
hence have remained the most stable, while Independent mills have seen less of a secular decline 
despite wide vacillations of between 55-70% capacity. A similar tendency is evident at Illovo’s mills, 
however this represents a substantial fall from previous range of performance from around 60-78%. 
Tongaat-Hullet’s mills have clearly performed the worst, falling from highs of 76% in 2000/01 to 51% 
in 2018/19, and a nadir of 30% in 2015/16. 
Figure 39 Cane crushed as a proportion of estimated crushing capacity by mill supply region, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
Source: Review of milling season, SASA (2009. 2019) 
 
32 Maximum milling capacity was estimated by first taking the maximum quantity of cane crushed over the 2000/01-2018/19 period and 
dividing this quantity by the estimate % time efficiency in the same year. The quotient was then further divided by the % of the length of 
the milling of the milling season in the same year against the longest recorded milling season over the period. 
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Figure 40 Cane crushed as a proportion of estimated crushing capacity by major sugar producer, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
Source: ‘Review of milling season’ various years, SASA (2009. 2019) 
 
The impact on throughput alone appears to be a key explanatory variable to miller’s profitability 
from their South African operations. Figure 41 illustrates the significant association between miller 
profitability (measured as operating profits as a percentage of revenue), with estimated capacity 
utilization. Consistent data is not publically available, largely owing to recent changes in the 
segmental reporting of Illovo and Tsb, which disguise operating profits from South African sugar 
production. The association is closest with Illovo’s mills, with Tongaat-Hulett mills seeing some 
association in direction of change, but with far more intense shifts in profitability in different 
periods. The direct association is weakest with Tsb over the period, largely owing to relative 
consistency in throughput over the period that operating profits are available.  
Figure 41 Cane crushed as a proportion of estimated crushing capacity and operating profit as a share of revenue by major 
sugar producer, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
Source: Review of milling season, various years. Illovo Sugar Limited (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), 
Remgro Limited (2004,2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015), Tongaat-Hulett (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018) 
 
Variation in mean rainfall is perhaps the most parsimonious explanation for changes in sugarcane 
production year-on-year, but does not, in itself, explain secular decline in some regions. The 
Northern irrigated region has sustained the least variation in production, but a sharp fall in 
production in 2016/17 was preceded by several years of low rainfall.  
Production in the Midlands region has fluctuated perhaps most strongly with rainfall, and witnessed 
one of the least secular declines in production over the past 20 years. In Zululand, North Coast and 
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Figure 42 Comparison of total annual cane production with annual rainfall, 2000/01-2018/19 
 
Source: SASA (2009, 2019), Review of the milling season 
*Rainfall from particular mills weighted by total cane production 
 




Source: Review of the milling season 
*Rainfall in particular from particular mills weighted by total cane production 
 
Although mill ownership tightly corresponds to mill-supply areas, it is notable that secular declines in 
production have been less pronounced at independent mills, where changes in cane production 
more closely mirror changes in mean annual rainfall. Among the corporate rain-fed mill areas, 
Illovo’s (currently owned) mills have certainly seen a secular decline in cane crushed, but fluctuate 
closely with mean rainfall. Tongaat-Hulett’s mills have seen by far the strongest secular decline, 
particularly after 2004/05. 
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Figures 44 Comparison of annual cane crushed by average rainfall by mill ownership. 
 
 
Source: Review of the milling season 
*Rainfall in particular from particular mills weighted by total cane production 
4.3.3 The shifting composition of sugarcane production forms 
While SSGs have faced the singular greatest pressure of sugarcane types, declining production has 
been a general feature for other cane production types as well. Other than SSGs, the most significant 
early declines came from millers’ own estates, but largely as transfers to NFGs, albeit with other 
LSGs witnessing a steeper decline from 2004/05. From 2010/11, however, total LSG cane production 
has seen a substantial rise, even as NFG production plateaued and saw some decline. Somewhat 
ironically, by 2018/19 non-NFG LSGs accounted for a higher proportion of cane production (72.33%) 
than in 1999/000 (68.6%) and 81.5% if NFGs are included. 
Figure 45 Cane deliveries by farm type, 1999/00 – 2018/19 
 
Source: SACGA database 1999/00-2013/14; followed by SACGA database 2018/19, which does not distinguish NFG 
*Dotted lines indicate trend over missing data points. 
 
Yet, while accounting for a higher proportion of supply, numbers of farms have seen a substantial 
fall. Non-NFG LSG farm numbers fell from just below 1,600 in 1999/00 to just above 1,000 by 
2015/16. While NFG numbers grew to about 386 by 2009/10, their numbers also contracted to 
about 323 in 2015/16. Nicholson & King (2016), moreover indicate a mounting yield gap between 
NFGs and other LSGs, with the latter achieving ±50 t/h between 2005-2014, and the former falling 
from ±40-25. Together, and notwithstanding land transfers from mill estates, LSG farms in general 
have witnessed a general decline from around 1,784-1,368 between 2000/01 and 2018/19. 
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Figure 46 Numbers of registered sugarcane growers by farm type, 1999/00 – 2018/19 
 
Source: SACGA database 1999/00-2013/14; supplemented with figures reported in SASA ( 2017, 2019) 
*Dotted lines indicate trend over missing data points. 
 
Nicholson & King (2016) show that NFGs indicated their greatest liabilities pertained to lack of 
infrastructure (24%) and funding (26%), as well as input costs (39%), but most pertinently inabilities 
to contend with drought and climatic changes (55%); with notably few indicating land size (9%) or 
labour (11%) as key problem areas. Success factors were highlighted mainly owing to funding (59%) 
and to training, in agronomic (36%), industry workings (25%), and finance/business (24%) as well as 
good extension relations (21%). Rainfed NFG supply has been significantly differentiated by region, 
but notably receipt of grant funding is unevenly associated with performance. Nicholson & King 
(2016) further show that grant funding had little impact on 5-year average yield and RV% among 
NFGs in the Amatikulu and Felixton supply areas, a positive association in the Midlands and North 
Coast, and an inverse association in the South Coast. 
Figure 47 Association of NFG 5-year mean yields and RV% achievement with grant funding by region  
 
Source: Nicholson & King (2016) 
 
The SSG production has also shifted since their generalized decline. Smaller levels of SSG production 
in the Midlands and South Coast have remained relatively stable, and fluctuated heavily with 
changes in rainfall in Zululand (where most SSGs are located). Nonetheless, SSG production has also 
seen secular decline in the North Coast, and a more secular rise in the Northern Irrigated regions. 
Expressed in terms of milling company, the greatest variation has occurred at THS mills, while the 
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Figure 48 Comparison of SSG production by mill supply region, 2009/10-2018/19 
 
Source: SACGA (2019) 
Figure 49 Comparison of SSG production by mill company, 2009/10-2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019) 
SSG production increases in Northern Irrigated areas appear to be due foremost to Restitution, 
particularly on miller-owned estates. Figure 50 shows that rising SSG production accompanied 
general fall in MCP production. However, as Restitution can also occur on LSG land, and given the 
general unavailability of synthesized data, here more precise figures are not possible. The tendency 
is less clear in the Midlands, although as will be seen in the subsequent section, much of Midlands’ 
SSG cane supply comes from grower codes with especially high levels of production – suggesting at a 
minimum that ‘SSGs’ are incorporated into group schemes, if not necessarily under restitution. 
Figure 50 Comparison of SSG, LSG, MCP production in the Northern Irrigated region, 2009/10 – 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019) 
 -
 500 000
 1 000 000
 1 500 000














































 1 000 000
 1 500 000















































 1 000 000
 2 000 000
 3 000 000
 4 000 000
 5 000 000























Figure 51 Comparison of SSG, LSG, MCP production in the Midlands region, 2009/10 – 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019) 
In general, numbers of registered SSGs fell by 2,222 (11%) between 2013/14 and 2018/19 and cane 
production fell by 239,801 tons (12%). Notably, 58% of decline in SSG numbers and 37% of the fall in 
SSG cane production was attributable to the Umfolozi mill alone. Strong declines were also 
witnessed in the North Coast, where SSG numbers nearly halved (from 1,539 - 780) and production 
fell by 37% (111,292 tons). The Midlands, where SSG production has been relatively limited 
nonetheless saw some small increase in both registered SSGs (1,817-2,383) and production (154,659 
– 184,077 tons). 
It is difficult to impute the importance of these shifts alone, given that SSG production codes include 
‘group’ schemes, such as in restitution or co-operatives, while other will refer to individual growers. 
In the next section, a review of relative concentration in cane production between LSG and SSG 
types suggests that production in the North Coast and Midlands areas come from composite 
producers. Nonetheless, as an aggregate trend, the suggestion is that if group schemes may bear 
some explanation for declines in grower numbers, they have not stemmed the decline in SSG 
production as a whole, although it is not clear whether or to what extent decline would have been 
more severe in the absence of such measures.  
Table 7 Comparison of changes in numbers of registered SSGs and production by mill area – 2013/14 – 2018/19 
 
Registered SSGs Tons SSG cane 
2013/14 2018/19 Diff. Diff % 2013/14 2018/19 Diff. Diff % 
N. Irrigated 
ML 258 204 -             54 -21% 103,285 101,479 -        1,806 -2% 
KM 706 564 -           142 -20% 439,521 409,456 -      30,065 -7% 
PG 169 137 -             32 -19% 64,828 56,513 -        8,315 -13% 
Sub-total 1,133 905 -           228 -20% 607,634 567,448 -      40,186 -7% 
Zululand 
AK 4,888 4,319 -           569 -12% 232,360 271,566 39,206 17% 
FX 5,100 4,960 -           140 -3% 332,091 281,915 -      50,176 -15% 
UF 4,387 3,099 -        1,288 -29% 176,225 98,038 -      78,187 -44% 
Sub-total 14,375 12,378 -        1,997 -14% 740,676 651,519 -      89,157 -12% 
N. Coast 
MS 704 346 -           358 -51% 115,479 56,159 -      59,320 -51% 
DL 206 183 -             23 -11% 102,275 79,045 -      23,230 -23% 
GH 629 251 -           378 -60% 79,826 51,084 -      28,742 -36% 
Sub-total 1,539 780 -           759 -49% 297,580 186,288 -    111,292 -37% 
Midlands 
UCL 3 15 12 400% 23,922 21,755 -        2,167 -9% 
ES 1,249 931 -           318 -25% 58,467 48,220 -      10,247 -18% 
NB 565 1,437 872 154% 72,270 114,102 41,832 58% 
Sub-total 1,817 2,383 566 31% 154,659 184,077 29,418 19% 
S. Coast 
SZ 1,839 1,893 54 3% 141,500 111,695 -      29,805 -21% 
UK 203 345 142 70% 44,178 45,399 1,221 3% 
Sub-total 2,042 2,238 196 10% 185,678 157,094 -      28,584 -15% 
Total  20,906 18,684 -        2,222 -11% 1,986,227 1,746,426 -    239,801 -12% 
Source: Ntshangase (2016), SACGA (2019) 
4.3.4 Signals of high concentration in sugarcane supply 
In both the LSG (including NFG) and SSG categories, production is highly unevenly distributed.  
For LSGs as a whole, in 2018/19 the bottom 75% (n=849) of LSGs produced only 32% of LSG cane (4.8 
mt), with the top 3% (n=34) farms producing 25% of all LSG cane (3.8 mt). In the Northern irrigated 


































with 77% (n=179) of LSGs producing 30% of LSG cane (0.93 mt), and the top 6% (n=14) producing 
39% (1.5 mt). 
Figure 52 Distribution of LSG numbers by scale of cane production, juxtaposed to cumulative percentage of numbers in 
numbers and cane supply, 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019), authors’ own calculations 
Despite their near categorization as ‘small-scale’, growers in the SSG segment are significantly 
differentiated. This is in part indicated by the sheer inequality in scale of deliveries. Table 8 below 
shows that in total, approximately 36% (n=6,681) of registered SSGs did not submit cane at all, and 
of those that did (n=12,071), 86% (n=10,368) submitted 200 tons or less, representing only 30% 
(0.5mt) of total SSG cane deliveries (1.7mt). The top 3% of SSGs (n=314) submitted over 1,000 tons 
each, reaching nearly 0.6mt of cane, and alone representing 34% of all SSG deliveries.  












Source: SACGA (2019), authors’ own calculations 
 
SSG uneveness is significantly disguised by the more substantial production of fewer numbers of 
irrigated SSGs, mainly in the Komati mill area. These growers accounted for 0.56 mt of cane, 
concentrated overwhelmingly in the 200-1000 ton delivery range (68%; n=537), albeit with 
significant numbers in the higher +1,000 ton range (20%, n=157), accounting for 54% and 44% of 





























































































































 0 1-200 201-1000 1001+ Total delivered 
SSG rainfed numbers 6556 10,268 798 157 11,223 
% 37% 91% 7% 1% 100% 
SSG rainfed tons 0 501,667 327,624 346,040 1,175,331 
%  43% 28% 29% 100% 
SSG irrigated  numbers 125 100 537 157 794 
% 14% 13% 68% 20% 100% 
SSG irrigated tons 0 12,098 303,980 247,551 563,630 
%  2% 54% 44% 100% 
SSG Total numbers 6681 10,368 1,335 314 12,017 
% 36% 86% 11% 3% 100% 
SSG Total tons 0 513,765 631,605 593,591 1,738,961 
%  30% 36% 34% 100% 
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Figure 53 Distribution of irrigated SSG numbers by scale of production and mill area, 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019), authors’ own calculations 
Figure 54 Distribution of irrigated SSG cane production by scale of production and mill area, 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019), authors’ own calculations 
Rainfed growers, by contrast, account for 95% (n=17,779) of registered growers and 98% (n=6,556) 
of non-delivering growers, but only 68% (1.1 mt) of production. 91% (n=10,268) of delivering 
growers are in the 1-200 ton range, accounting for 43% (0.5 mt) of cane in their segment; and with 
the top 1% (n=157) accounting for 29% (0.34mt). The ‘less than 200 tons’ category is of significance 
given that this is the threshold of deliveries for receipt of the SPF, although larger ‘group’ schemes 
may also receive SPF by virtue of the numbers of their beneficiaries (i.e. producing less than 200 ton 
per member). Nonetheless, it is notable that the bulk of SSGs delivering ‘below 200 tons’ in rainfall 
areas delivered less than 100 tons in 2018, and were concentrated overwhelmingly in the Zululand 
Amatikulu, Felixton, and Umfolozi supply areas; albeit with some significant numbers supplying 
Sezela and Noodsberg mills (albeit with production from the latter focussed heavily on growers 
delivering upwards of 5,000 tons). Growers outside of these areas, such as in the North Coast and 
Midlands were comprised of growers delivering far greater quantities of cane, at LSG levels. 
Figure 55 Distribution of rainfed SSG numbers by scale of production and mill area, 2018/19 






































































Figure 56 Distribution of rainfed SSG cane production by scale of production and mill area, 2018/19 
Source: SACGA (2019), authors’ own calculations 
On its face, the concentration of ‘small’ growers in delivery segments that technically qualify as 
‘large’ appears odd, but is significantly impacted by ‘group’ schemes with multiple beneficiaries 
utilizing one grower code. The character of these growers is not easy to induct, but apparent group 
schemes were identified based on the presence of an obvious indicator in their registered name, and 
divided between apparent collective organizations (e.g. co-operative, community property 
association, community trust etc.) and private/corporate ones (e.g. CC, Pty Ltd, Family trust etc.). 
These are likely not comprehensive, owing to this partial and subjective identification process. 
Nonetheless, of obvious codes identified, an approximate 187 group schemes accounted for 0.25 mt 
of production, 0.20 mt of which were in the 1000+ segment (largely shared between ‘collective’ and 
‘corporate’ bodies), and which would account for approximately 33.7% of deliveries in this strata for 
registered SSG segment as a whole. Those in rainfed areas (n=53) accounted for 0.13 mt, and 
approximately 39% of deliveries in the 1000+ strata, but 70% of these (94,590 tons) were notably 
delivered by corporate bodies. In the irrigated areas, where group bodies accounted for 27% (0.066 
mt) in the 1000+ strata, the reverse applied, with collective bodies accounting for 81% (0.054 mt) of 
group deliveries. 
Table 9 Estimated numbers and scale of production of ‘group’ schemes in SSG production category 
   0 1-200 201-1000 1001+ Total delivered 
Dryland Total 
N 68 33 64 53 183 
Tons - 3,142 37,446 134,271 174,860 
 
Dryland (CC etc.) 
N 35 18 47 39 104 
 Tons - 1,991 27,024 94,590 123,605 
 
Dryland (Co-op etc.) 
N 33 15 17 14 79 
 Tons - 1,151 10,422 39,682 51,255 
Irrigated Total 
N 6 2 19 16 37 
Tons - 283 11,498 65,872 77,654 
 
Irrigated (CC etc.) 
N 3 1 12 8 21 
 Tons - 180 8,393 12,352 20,926 
 
Irrigated (Co-op etc.) 
N 3 1 7 8 16 
 Tons - 103 3,105 53,520 56,728 
Total 
N 74 35 83 69 187 
Tons - 3,425 48,944 200,144 252,513 
 
Total  (CC etc.) 
N 38 19 59 47 125 
 Tons - 2,171 35,417 106,942 144,530 
 
Total (Co-op etc.) 
N 36 16 24 22 62 
 Tons - 1,254 13,527 93,202 107,983 


































5. Character and constraints of SSG production: summary and review of illustrative case-
studies 
As observed above, SSG production is a highly differentiated sector. Growers classified as “SSGs” are 
done so according to their annual production, or their approximate share of annual production in 
the case of multi-member ‘group’ schemes. At a minimum, SSG production must be distinguished 
between the rainfed and irrigated regions, as irrigation both enables higher levels of production, and 
hence generally incomes, but also introduces additional imperatives to group management of 
irrigation infrastructure (and the costs thereto) and different labour profiles.  
Moreover, as has been a central concern of this review, SSGs have undergone significant shifts in the 
terms and mechanisms of their incorporation into the sugar industry over the past 40 years, when 
SSG production began in earnest. As observed, these were intimately related to crises and pressures 
on the sugar industry as a whole. The rapid growth in SSG production was intimately tied to SSGs’ 
attraction of price premiums to millers and the political imperatives of stabilizing the Bantustans. 
Millers invested heavily in ‘development companies’ funded under the cost-based DoP by the 
industry at large, and utilized the FAF mechanism to undertake the bulk of SSG production 
themselves. Bantustan development agencies committed large amounts funds to develop roads and 
offer credit to FAF and for the establishment of local black contractors (SASYB 1974/5, Vaughan 
1992, Rahman 1997, Dubb 2016).  
The removal of these mechanisms was an important harbinger of SSGs’ general decline (in numbers 
and production), but offered the potential to focus on developing SSGs as ‘independent’ growers. 
The re-orientation of support towards seedcane and fertilizer schemes, grower training, a more 
limited but important price-support mechanism, and the extension of government financed credit 
schemes to co-operatives (Armitage et al. 2009, Hurly et al. 2015), however, has not seen SSG 
production rise in any sustained way from 2010 levels. Moreover, while once the leading example of 
the sugar industry’s potential for transformation, of itself and as compared to other agro-food 
commodities, increasing focus had been orientated towards meeting the ambitions of land reform, 
first through the establishment of black large-scale growers and more recently in maintaining cane 
production on restitution schemes. Ironically, this has meant that land reform policy has in some 
respects pulled resources and attention away from some of the industry’s poorest members, and 
most significant victims of colonialism/apartheid. From its peak 1997/98, SSG production injected 
flows of approximately R1.5bn into South Africa’s communal areas, a figure that has nearly halved to 
around R0.81bn in 2017/18. 
Before examining case studies of SSGs in different areas eras, it is useful to make some remarks on 
their general features. Firstly, SSGs tend to come from large multigenerational households, with 
registered SSGs themselves typically being older, having achieved little formal education and 
disproportionately female. According to Hurly et al. (2015) SACGA’s own surveys suggest that 
approximately 43% of SSGs are older than 60, 48% had no or only primary education, and 60% were 
female. A general SSG survey by Eweg et al. (2009) indicated that 72% (n=941) of SSGs claimed no or 
only primary education and that despite efforts at ensuring equitable demographic representation, 
that 60% of growers were female and that over 80% were older than 40, and 36% older than 60. 
Woodhouse & James (2017) indicated that irrigated SSGs nonetheless have a generally higher 
propensity to be male, and have greater levels of education. 
Secondly, SSGs tend to cultivate under conditions of customary tenure in both rainfed and irrigated 
areas. The innovation of FAF as a rotating credit scheme was in part orientated to overcoming the 
‘barrier’ posed by customary tenure to utilizing land as collateral for credit. However, the 
widespread default of SSGs over their history suggests that tens of thousands of homesteads would 
have been acutely vulnerable to becoming landless had their land been utilized as collateral. 
Furthermore, the notion that customary tenure has widely inhibited land markets must, at a 
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minimum, be moderated by the observed (Dubb 2015; Woodhouse & James 2017) presence of 
active ‘vernacular’ (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006) markets for land in SSG areas. Often legitimized 
by local traditional authorities, and typically with relatively successful irrigated and ‘contractor’ SSGs 
as purchasers, these active land markets suggest that to the extent that customary tenure has 
inhibited concentration, this is due more to inhibiting debt-related dispossession than issues of 
security over title.  
Thirdly, however, low returns to small-scale sugarcane means that, in rainfed areas, SSGs rarely 
garner incomes from sugarcane production sufficient to support a rural homesteads above poverty-
line levels (Dubb 2016; Cobbett 1984; Mbowa and Nieuwoudt 1998). Income from sugarcane 
nonetheless plays an important differential role in SSGs’ reproduction, by supporting monthly 
expenditure and/or providing a significant lump-sum for larger purchases, such as 
building/improving residences, and investing in education/training of family members. Nonetheless, 
SSGs’ rely heavily on non-farm income for their survival, with historical reliance on migrant 
remittances (Cobbett 1984) largely supplanted by social grants, and with employment acting as a 
dominant driver of differences in relative wealth, excepting local ‘contractors’ (Dubb 2016). In 
irrigated areas, cane income is more important given the higher returns garnered, but below what 
community members estimate is sufficient to maintain households at their given standard of living 
(Woodhouse & James 2017).  
A rough guide to SSGs’ current returns is provided by using cost figures in Dlamini et al. (2018). The 
impact of supressed RV prices is particularly harsh. Given assumptions of an RV price of R3,121 a 
RV% of 11.2% and an optimistic 47 ton/ha yield, rainfed SSGs would make a loss on a new planting, 
with proposed subsidization measures acting largely to ameliorate its extent. Shifting the RV price 
assumption to the slightly higher (ultimate annual) RV price for 2018/19 only limits the loss further, 
and with a positive balance assuming only a ratoon submission (i.e. no fertilizer or planting costs). 
However, reducing yield scenarios to historical levels (Armitage et al. 2009) presents a much more 
severe picture of losses, even with subsidization. A less severe picture emerges for irrigated 
producers, where, under assumptions of a lower level of yield of 60 t/ha, subsidization sees losses 
made in planting but not on ratoon cuttings. 
Table 10 Comparison of weighted operating costs and revenue of rainfed and irrigated SSGs in 2018 
    Rainfed Irrigated 
    R/ton % Gross R/ton % Gross 
Assumed RV% 11.20% 13.01% 
Assumed yield 47 71 
Assumed RV price (R/ton) 3121 3145 
Gross income 420.62 100% 480.23 100% 
  Revenue from cane 349.52 83% 409.13 85% 
  Subsidy 71.10 17% 71.10 15% 
   
Other Income 
(SPF, Rebates, etc) 30.00 7% 30.00 6% 
   Transformation Intervention 1 27.27 6% 27.27 6% 
   Transformation Intervention 3 10.24 2% 10.24 2% 
   Transformation Intervention 5 3.59 1% 3.59 1% 
 Operating costs 491.66 117% 521.91 109% 
  Harvesting (incl. contractors) 44.88 11% 32.77 7% 
  Haulage and transport 122.54 29% 163.70 34% 
  Fertiliser 82.47 20% 69.39 14% 
  Chemicals 40.92 10% 54.17 11% 
  Planting 88.31 21% 134.52 28% 
  Levies  0% 5.75 1% 
  Sundry expenses 112.54 27% 61.61 13% 
 Profit/Loss -  71.05 -17% -     41.68 -9% 
* Loss without subsidy (% revenue) - 142.14 -41% -   112.78 -28% 
* Profit/Loss assuming R3,702 RV price -      5.98 -1% 30.77 6% 
* Profit/Loss without planting & fertilizer at R3,702 RV price 164.80 39% 234.68 49% 
* Profit/Loss assuming 24 t/ha; 60t/ha at R3,702 RV price - 477.15 -98% -64.91 -12% 
* Profit/Loss assuming 24 t/ha; 60 t/ha & no planting & fertilizer at R3,702 RV price - 142.71 -17% 176.38 22% 





The inability of SSGs to ‘specialize’ in sugarcane production for survival introduces a host of tensions, 
most of which are tied to the dilemma of whether to consume or invest.  
One is the issue of sugarcane’s displacement of other potential forms of landed production. Tensions 
with other cropping activities in rainfed areas, particularly for direct consumption, appears to have 
been importantly moderated by the extension of social grants; with non-cane cropping concentrated 
among poorer growers in particular. With few available markets for other crops, sugarcane remains 
the most accessible means of cropping for income. In irrigated areas, a wider range of substitutions 
may in principle be feasible. The most robust tension in rainfed, and to some extent irrigation, areas 
concerns cattle production. On the one hand, sugarcane production can displace land erstwhile 
utilized to extend grazing, but on the other can also provide a means to purchase cattle cattle (Dubb 
2016, Cobbet 1984, Munro 1996, Woodhouse & James 2017, Vellema & Chamberlain 2017).  
A second tension is in the mobilization of labour. In principle, SSGs are expected to both have the 
greatest control and comparative advantage in labour, both in regards to more intensive husbandry 
(and associated premiums thereto), lower-overheads in monitoring, and acceptance of lower profit-
rates by combination of wage and profit ‘funds’. However, low returns to sugarcane at SSGs’ typical 
scale, particularly in rainfed areas, raises large difficulties for growers in attracting and managing 
labour. Within the homestead, growers’ older-age inhibit personal labour commitments, but sparse 
returns also limit the capacities to attract and/or discipline household labour into cane production – 
indeed input and labour purchases are often contingent on commitments by employed household 
members. That returns from sugarcane are often orientated to providing training/education to free 
family members from agricultural labour is a further ironic dynamic. Consequently, hiring wage 
labour is more frequent than not for most activities, but SSGs also are unable to afford much beyond 
bare wage payments. Non-homestead labour is hence more likely to be provided either in reciprocal 
arrangements by SSGs themselves, hire of particularly vulnerable community members (such as 
youth without grants, employment, or substantial family support) or relatively vulnerable foreign 
nationals (Woodhouse & James 2017, Dubb 2016, Hurly et al. 2015).  
A closely related issue concerns how working capital is organized for SSGs as a whole. SSGs’ scale is 
typically far too low to afford ‘lumpy’ productivity improving equipment such as tractors for short-
haul and planting, trucks for long-haul, and in the case of northern irrigated growers, irrigation 
equipment. SSGs typically depend on  local tractor-owning ‘contractors’ providing hauling, planting, 
harvest and transport services with their own hired labour, and are usually paid upon deduction 
from client-SSGs’ submission to the mill. Up until the 1990s, millers typically organized contractors 
and SSG production in general, and management costs were largely borne by the wider industry. 
This resulted in scale and co-ordination efficiencies that were not achieved by more ‘independent’ 
SSGs, but left registered SSGs themselves with almost no direct control over the production 
processes as well as the risk of agricultural production. Thereafter, contractors in principle compete 
for SSG-clients, but have long been known to engage in cartel-like behaviour, often accentuated by 
their stronger local social power, and provide highly variable services. These are particularly acute in 
sub-standard planting (and in irrigation infrastructure), the impacts of which cannot be undone until 
several years and multiple ratoons, as well as in transport, where logistical inefficiencies can result in 
delays that have severe impacts on cane quality. Some studies indicate that better organization of 
contractors and grower organizations substantially improve services with better access to 
information, although in other group schemes contractor efficiency has remained a considerable 
burden. Contractors themselves, however, face a number of constraints in servicing SSGs – 
particularly in rainfed areas where contractors often extend second-hand equipment over poor-
roads to service disparate growers with un-coordinated planting and harvest periods. While 
surviving contractors are typically among the wealthiest SSG strata, this in part owes to the fact that 
the success in contracting operations is highly contingent on cross-subsidization and synergy with 
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larger sugarcane operations (Woodhouse & James 2017, James & Woodhouse 2017, Dubb 2016, 
Vaughan 1992, Cobbett 1984, Northard et al. 2004, Northard et al. 2005, Vellema & Chamberlain 
2017, Dube & Nicholson 2019).  
The issue of contractors is further central to the question of SSGs re-establishing cane. Eweg (2009) 
observed that close to 50% of SSGs had never re-established their cane plantings, and SACGA (2015) 
has raised concern about succession, particularly in the absence of credit facilities. Munro (1996) 
observed that many SSGs had initiated cane production without undertaking debt through plant-
lease arrangements with contractors, who would cover the entire cost of establishment in return for 
the first years revenue – with growers hence garnering income from subsequent ratoons and 
contractors expanding their client base. 
In the context of the SSGs receiving reduced premiums and oversight, the general collapse of 
FAF/UAF credit provisions, and barriers to efficiencies in the provision of services by contractors, 
various ‘group’ schemes have been advanced. In some cases, collective bodies act to facilitate 
engagements among growers and contractors, promoting trust, information, and competitive 
services, but have occurred typically in areas where growers are fewer in number and supply larger 
quantities of cane (Gillham & Hurly 2009, Landman et al. 2009, Nicholson & Dube 2019). Broader 
‘group’ schemes have typically emanated from SSGs’ inability to garner sufficient capital to invest in 
cane establishment. SSGs are encouraged to form ‘co-operatives’ to garner greater economies of 
scale and provide a less risky basis for the extension of credit, typically sourced from MAFISA or AAF. 
However, within nominal ‘co-operatives’, growers tend to commit their land but not be involved 
directly in production. In practice, they more closely resemble lessors, receiving a pro-rata margin 
(whether fixed or tied to returns from supplied cane) but with actual production processes 
undertaken entirely by contractors and/or managers. While often indicating preferential 
employment for members, these tend not to be taken up. Diminishing returns in general have 
accentuated emergent or latent tensions among growers (of differential capacities, endowments 
and interests) and with contractors (of differential service provision) and managers (at substantial 
cost and typically privileging productivity over returns to growers) (Vellema & Chamberlain 2017, 
Woodhouse & James 2017); sometimes to the point of violence (Motha 2015, 2019).  
The subsequent section reviews four in-depth case studies of different forms of SSG production in 
different periods. Cobbet (1984) provides something of a ‘baseline’ for rainfed SSG production under 
the prior regulatory regime in the apartheid era, comparing two communities. Those in miller-co-
ordinated schemes tended to generate better returns than those more ‘independent’ growers, 
garnering returns competitive with migrant remittances but insufficient to meet estimated 
subsistence level earnings in general. Dubb (2015) provides an overview of tensions faced by rainfed 
SSGs under the current regulatory regime in the Umfolozi area, where SSGs were anticipated to 
emerge as stronger candidates for relatively independent production (Rahman 1997). Next, 
Woodhouse & James (2017) study of irrigated SSGs is reviewed, wherein income pressures are less 
severe than under rainfed conditions, but where management and maintenance of irrigation 
infrastructure emerges as a central tension. Finally, Vellema & Chamberlain (2017) overview of 
Tongaat-Huett’s major lease-management schemes is summarized. Here schemes somewhat 
resemble those of prior ‘development companies’, but without the benefits of local market returns 
and industry financing of logistics and oversight, a greater emphasis has been placed on ‘co-
operative’ leaseholds and contractor arrangements. 
5.1 Rainfed SSG production prior to SIA (2000) (Cobbett 1984) 
Considering the important changes that have occurred in SSG production, it is worthwhile to review 
Cobbet’s (1984) case study. The study considered two communities, Newspaper and Nqunquma, 
around 30km apart with average rainfall of close to 1200mm, and each constituted by large rural 
households at mean size of nine. 
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Despite their proximity, both communities had substantially different profiles. Nqunquma consisted 
of around 300ha almost completely surrounded by white sugarcane farms. The community had been 
involved in sugarcane production prior to FAF, and all but one household was involved in sugarcane 
cultivation, with an estimated 5% of area under food crops, and 64% of homesteads claiming no 
cattle. They supplied the Noodsberg mill, generally with little extension services. Haulage, land 
preparation and transport services were performed by unregulated local contractors who had 
acquired second-hand machinery, almost all (eight of ten) who had gone out of business under the 
pressure of SSGs’ low returns and an insufficient market. Casual labour was performed almost 
completely by women at very low wages. Generally, the community was considered to be caught in 
a cycle of declining returns, dependant entirely on their own cash incomes for reinvestment, and 
achieving an average yield of only 27.4 in 1980/81. 
Newspaper, by contrast, presented a significantly different picture. Bordering Natal, Newspaper 
encompassed an area of around 7,000ha of which only 5% was undercane and 50% to food crops, 
albeit with a similar 55% of homesteads without cattle. The community had been recently 
introduced to cane by the (small, then owned by Lonrho) Glendale Mill.33 Millers had organized 
growers into farmers associations, with the KwaZulu government ensuring the construction of roads 
and depots for transport to the mill, and the KwaZulu Finance Corporation (KFC) extending loans to 
four black rural businessmen to purchase equipment and establish themselves as contractors; while 
encouraged by the mill to form a cartel and maintain a fixed pricing structure. Contractor earnings 
were difficult to determine, but estimated at between R8-18,000 (R(2016) 195-439,000). 
The extension of sugarcane at Newspaper was closely tied to FAF, which offered loans of R1,000/ha 
(around R(2016) 24,400/ha) to establish sugarcane, the bulk of which was orientated towards land 
preparation and initial inputs, at an interest rate of 3% for the first four years and 5% thereafter. 
Loans were only extended to men, and carried the additional condition of a minimum half a hectare 
planted and maintenance of 70% of their land allocation undercane. Finally, and critically, the mill 
maintained responsibility for ‘orderly’ production, effectively carrying out most or all of production 
themselves in conjunction with contractors, upon deductions from growers’ harvest. This effectively 
left only the task of weeding to growers themselves (although this too could be contracted out to 
the mill). Yields in 1980/81 were nonetheless more impressive, at around 65 t/ha. Casual labour at 
Newspaper was also performed almost entirely by women at very low wages. 







Estimated net earnings at Newspaper and Nqunquma illustrate sugarcane’s relative historical 
significance as an income source as compared to migrant remittances and against a Household 
Subsistence Level (HSL) baseline of R3,144 (R(2016) 76,683) p.a. At Nqunquma, area under cane was 
largely bifurcated between households with less than two hectares and those with over four 
hectares under cane. For the bottom group, sugarcane contributed only up to 13% of the HSL, 
although for the larger grouping it contributed a more substantial minimum of 39%. At Newspaper, 
the bulk of homesteads claimed less than three hectares, although in more even graduations. In this 
range, the higher yields saw sugarcane contributed to between 11% and 53% of the HSL, although 
 
33 Since the closure of the Glendale Mill, government has embarked on a large housing initiative. Current residents typically survive on a 
mix of social grants and limited employment, with employment in the immediate area largely limited to casual sugarcane labour on nearby 
commercial farms (Dubbeld 2012). 
  % R (1980/81) R (2016) 
  100% 1000       24,390  
Land prep 27%             270           6,585  
Seedcane 26%             260           6,341  
Fertilizer 30%             300           7,317  
Weeding 10%             100           2,439  
Planting 7%               70           1,707  
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the top 22% of homesteads (excluding a chief with 36ha) homesteads achieved between 75%-97% of 
their HSL. 








A key concern was income relative to migrant earnings and food crop production, both of which 
were core livelihood sources in the apartheid era bantustans, particularly given that social grants 
had not been extended. As noted, food production was low, particularly at Nqunquma. Although 
sugarcane earnings were similarly low as compared to the HSL, migrant earnings were even more 
miserable: 35% of households at Newspaper and 40% of households at Nqunquma garnered 
earnings that only accounted for some 7% of the HSL, while the top 15% of migrant remittances 
accounted for only between 23%-29%. 






5.2 The case of small-scale 
sugarcane production in Umfolozi supply area (Dubb 2015) 
Dubb (2015) investigated rainfed SSGs in the Umfolozi supply area. Umfolozi’s SSGs are distinctive 
for several key reasons. In the first instance, USM is one of the few mills not owned by one of the 
major three sugar companies. Secondly, following the reform of the DoP, Umfolozi’s SSGs were 
considered more likely to emerge as ‘independent’ growers owing to the thinner history of 
‘development company’ interventions, decent rainfall conditions, and their ‘more rural’ character; 
including larger average land holdings and few employment opportunities (Rahman 1997). However, 
while SSG production boomed significantly from around 83,000 tons in 1994 to 400,000 tons in 
2000, production had fallen off dramatically to 101,000 tons by 2010 at the time of investigation 
(and stood at 98,000 tons in 2018/19). 
The social profile of SSGs tend to reflect that of SSGs at large, coming from large (mean members 
present most/all nights = 10.39) multi-generational (mean = 2.88) homesteads comprising a mean 
6.81 adults and 4.41 children. SSGs themselves tended to be relatively evenly split across men and 
women (54.8% female) but tended to be relatively old at a mean age of 74 and with most (73.9%) 
considered household heads. 47% had no education, and around 35% had completed primary 
school. SSGs tended to be heavily dependent on grant income for survival, with 58% claiming an old 
age grant, 30% claiming a child support grant, and 7% claiming a foster care or disability grant. Only 




Newspaper (yield 65t/ha) Nqunquma (yield 27.4 t/ha) 
 % 
household  
 Annual net returns   % 
household  
 Annual net returns  
R (1980/81) R(2016) R (1980/81) R(2016) 
                
1  28%                336              8,195  8%                132             3,220  
 1-1.9  18%             1,008            24,585  30%                408             9,951  
 2-2.9  27%             1,680            40,976  6%                684           16,683  
 3-3.9  13%             2,352            57,366  3%                960           23,415  
 4-4.9  9%             3,036            74,049  43%            1,236           30,146  
 5-5.9  0%    5%            1,512           36,878  






adj, max Newspaper Nqunquma 
R(1980/81) R(2016) R(2016) % Households 
10                     2,927    14% 7% 
10-19                     2,927  
            
5,561  21% 33% 
20-29                     5,854  
            
8,488  18% 18% 
30-39                     8,780           11,415  22% 27% 
40-59                   11,707           17,268  10% 15% 
60-79                   17,561           23,122  15% 0% 
66 
 
Although land-sizes were only approximated, SSGs reported holding a median of around 4ha, 2ha of 
which were under cane, and had submitted a mean 30 tons per year over the preceding five years. 
As expected, relatively few SSGs had ever received credit (27%) and significant numbers (37%) had 
claimed to have never accessed the retention savings scheme. Only around 10% had ever received 
agricultural training of any kind, and only 21% could name the last time they had contact with an 
extension officer from any organization. 
SSG labour regimes tended to be highly heterogeneous. While nearly all relied on local contractors 
(themselves larger SSGs) for ploughing and short-hauling to local loading zones (from which haulier 
contractors would transport cane to USM), the combinations of unpaid homestead labour, paid 
homestead labour, and largely locally sourced paid labour were highly uneven. Nonetheless, among 
the sample as a whole, exclusively unpaid labour was commonly applied mainly in top-dressing 
(76%) and, among the 52% that did so, chemical application (70%), and to a lesser degree, clearing 
(52%). Paid labour was highest in harvest (75%), and to a lesser degree planting (47%), typically 
performed by local contractors. Weeding saw the greatest mix of labour forms, divided almost 
evenly between fully paid (34%), fully unpaid (36%), and mixed (30%) labour applications. 
SSGs’ direct relationship with contractors and hired labour was highly contradictory. On the one 
hand, SSGs’ rely heavily on contractors to perform planting, haulage and harvest in general, both 
because of their scale is too low to cover the costs of ‘bulky’ machinery inputs like tractors, and 
because many SSGs are too old, and their command over household labour too partial, to perform 
heavy tasks themselves. Moreover, contractors were often the original point of involvement in cane 
for many SSGs, as contractors were known to offer plant-lease arrangements, covering the entire 
cost of establishment in return for the first year’s revenue – with growers hence garnering income 
from subsequent ratoons and contractors expanding their client base.  
On the other hand, contractors’ efficiency was a major barrier to SSG production. Transport delays, 
which can have a high negative impact on cane quality, were one of the most chronic issues. 89% of 
SSGs complained of delays from long-distance hauliers and 35% complained of delays from local 
contractors – which could last up to several weeks. Contractor performance in planting is also highly 
variable, although only growers more knowledgeable of cane typically expressed concern. Moreover, 
with contractors’ scope of operation geographically limited, cartel-like behaviour was common, 
particularly among relatives. Similar contradictions pertained in regards to labour, both in regards to 
homestead labour and hiring of local labour. SSGs relationship to local labour was largely expressed 
in terms of hired workers being demanding, ‘lazy’, and dependant on social grants (despite being so 
themselves) and in terms of family members reticence to engage in difficult labour for little pay (if 
any). Contractor labour was typically sourced from further afield and included foreign nationals. 
Table 13 summarizes the outcomes of a cost survey where some of these issues expressed in a ‘cost-
price’ squeeze. Assuming an average of 12.4% RV and 24.5 tons per hectare, an SSG establishing 
cane at average costs in 2010 would have either just broke even or suffered an outright loss – even 
with the support of SPF and diesel rebates. Returns from annual ratoon cuttings would be more 
significant, at between R3,000-3,500, assuming all labour to have been paid for, but this amounted 
only roughly to the equivalent of a child support grant (then R290 per month). Presuming fully 
unpaid family labour and a full cutting of median 2 hectares under cane, total net returns would rise 
to R12,176 – less than the income of an old age grant (then R1,260). While even optimistically too 
sparse an income upon which to support a homestead, income from cane was still often expressed 






Table 14 Summary of average production costs and estimation of net income from small-scale production in Umfolozi, 2010. 
      Mean (R/ha) %Gross 
Gross income Revenue 
 
7,799 86% 
SPF & rebate 1,287 14% 
Total   9,086 100% 
Transport (33% gross)     2,998 33% 
Annual (‘ratoon’) 
Input Applying top-dressing 691 8% 
Applying chemicals 417 5% 
Sub-total 1,108 12% 
Labour Clearing 267 3% 
Applying top-dressing 189 2% 
Weeding 613 7% 
Applying chemicals 201 2% 
Cutting 200 700 2% 8%  
Sub-total 1,470 1,970 16% 22% 
Sub total 2,578 3,078 28% 34% 
Net   3,510 3,010 39% 33% 
Establishment 
 (Once per planting cycle) 
Input Preparing fertiliser 626 7% 
Seedcane 531 6% 
Sub-total 1,157 13% 
Labour Tractor tilling 1,758 19% 
Planting 359 4% 
Sub-total 2,117 23% 
Sub total  3,274 36% 
Net   236 -264 3% -3% 
 
In regards to general patterns of relative wealth, cane’s role came as an important but secondary to 
both social grants, which formed the baseline for homestead consumption, and access to non-farm 
income and employment, which stood as the major differentiator of wealth (as measured by 
homestead asset ownership). The exception here concerned SSG contractors, who were 
concentrated in the richest asset-groups and generally had sparse off-farm employment. As shown 
in Table 14, numbers and quality of non-grant income sources ascend with asset-wealth. Area under 
cane similarly increases across wealth groups, largely in tandem with total homestead land, with the 
highest concentration again in the richest category. Yet wealth stratification was also suggested to 
be very modest among the majority: Jobs and cane were concentrated heavily in the ‘top’ asset 
group, and their statistical association with asset-wealth degraded heavily when restricted to groups 
1-3. 







Land (ha) Estimated 
% casual 
labour in 













Asset group n= Mean % Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
1 (0-6 assets) 21 9.81 66.67% 3.70 2.53 1.56 34% 3.33 4.90 3.29 0.05 0.21 0.05 
2 (7-9 assets) 19 9.79 73.68% 3.65 1.81 1.63 26% 1.79 5.42 3.21 0.26 0.26 0.42 
3 (10-11 assets) 17 10.88 52.94% 6.81 3.18 2.85 22% 3.06 6.47 3.41 0.56 0.50 0.19 




p .232 .175* .312* .152 .263 -.241 -.059 .335 .145 .359 .180 .166 
Sig. .083 .419 .020 .269 .051 .110 .663 .011 .283 .008 .193 .230 
n 57 57 55 55 56 45 57 57 57 54 54 54 
ANOVA 
F 0.266  3.521 1.094 2.493 0.483 0.664 1.849 0.036 4.594 1.220 4.189 




p .433 0.380* .513 .463 .497 .231 .383 .486 .177 .407 .072 .238 
Sig. .000 .014 .000 .000 .000 .074 .001 .000 .132 .001 .563 .054 
n 74 74 72 72 72 61 74 74 74 66 66 66 
ANOVA 
F 4.036  7.701 8.136 7.702 2.906 5.197 3.737 0.221 6.480 0.917 2.343 
Sig. .010  .000 .000 .000 .042 .003 .015 .881 .001 .438 .082 
*Refers to Cramer’s V in chi square analysis 
**Refers only to non-cutting annually recurrent tasks in cane: weeding, fertilizer & chemical application 
 
Interviews with subsections of growers revealed that sugarcane had come to interact with other 
homestead livelihoods in complex ways. Five general trajectories were identified. 
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The first category of growers who were ‘stepping-up’ production were universally contractors, and 
distinguished furthermore by their far larger than average area under cane (6-25ha). In three of four 
cases, additional cane-land was acquired in a ‘vernacular’ (Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006) cash 
exchanges legitimated by the induna. All of these SSGs were male, although two were notably 
younger, unmarried and did not consider them-selves ‘heads’ of their homestead. That both 
sugarcane and contracting were necessary compliments in context was evident by the fact that 
there were no contractors without substantial cane fields and no growers without substantial cane 
fields who were not also contractors.  Several dynamic interactions between cane and contracting 
were key to their relative expansion. In the first instance, each enterprise provided a cash-flow 
complement to one another, with sugarcane providing bulk returns for tractor-maintenance at year 
end, and contracting providing a stream of cash-on-hand to purchase inputs and labour. Secondly, 
contracting essentially subsidized the costs of working capital too costly and ‘bulky’ at small-scales, 
but necessary for scale efficiencies. Thirdly, high diesel costs and rates of depreciation rendered 
contracting a generally unsustainable enterprise outside of the surpluses from cane. 
The second category concerned two growers ‘hanging-in’, in regard to maintaining production at 
relatively constant levels. The first, also a contractor, was somewhat hindered by the fact that he 
was only able to command a portion of his family’s sugarcane fields for his own use, and was falling 
deeper into debt. The second, an elderly woman with 4ha under cane, was able to both effectively 
rely almost entirely on unpaid homestead labour and keep to a strict regimen of consumption within 
the boundaries of her old-age grant and reed mat sales. The net proceeds of cane were utilized to 
send her children to university. 
The third category included four growers ‘stepping out’ and ‘stepping down’ from sugarcane 
production. For two of the growers, access to employment was the most pronounced vehicle for 
exit. Although in principle employment helped stabilize consumption and provide cash-on-hand for 
labour and input purchases, net returns were too low justify on-going investment without strenuous 
applications of homestead labour. In another case, a third-wife was devolved circumscribed access 
to land from her husband (who also cut financial contributions). This grower was compelled to rely 
heavily on her employed child for sustained cane production, but subsists mainly from her old-age 
grant. A fourth grower was notable as one of the few in the sample who had utilized FAF, acquired a 
tractor, and at his peak had reached 15ha without an old age grant or on-going employment. That he 
since reduced his field to 4ha, was unable to sustain tractor maintenance and felt compelled to 
grudgingly apply for an old-age grant is testament to the intensity of the shifting terms of exchange 
SSGs have felt. 
The fourth category included growers, uniformly female, who were dropping out or had already 
dropped out of production. The harshest commonality among these growers was the death or 
incapacitation of husbands or sons with access to employment, or, in one case, a contractor, and 
consequent deepening crises of consumption that inhibited sustained re-investment. A second 
notable tendency among these growers, however, was that initial plantings of cane were largely 
experimental, sometimes in land-lease agreements with contractors. ‘Lump-sum’ returns were 
typically invested in education and training to free family members from agricultural labour. The 
requirement of greater investment of money and labour is hence, something of an inversion of this 
original appeal.  
The final category concerned two growers who, despite sustaining near total falls in production, 
were in the process of ‘creeping back’ into production incrementally. Common to both homesteads 
was a focus on limiting consumption to other available, mainly grant, incomes sources with annual 
ratoons either committed directly as seedcane or submitted for proceeds to be directly re-invested. 
In each case, the object of expansion was to reach full scale, and hence consolidate margins into a 
lump sum.  
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5.3 Irrigated SSGs in the Nkomazi area (James & Woodhouse 2017, 2015; Woodhouse & James 2017) 
In their study of Northern Irrigated growers, Woodhouse and James (2017) mixed a series of 
interviews, focus groups and survey of 120 small-scale growers on irrigated plots in the Nkomazi 
area of KaNgwane former homeland, supplying TSB’s Komati and Malelane mills.34 SSG production in 
the Nkomazi area was largely established in 1983 (on roughly 2,500ha) and substantially expanded 
with the Nkomazi Irrigation Expansion Scheme (NIES) (by around 7,000ha) and a further Land Bank 
funded expansion from 2003-2005 (1,300ha). SSGs were organized into projects of around 150 – 
250ha using shared irrigated infrastructure (pipes, pumps and weirs) to deliver water from Lomati or 
Komati to individual growers on between 2-10ha.  
Irrigated SSGs’ social profile is somewhat different from those in the rain-fed regions. Slightly greater 
numbers were men (58%), albeit with the vast majority (72%) over 50 years old. Education was also 
higher: most had at least some primary (42%) or secondary (39%) education. While few (4.7%) had 
tertiary education many (70.5%) had received agricultural training and some (7.6%) in business in 
accountancy. SSG irrigation schemes have also been an important source of direct employment, with 
42% of SSGs garnering income from employment within the project, 16% claiming employment from 
an unrelated job/business and 47% receiving social grants. 
In addition to being distinguished by irrigation, Nkomazi SSGs were distinguished as the only 
segment considered financially viable after the collapse of FAF/UAF.TSB then formed Akwandze 
Agricultural Finance (AAF) as a 50-50 partnership with a new Liguguletfu Co-operative Limited, 
representing 889 SSGs in the Mpumalanga region. Each contributed R25m Rand, and garnered 
further R75m from Khula Enterprise Finance Initiative to provide credit for SSGs. Loans from 
Khula/AAF fund are directed chiefly to non-annual, higher-cost investments such as replanting, 
upgrading or replacing irrigation infrastructure and purchasing additional sugarcane plots.  
SSGs individually pay for fertiliser, labour, pesticide spraying, and cane cutting, loading and 
transport, while electricity and water costs in irrigation are paid collectively. Costs are generally paid 
either through retention savings (e.g. fertiliser, labour, pesticides) or as automatic deductions upon 
delivery to the mill (e.g. cutting, loading and transport, and electricity and water). SSGs tended to 
expend far more on labour (R3,200/ha) than contractors (R1,288/ha) for harvest, loading and 
transport, but tended to hire far more (foreign and female) workers at lower rates. While contractor 
labour has some effective oversight by Akwanze, who will only release funds for registered 
contractors, SSGs directly hire permanent labour (mainly Swazi and Mozambican foreign nationals) 
for irrigation, and mostly female casual labour in weeding and chemical application. Barring 16 
growers who performed all other labour themselves, on average SSGs hired one permanent worker 
per 5.4ha, but with a high range. Wage rates averaged R857 per month, but also had a high range of 
R300 to R2100, with some indication of positive correlations with overall area per worker (0.505), 
yield (0.224) and non-farm income (0.140).  
However, from 2006 – 2014 SSG production dropped significantly, from approximately 621 - 461,000 
tons. Indeed, while SSGs accounted for approximately 20% of land used to grow sugarcane towards 
TSB’s two mills, they delivered only 11.2% of total sugarcane. Chief among the most problematic 
projects were those funded in the Land Bank period, where unrealistic projected incomes, poor 
project design, and poor contractual services saw SSGs carry the burden of unsustainable debt 
levels. This accentuated problems of insufficient re-investment in irrigation infrastructure, which 
became critical, first when flooding badly damaged pumps in 2000, and secondly then with low 
rainfall in 2004-2006 and 2011/12.  
 
34 Sample = 109/888. 40 Malelane and 80 in Komati  




One problem was that growers tended to use their institutional savings for breakdowns rather than 
regular maintenance. Secondly, in some instances unscrupulous developers saw some irrigation 
projects designed and installed poorly, resulting in irrigation infrastructure unable to pump water to 
the farms. Thirdly, theft of electrical equipment to be sold as scrap has hindered some growers, 
particularly in recurrent cases where theft occurred immediately after equipment was replaced. 
Fourthly, collective management of irrigation infrastructure has not proved resilient in the face of 
these challenges, leading some growers to pursue counter-productive individual strategies, such as 
increasing sprinklers on their farms. Despite river flow being sufficient, this saw between 30- 40% of 
growers being unable to irrigate whatsoever. Differentiation among growers within the schemes has 
itself been a vulnerability, as those failing or unable to contribute to collective irrigation and 
electricity expenditure put added pressure on the margins of other members, threatening to effect a 
viscous cycle of decreasing returns, credit unworthiness and collapse. 
Rising electricity costs have been another fundamental concern to the largely pump-irrigation 
systems then employed. Alternative centre-pivot and drip-irrigation have both been utilized but 
carry their own challenges. While centre pivot is considered the cheapest, it involves a higher degree 
of shared infrastructure coordination among growers. Drip irrigation offers the potential to reduce 
overall demand and autonomy by growers, but renders pumps more vulnerable to breakdown, is 
unsuitable for establishment unless placed underground at high cost (then R16,000/ha), and 
requires careful maintenance. 
Together, these difficulties substantially accentuated tendencies to differentiation. A survey of costs 
among SSGs in different productivity categories illustrates the general point well. Conventional 
considerations that achieving a minimum yield of 60t/ha was necessary to break-even informed the 
lowest grouping, with growers in this segment producing the least value added, lowest absolute 
labour expenditure, lowest investment of fertilizers, and highest debt burden relative to their net 
earnings – a substantial portion of which itself emanated from VAT/diesel rebates. Growers in the 
intermediate range garnered greater net earnings than those in lowest segment, but, despite 
producing similar levels of value-added as that of the most productive segment, saw higher 
proportions directed toward labour and debt service. 
The cost survey excluded about a quarter of the sampled growers  that earned no net revenue after 
deductions from their cane delivery earnings in 2012, and a large majority were earning less than 
R30,000 from their sugarcane in 2012. Interviews and focus groups suggested that sugarcane’s 
contribution to livelihoods were historically considered fondly, and contributed substantially to SSGs 
distinction from other KaNgwane residents in affording motor vehicles, university education for 
children, and the construction of ‘modern’ houses (with indoor plumbing, furnished living rooms 
etc.). Cattle were another area of considerable investment that could also be utilized as ‘savings’ 
(despite being vulnerable to drought) although growers were reluctant to share the size of their 
herds.  However, youth were increasingly circumspect of succession owing to the evident higher 
income risks. Focus groups suggested that a (then) annual minimum of R180,000 was necessary to 
support for social reproduction. This, at prevailing rates, would require nearly 16ha of fully irrigated 
sugarcane land producing 80 t/ha.  
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Figure 57 Proportional comparison of costs and returns from irrigated small-scale sugarcane production in Nkomazi across 
productivity groups, 2011 
 
Figure 58 Comparison of costs and returns from irrigated small-scale sugarcane production in Nkomazi, across productivity 
groups,2011 
 
Table 16 Comparison of costs and returns from irrigated SSG production in Nkomazi across productivity groups , 2011 
      <60 t/ha 60-80 t/ha >80 t/ha 
    n 48 28 29 
Yield t/ha 55.1 69.9 84.2 
change in mean (2010-12 - 2008 -10) % -14.3% -11.6% 8.4% 
  RV% 12.8% 13.5% 12.8% 
Total gross income R/ha         24,090           31,416               36,564  
 Revenue R/ha         22,768           29,736               34,543  
 VAT rebate at R24/ton R/ha           1,320             1,680                  2,020  
Production costs R/ha         16,648           21,028               22,033  
 Cutting, loading and transport R/ha           6,258             8,083                  8,329  
 Levies R/ha               548                 973                     610  
 Irrigation (elec., water & maint.) R/ha           3,666             3,926                  4,053  
 Fertiliser R/ha           3,039             3,354                  4,707  
 Herbicide R/ha               632                 685                     751  
 Labour R/ha           2,505             4,007                  3,583  
Gross margin R/ha           7,442           10,388               14,531  
 Average loan repayment R/ha           4,019             4,610                  3,124  
Net earnings R/ha           3,423             5,778               11,407  
Production costs % of Total gross 
income % 73.1% 70.7% 63.8% 
Loan % Gross margin % 54.0% 44.4% 21.5% 
Net earnings % Gross income % 14.2% 18.4% 31.2% 
VA+%   % 46% 52% 54% 
 
A second tendency to concentration has been through initiatives to co-operatization. Woodhouse & 
James (2017) indicate the relative successes and limitations of this tendency with the case of 
“Langeloop Phase 2”, which was originally among the problematic ‘Land Bank’ projects established 
on 283ha and involving 39 farmers on around 7ha each. Like many of the ‘Land Bank’ projects, 
Langeloop Phase 2 was burdened from the outset with unsustainable debt levels on land not 
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contractor services and utilization of cane varieties susceptible to a sugarcane disease known as 
smut. Positive early performances in production (at around 85 t/ha) were nonetheless undercut by 
the high debt-levels faced by SSGs. Ultimately, a terminal outbreak of smut spelled disaster for the 
project, with debt escalating from R16m – R24m  well outside of SSG’s capacities. 
In response, co-operatization and hiring of professional, external management was envisioned as a 
key precursor for new injections of funding to re-invigorate production. SACGA successfully 
negotiated the debt burden down to R6.8m, SASA established a nursery to provide smut-resistant 
varieties, and the Mpumalanga Department of Agriculture Rural Development and Land 
Administration (DARDLA) committed R3.6m to rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure and in 2011 and 
two further grants of R2.9m  and R3.4m  in 2012 for the planting of 58ha and 80ha respectively, and 
with then plans to expand by another 50ha with a further grant. 
Early results were exceptional from a production perspective, with the project yielding award-
winning levels of 150 t/ha at 17% RV. However, the effective ‘dividend’ to co-operative members has 
been less impressive. The rate of lease was then set at R100/ha per month, amounting to 
approximately R700 per month or R8,400 per year per seven-hectare holding. At the average rates 
reviewed above, even a poorly performing 60t/ha farmer would then earn around R24,000 from 
seven hectares. Employment opportunities were further limited owing to the manager opting to use 
non-committee labour to evade conflict within the committee, and themselves garnering R42,000 
per month in managerial fees – equivalent to R500,000 per annum or 60 annual rental incomes of 
R8,400 for 7ha. Moreover, governance issues have beset the organization, with shareholders 
accusing the chairperson of mismanagement and corruption, culminating in the committee being 
removed from power in August 2014 and the re-hiring of a farm manager who had been fired less 
than a year earlier. 
Similar tensions are evident in James & Woodhouse (2015) inquiry into Joint Ventures between TSB 
and restitution beneficiaries of the Greater Tenbosch Land Claim. The case is of interest because, 
although productions on Restitution projects encompass areas in the thousands of hectares, they 
are often categorized as ‘small-scale’ owing to the number of beneficiaries.  
Although met with opposition from the majority of white farmers, TSB were supportive of it from 
the start. The claim was gazetted by government in 2001, and settled in 2007, when transfers of land 
began. It encompassed the claims by tribal authorities in the Tenbosch Land Claim (the Ngomane 
Hoyi, the Ngomane Siboshwa, the Ngomane Lugedlane and the Mhlaba), additional tribal authority 
claims (the Mahlalela, the Mawewe and Matsamo) as well as 18 smaller claims made by individuals 
or families. At the time of writing, James & Woodhouse (2015) observed the processes had 
witnessed the transfer of 43,000ha (of 61,202ha approved for transfer) to seven trusts comprising 
24,636 beneficiaries at a land purchase cost of R2.8bn. This includes land previously and currently 
under sugarcane, but also other uses, such as citrus farming and game ranching, as well as land 
identified for eco-tourism. In 2014, TSB estimated that 21,605ha of were under claim by restitution 
projects, representing about 42% of the 51,054ha growing sugarcane in Nkomazi, and 35% of the 
62,202ha approved for transfer.  
Three main models for sugarcane farming emerged following restitution. In the first instance, 
claimants may elect to simply lease their land to TSB, or to other commercial farmers. Secondly, 
restituted land may be placed under production by trust management, employing farm managers 
from among beneficiaries, or from outside the claim. Third, trusts may elect to create a Joint 
Venture, a body 50% owned and represented by the Trust and a ‘strategic partner’ (such as TSB or 
Umlimi) under a lease and/or profit sharing agreement, together with preferential employment 
(‘skills development’) and service contracting (‘enterprise development’).  
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As with Langeloop Phase 2, a similar tension has emerged between the professional management of 
production and the ultimate flow of benefits to numerous claimants. Certainly, the level of landed 
production has been highly significant, with yields at IST and SST, for instance, rising from 90t/ha to 
over 100 t/ha from 2006-2010, and surpassing 110 t/ha by 2012-13. However, as illustrated in Table 
16, the profitability of the enterprises and their returns to beneficiaries have been less impressive. 
Production costs have stood at approximately 80% of revenue, but with gross margins were 
effectively negated by fixed costs. These include leases to beneficiary trusts themselves, but are met 
or surpassed by administration and managerial fees. If not for ‘fair value’ adjustments to cane-roots, 
the enterprises would have universally suffered losses. Rental incomes as a mass amounted to 
R28m, which, while significant amount to marginal incomes on a per-beneficiary basis of around 
R1,600, and would remain small even if all post-tax profits were released as dividends. This, it should 
be noted, is also consequent to the large number of beneficiaries themselves, with effective area 
harvested per beneficiary amounting to less than half a hectare. 
Other benefits from preferential employment and enterprise development are substantial but not 
generalizable, typically including only some members of large claimant beneficiary populations. 
Perhaps the most broad-based, preferential employment, is highly limited on capital intensive 
operations. TSB’s data suggests that approximately 35% of the workforce comprises claimant 
members, however, even full employment could only absorb approximately 3.8% of beneficiaries. 
Moreover, with remuneration at market rates (and, hence, not intrinsically commercial sugarcane 
production in general) such work is in anycase often eschewed by young black South Africans as well 
as older claimants unfit for agricultural labour. Farm management positions are far more attractive, 
but across the JVs there existed only 3 general managers, 10 farm managers and 1 junior manager – 
to say nothing of the tension between managerial fees and dividends noted so far. Similarly, while 
some relatively well-positioned entrepreneurs have benefitted from contracting opportunities, these 
few relatively more lucrative opportunities have inspired a tendency toward ‘ring-fencing’ from 





Table 17 Characteristics of key aspects of major sugarcane Restitution projects in Nkomazi 
Tribal Authority CPA/Trust Beneficiaries Ha R Lease Trust man. JV JV name 
Ngomane Hoyi Ingwenyama Simhulu Trust (IST) 6,170 5,074 269,884,375  ✓ TSB Libuyile Farming Services 
Ngomane Siboshwa 
Siphumelele Tenbosch Trust 
(STT) 5,000 8,038 351,393,750   TSB Mgubho Farming Services 
Matsamo Matsamo CPA 5,266 875 9,567,690 Comm. Farm.  TSB Sivunosetfu 
Mhlaba Mhlaba Trust 1,700 557 20,273,195 Comm. Farm. ✓ Umlimi (collapsed)  
Ngomane Lugedlane Mjejane Trust n/a** 10,001 177,635,000  ✓ Umlimi (collapsed); Keysha investments  
State*  19,367 339,817,061     
Approved For Transfer**  17,290 866,822,015     
Transferred by 2010  18136+ 61,202 2,035,393,086     
Matsamo Matsamo CPA 5,266 11743      
Mahlalela Bambani Mlambo Trust 2,500 5,240  TSB    
Mawewe Mawewe CPA 1,500 4,958      
Other Libuyile Community Trust  21,941    Crookes Brothers Mthayiza Farming 
Table 18 Production characteristics of ITT and STT joint ventures, 2006-2010 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
IST Harvested (ha) 2,305 2,184 2,280 2,783 3,497 
IST Cane (tons) 209,501 224,570 249,658 301,662 384,311 
IST Yield (tons/ha) 90.89 102.83 109.51 108.39 109.89 
STT Harvested (ha) 2,734.60 2,332 2,334 2,411 2,382 
STT Cane (tons) 248,548 239,758 251,773 261,189 248,700 
STT Yield (tons/ha) 90.89 102.83 107.88 108.33 104.41 
Table 19 Overview of income, costs and returns of Joint Ventures with TSB, 2012/13 
    JV1 JV2 JV3 All JV 
Ha harvested 2,918 2,402 2,278 7,598 
Tons cane 340,613 277,009 241,865 859,487 
Yield (t/ha) 116.74 115.32 106.18 113.12 
RV%  12.77% 12.35% 12.73% 12.62% 
Cane turnover (Rm) 140 108 97 345 
 Production costs* 114 88 76 279 
 Cane gross margin 27 19 20 65 
  Total fixed costs 36 37 28 100 
   Administration 14 19 12 45 
   Management fees 3 3 7 14 
   Leases 15 10 4 28 
   Other*** 4 4 6 14 
Net    -10 -17 -8 -34 
None-cane income** 3 1 - 3 
“fair value adjustment” 10 13 50 72 
Earnings before interest and tax 3 - 44 45 
Profit after tax 1 -                        3 29 27 
Estimated lease income per beneficiary (assume 5,500 beneficiaries) 2,803 1,761 704 1,671 




5.4 The Vuselele & Simamisa lease-management arrangements (Vellema & Chamberlain 2017) 
Under the conditions of general SSG decline and a lack of private land available to extend cane 
production for its mills, Tongaat-Hulett undertook two projects in 2009 and 2012 to overcome SSGs’ 
barriers to reinvestment and increased scale of production. In some ways, the operations resemble 
that of the ‘development companies’ that predominated during the period of rapid SSG growth in 
the 1980s-1990s, with Tongaat-Hulett establishing a co-ordinating SSG unit operating at R20m p.a. 
and a separate unit to administer funds at roughly R2m p.a. Unlike the previous period, these costs 
are not claimed from industry gross proceeds. 
The first project, Operation Vuselele (“revival”) was launched in 2009/10 at the initiative of Tongaat-
Hulett and the Kwazulu-Natal Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT) with the 
ambition of rehabilitating 3,700ha of SSG cane land within three years, and in supply of Tongaat-
Hulett’s Maidstone mill. Although only reaching 2,361ha by the three-year target, by 2016 3,534ha 
of cane had been planted on lease from 31 co-operatives representing 2,555 members and overseen 
by 71 extension officers. 
Under this model, SSGs were encouraged to form and lease their land to co-operatives which would 
in turn enter into a 10-year supply arrangement with Tongaat-Hulett. Co-operatives would own the 
sugarcane roots, financed mainly by the KZN-DEDT (R64m) but with contributions from Tongaat-
Hulett (R12m) as well. Contractors appointed by the KZN-DEDT and supervised by Tongaat-Hulett 
would perform the planting and management of the crop for six months (until the cane developed 
into a canopy stage where weeding was no longer necessary). Contractors would be subject to a 
‘trial period’ of two weeks to plant two hectares, during which Tongaat-Hulett would have authority 
to terminate the contract. After the planting and six month management period, co-operatives 
together with Tongaat-Hulett would select contractors to perform harvesting and transport. 
Contractors would be bound to recruit locally with preference to co-operative members. Contractor 
harvest and transport programmes would be drawn up with co-operative management, and again 
with oversight by Tongaat-Hulett extension personnel. 10% of the gross revenue from cane would be 
paid directly to co-operative members by Tongaat-Hulett, pro rata to their land commitments, and 
further be eligible for the SPF. A second 10% would be put aside for re-planting, and a pre-
determined sum would be placed in retention for input purchases the subsequent year (R130/ton in 
2013). Should actual retention expense be lower, the balance is to be redistributed to co-operatives, 
whether for re-investment or distribution. 
The long-term sustainability of Operation Vuselele is not altogether clear, particularly given the 
general crisis facing the sugar industry at large. The programme, however faced a number of key 
issues in its development, the two most prominent being relations with contractors and the 
dissatisfaction of some co-operative members.  
In regards to the former, contractors were targeted to be drawn primarily from the local areas, they 
were typically under-resourced, both in regards to equipment and, in many cases, agricultural 
training. While short, one-year contract periods incentivised performance for subsequent renewal, 
they de-incentivised Tongaat-Hulett from investing in building their capacities. Moreover, 
contractors were found to often perform sub-standard work, moving quickly from area to another, 
and in some cases appropriating co-operatives’ inputs for their own cane or submitting cane on their 
own production codes.  
With regards to the latter, community dissatisfaction revolved largely around proceeds from cane. In 
the first instance, delays in the planting of cane meant that the 10% of gross revenue attributable to 
all members was felt to come at the cost of those whose land was planted late, and who could have 
in principle achieved greater returns themselves. This was particularly true of growers who joined 
because they were unable to finance replanting, rather than an unwillingness/inability to grow cane 
themselves. A second issue concerned members who allowed their cattle to graze on co-operative 
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lands, diminishing proceeds across the entire co-operative while entirely benefitting their own 
cattle. Many growers also suggested that returns were lower than what they could achieve 
themselves, although Tongaat-Hulett staff suggested these growers mistakenly compared their own 
gross revenue, irrespective of re-investment costs.  
Nonetheless, the proceeds arrangement itself also raises the question of the nature of these ‘co-
operatives. All production activities were performed by contractors, and despite a local recruitment 
policy, few members were either able (largely owing to age) or willing (largely owing to sub-
minimum wage levels) to perform labour themselves. In effect, ‘co-operatives’ acted as semi-land-
rental agencies, but with ‘rents’ tied to the risk of contractor performance and wider economic 
conditions.  
Owing in part to the difficulties faced in engaging with contractors, the Simamisa programme 
(orientated to supplying the Felixton and Amatikulu mills) was launched following Tongaat-Huletts 
approach to the Ingonyama Board Trust (IBT) to seek a different model, which in turn approached 
Simamisa, a sugarcane farming company. 
The Simamisa programme differed from Operation Vuselele in several key respects. In the first 
instance, Simamisa explicitly sought out areas which had not hitherto been placed under cane, and 
where landholdings were both larger (at around five hectares per homestead) and contiguous. This 
enables Simamisa to achieve greater economies of scale, but also inhibits membership by potential 
growers whose land is not contiguous. Utilizing its close linkages with traditional authorities, 
Simamisa would approach communities in the format of a ‘roadshow’, explaining and advocating 
their programme, encouraging members to establish co-operatives and identify land together with 
traditional authorities. 
In the Simamisa model, co-operative members sign their power of attorney to the co-operative, 
which directly leases their lands to Tongaat-Hulett, in turn and supplying fully owned cane roots. As 
such, unlike Vuselele, the lease is between Tongaat-Hulett and the co-operative rather than the co-
operative and its members. Tongaat-Hulett then engages Simamisa as the sole contractor to 
undertake all productive activities and engagement with co-operative members. Like Vuselele, 
however, co-operative members are not directly involved in production unless hired by Simamisa as 
labourers, and enter the project on the condition of receiving 10% of gross revenues pro-rata to 
their land commitments. Unlike the Vuselele model, however, there is no clear savings plan, raising 
questions of re-investment after the initial 10-year lease period. 
Since 2012, 18 co-operatives have been established with over 6,600 members, on approximately 
6,591ha. Although this model has released Tongaat-Hulett from the difficulties of managing 
contractors, community members have contentious engagements with Simamisa. Lower than 
expected returns, confusion and lack of clarity around the payment system, and proscription of 
grazing lands form the major (reported) loci of complaint. One individual claimed in 2015 that they 
had received as low as R1,000 for their one hectare (Zungu et al. 2016). Reports that the Simamisa 
scheme was advanced unscrupulously are linked with the assassination of tribal authority figures 
(Motha 2015). More recently, some angry community members claim to have been tricked into the 
Simamisa lease by their late Inkosi, that his death effectively negates the agreement, and have 




The prospects for supporting SSGs in the communal areas and in restitution projects, both in rainfed 
and irrigated areas, will undoubtedly be heavily conditioned by the ‘Master Plan‘ currently under 
negotiation between the sugar industry and government. 
It is not known what the full prospects are for ameliorating the severe strain that a combination of 
imports from Swaziland, iterant ‘deep-sea’ imports, reduced direct consumption from high domestic 
retail price-mill price-spreads, and reduced industrial consumption at least accelerated by the HPL 
may be. These are beyond the scope of the report, but all appear to contain significant liabilities. 
Ethanol-for fuel alone would require what appear as prohibitive levels of subsidization, but may be 
more feasible in conjunction with production of other commodities. Expanding a continental 
protected market may absorb some surplus production, but if demand is not ‘ring-fenced’ in some 
other manner, it is likely companies located in other national contexts would be better situated to 
meeting these gaps. This might even incentivise the dis-investment of corporations operating in 
South Africa, but with significant if not greater interests in these countries. The crisis facing the 
sugar-industry is certainly larger than SSGs alone. Any down-scaling could have significant, and in 
some cases possibly devastating impacts on employment in rural and per-urban towns centres 
around sugarcane and sugar production.  
Nonetheless, this report considers that the sugar industry’s involvement of thousands of small-scale 
producers in the communal areas and restitution projects as one of, if not the, greatest socio-
economic liabilities of the industry’s current crisis. Should a down-scaling be necessary or inevitable, 
it is imperative that SSG production not be placed under the same or similar burdens as that of the 
large-scale sector. The imperative is particularly sharp given that SSGs have in many respects already 
suffered more than their fair-share to maintaining the durability of the industry since the 2000s (to 
say nothing of their generally impoverished status). SSG production saw the most rapid decline from 
the 2000s, doing more to pull domestic production into the domestic market, and hence inflate 
prices, than any other cane segment. This is despite some signs of expansion in the large-scale sector 
as a result. The same is even true for millers who had hitherto invested the most in, and relied the 
most on SSG supply, and have suffered the greatest falls in throughput. This included mill closures 
(Entumeni), relocations (Glendale) and much larger than average falls in throughput 
(Felixton/Amatikulu). 
The sugar industry has effectively acknowledged this reality through its commitment to the 
‘Transformation Fund’. The commitment is particularly commendable given the immense strain the 
industry is under. However, it is the view of this report that the particularities of the sugar industry 
offer greater opportunities to both incentivise safe-guarding SSG production in any potential down-
scaling and encourage its expansion. The recommendations are not entirely novel: indeed they are 
based heavily on mechanisms that existed to spur SSG production in the first place, notably as a 
mechanism to contend with general contraction in production. 
6.1 Price premiums to SSG cane and SSG sugar 
As observed, prior to the SIA (2000), SSG production was heavily incentivised by categorically 
receiving ‘A-pool’ prices. This both raised returns to SSGs themselves through a higher cane-price, as 
well as incentivised mills to expand their SSG production in order to raise their effective share of the 
domestic market. This occurred in a period of general efforts to curb ‘surplus’ production headed for 
international sale. There is little doubt that the introduction of these mechanisms were central to 
SSGs original growth, and that their removal underpinned the critical decline in SSG numbers, 
attended by the closure of the much-vaunted FAF credit scheme. 
The industry has, certainly, made efforts to ameliorate this with other price-support mechanisms. 
The SPF and VAT/diesel rebates have been important measures, and gained in relative importance 
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with the gradual fall in exported production (albeit in large part consequence to SSGs’ initial decline). 
However, the displacement of production into the international market has eroded these measures 
severely, even with ‘Transformation Fund’ supplements.  
Using available figures, an estimate of the extent of the difference, for the prices received by SSGs is 
provided in Table 20 below. Estimated gross revenue per ton of cane (assuming 11.2% RV) is only 
R400/ton. The SPF and diesel subsidy contributes around an extra 8%, and an extra 21% if all 
industry subsidy initiatives are added (even seed-cane schemes, which would not factor into the 
price). Yet, a domestic market price, without any further subsidy, would contribute an extra 62%; 
even excluding VAT & diesel rebates that come at little direct cost (in administration) to the industry 
itself. 
The scope for raising SSG price support may even be greater: by providing SSGs with domestic direct 
retail prices in particular.  It is difficult to estimate what the retail premiums on direct sugar are, and 
to what extent these are effectively occluded from the ‘notional price’. Should differences pertain, it 
appears unlikely that any competition among millers (through rebates, discounts etc.) reflect in 
benefit to consumers (as retail prices are conditioned utmost by the dollar-based-reference-price 
tariff), or to growers (as these would be effectively ‘ring-fenced’ by the notional price). The worst-
case scenario, is one where domestic prices are raised through tariff protection but captured by 
retailers (especially via competition with the Swazi industry) and resulting in diminished local 
demand.  
There appears little economic reason, then, to allow prices to be effectively inflated by tariff 
protection on the basis of the sugar industry’s national socio-economic contribution without also 
controlling margins for retailers. This is particularly true given the combined rise of the DBRP with 
the incursion of Swazi imports. Introducing controls on retail prices within South Africa might also 
have the added benefit of reducing the competitive advantage of Swazi imports (as payments to 
millers would find less differential from consumer prices). Controlling retail margins and 
categorically providing SSG production with higher retail level prices would further act to both raise 
returns to SSGs and provide millers with a competitive incentive to raise SSG production. Estimating 
a ringfence of domestic retail sales (estimated by assuming a fixed mill-retail spread of 25% on 
average retail prices) shows an even more substantial doubling of the standard price. 
Table 20 Comparison of estimated differential in SSG pricing between non-subsidization, current subsidization measures 




Total market (SPF 
& rebate only) 






Notional price sugar R/ton 5,553.13 5,553.13 5,553.13 8,970.00 11,406.71 
RV R/ton  3,573.41 3,573.41 3,574.41 5,773.76 7,342.22 
R/ton of cane (RV% 11.2) 400.22 400.22 400.33 646.66 822.33 
Subsidies   30 82.36   
 SPF & rebate 30 30   
 Price   27.27   
 Transport   10.24   
 Levies   3.59   
 Seedcane   11.26   
Gross revenue 393.08 423.08 475.55 635.11 822.33 
R/ton difference - 30.00 82.47 242.03 429.25 
% Difference 100% 108% 121% 162% 209% 
 
Finally, the national contribution of the sugar industry via SSGs is often considered in regards to 
policy, but has failed to be reflected in marketing. This, no doubt, is owing to sugar being a largely 
undifferentiated commodity. However, the scope for branding sugar products as ‘SSG’ (proportional 
to millers’ supply from SSGs) should also be considered as a potential avenue for further augmenting 
SSG incomes by enlisting consumers’ willingness to pay premiums to specifically support poor 
producers. Such strategies have been utilized to some extent by ‘FairTrade’ and other ethical 
marketing labelling campaigns. According to FairTrade (2013), their premium in 2011 stood at $60 
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per ton of sugar, and it is not clear if this margin has been impacted by the recent fall in EU sugar 
prices. Nonetheless, presuming it to be static, this would translate to approximately R92 per ton of 
cane – exceeding all current support measures at around R82 per ton. This would further provide an 
incentive for millers to support SSG production, and privilege mills with strong SSG supply bases. 
It has been observed that a benefit of the SPF and transformation subsidy is that they are non-
conditional, that is, they apply irrespective of marketing conditions and hence are more significant 
stabilizers to SSG income. The weakness of this argument is a) that it would reduce returns to SSG 
production, b) ignores the relative stability of domestic market returns, c) does not carry a similar 
incentive to millers to expand SSG production and d) does not incentivise a prioritization of SSG 
supply under conditions of contraction. However, as stability is no doubt a real concern, available 
subsidies should be enacted if prices fall below historic domestic market returns. This would release 
the industry from subsidy except under exceptional conditions. 
6.2 ‘Development costs’ to be deducted as first charge from gross proceeds 
While price premiums to SSGs were one of the strongest undercurrents to SSGs’ original rapid 
growth, a second was millers’ capacity to deduct the costs of ‘development companies’ from gross 
industrial proceeds. The system specifically encouraged millers to invest in large numbers of 
extension officers, and co-ordinate planting and transportation logistics to grow SSG production in a 
period of relative contraction. It came at the effective expense of mills without significant SSG 
supply, but particularly large-scale growers who complained that it provided mills with an avenue by 
which to artificially inflate their ‘costs’ and hence claims on total industry proceeds. This formed a 
key reason for the ultimate scrapping of the ‘cost-based’ DoP.  
However, in the absence of such companies, SSG production has suffered considerably. SSGs are 
dependent on the provision of services by contractors over whom they have little bargaining power, 
and whose revenues are premised utmost on numbers of growers serviced, rather than the quality 
of those services provided. The plethora of independent contractors and growers, moreover, 
underpin serious obstacles to co-ordination that come at direct cost to all actors involved: with SSGs 
suffering poor planting and transport services, contractors stretched across wide service areas, and 
mills suffering difficulties in planning and maintaining throughput. 
Millers have nonetheless made attempts to approach the methods of the ‘development companies’ 
to augment SSG supply, as evidenced by Operation Vuselele and the Akwanze Agricultural Fund. 
However, without additional resources to invest outside of anticipated increases in throughput, such 
schemes face difficult dilemmas that have prevented them from achieving comparable results; and 
provide disincentives to pursue them in the future. Typically, they have (variably) relied on credit 
mechanisms that raise SSG’s risk (and accentuate invest/consume dilemmas), rely on growers to 
provide land in return for a proportion of gross proceeds (expose them to agricultural and marketing 
risks), entail high levels of sub-contracting that expose SSG to variable and often poor services 
(accentuating their lack of economies of scale), high managerial fees that can negate productivity 
premiums that ensue, or place additional burdens on SSGs to manage co-operative structures and 
conflicts of interest within them, including with traditional authorities.  
The price support measures above alone would be a substantial incentive to millers to invest in 
expanding their share of SSG production, as doing so would augment their share of the domestic 
market. However, the upper limit on such investments would remain related to the premiums they 
receive from SSG production, and ultimately costs of expanding SSG production would need to be 
balanced against millers’ wider competitive pressures. Alone, then, the mechanism could 
problematically both retain millers’ ‘default’ interest in subcontracting logistics and coordination to 
for-profit bodies, and hence potentially come at the expense of SSG margins, or place SSGs in an 
institutionally dependant position to millers. 
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Deducting ‘development’ costs tied to the managing of logistics and provision of contractual services 
as a first charge prior to the DoP is defensible because such costs concern both growers (SSGs 
benefiting from enhanced services) and millers (benefitting from expanded throughput) and the 
transformation agenda of the industry as a whole. Most importantly, it would re-introduce 
incentives to maintain trained personnel and maintained equipment for planting, transport and co-
ordination services, hence reducing the risk of efforts to transform cane supply and incentivise its 
pursuit. These would be key to forming a cost-based competitive floor in SSGs interests, against 
which other service providers would be judged. That much of the industry’s own recent efforts in 
encouraging SSG supply have been premised on formalizing SSG/contractor relations further 
supports the argument. 
However, doing so does raise the concern that such costs might be manipulated. Consequently, cost 
deductions should be provided at a maximum rate tied to the actual extent of SSG production (on a 
quality basis, e.g. tons RV) and which provide for depreciation, but not return on capital. This further 
would require maximum prices to be regularly reviewed and disseminated through grower 
structures and be open to industry audit. This would both inhibit potential manipulation by 
contractual service providers, and incentivise the provision of cost-competitive services.  
It is further important to promote a competitive service provision among service-providing agencies. 
Costs of services should be available to be deducted not only by miller prospective ‘development’ 
companies, but by any industry-affiliated agency providing contractual services. This would include 
initiatives by grower organizations (such as SAFDA’s proposed Farm Management Services body) and 
independent local contractors. The provision of services by multiple agencies would help enforce the 
price structure and promote competition based on quality of services. Miller and grower 
‘development companies’ would establish competitive base-lines, upon which any local contractors 
would measure themselves against, by providing services available to any grower on request.  
6.3 Rationalizing cane planting, harvesting and transport 
While providing flexible and competitive contractor services for growers is integral, however, 
growers would need, at a minimum to commit to planting and harvesting schedules (irrespective of 
which service provider is utilized) to ensure such services could be provided in a cost-efficient 
manner. These commitments could be bolstered by a ‘last resort’ measure, which would include 
rights to a ‘development company’ to assume responsibility and payment for contractual services if 
a grower or independent contractor is unable to meet their commitments. The capacity to 
‘rationalize’ thousands of small-scale growers, is daunting, but would be greatly ameliorated by co-
ordinating the sort of cane plant-lease arrangements that, again, were important to the historic 
expansion of SSG production in the 1990s.  
Recommendations 1 and 2 would provide a significant incentive to leverage this mechanism in a 
manner that would incentivise SSG expansion in co-ordinated fashion while retaining a reduced risk-
profile for SSGs. Perhaps most importantly, this would provide a measure to substantially expand 
SSG production on the basis that resembles the ‘vernacular’ plant-lease arrangements that under-
pinned SSGs rapid growth in the 1990s, without requiring onerous business plans, undertaking 
substantial debt, or requiring SSGs to plan for re-establishment over the better course of a decade. 
By these arrangements, SSGs allowed contractors to bear the cost of establishing cane (ploughing, 
planting, and fertilizer application) on their land, while allowing contractors to take the proceeds 
from a first cutting to cover the costs thereto. SSGs hence enjoyed the debt-less establishment of 
cane from which they could enjoy proceeds from subsequent ratoons, while contractors expanded 
their own client base. 
Here, similarly, SSGs would bear an opportunity cost in the first year of planting, as proceeds of the 
first cutting would be captured by the contractual agency, including the bulk of quality premiums 
that would incentivise quality planting. In this year, SSGs may only receive only a fixed ‘rental’ 
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income, and a small share of ‘net’ proceeds, but would enjoy income from subsequent cuttings, and 
having established cane at no direct financial cost to themselves. The further benefit of such a 
system is that it reduces the burden of financial planning for-replanting on the part of the SSG: net 
proceeds from subsequent ratoons could be consumed entirely, and cane re-established by the 
renewal of such an arrangement. Millers or other contractor agencies might bear the initial risk 
planting, but as amoritized on the first cutting, it would greatly reduce the (potentially decade long) 
risk of holding an agricultural asset (cane roots) on SSG land. Those SSGs capable of saving for re-
planting, however, would be able to do so on their own account, at the potential benefit of not 
surrendering premiums in the planting year. Additional benefits of such a model would be that SSGs 
would no longer be compelled (while still being free) to enter into often conflictual, risky and 
administratively consuming co-operative arrangements in order to (re-)establish cane production. 
The importance of combining local market pricing, efficient planting services and flexibility in cane 
husbandry cane be illustrated in Table 20 below. Here yield achievements are divided into those 
historically garnered in the current regulatory dispensation (24 t/ha) and more optimistic (but still 
conservative) averages (47 t/ha). Each is further divided into a local market pricing scenario and a 
scenario where current prices are received and subsidised by existing mechanisms. Further, in each 
case a scenario is given where the full costs of planting are borne by the grower, as with new 
establishments, scenarios where only the costs of ratoon management are borne, which would 
correspond to growers investing in cane but unable to bear any labour commitments due to age 
and/or opportunity costs to the self or family members, and a third scenario where labour costs are 
removed, effectively presuming a full commitment of household labour.  
We see that under conditions of SSG’s historical yield achievements, the current level of subsidy 
would see SSGs make a loss when bearing the full costs of planting and ratoon management – an 
outcome particularly severe for elderly growers unable to mobilize household labour or commit 
their own. Here, only full household labour commitments would push returns into the positive, but 
only to R1,676/ha – a fraction of even a child support grant. Local market pricing would improve the 
returns under this scenario, but still would be less than the value of a child support grant per 
hectare. Under the higher yield scenario, however, local market pricing would provide sufficient 
return for both contractors and SSGs to share a R3,443/ha premium on a ‘full-cost’ quality planting. 
At such yields, fully costed services would provide significant returns, equal to nearly that achieved 
by full household labour commitments in a low yield scenario. To the capable grower, however, 
good yields, local market pricing, and full labour substitution would provide nearly double the 













Table 21 Estimation of returns to rain-fed SSGs under current levels of subsidy and local market pricing conditions, and 
under poor and good yield scenarios 
    Rainfed - low yield Rainfed - high yield 
Assumed RV% 11.20% 11.20% 
Assumed yield (t/ha) 24 47 
RV - Local Market (R/ton) 5,773.76 5,773.76 
RV – current (R/ton) 3,573.41 3,573.41 
Scenario 



































Gross income (R/ton) 471 471 471 635.11 635.11 635.11 471 471 471 635.11 635.11 635.11 
  Revenue from cane 400 400 400    400 400 400    
  Subsidy 71 71 71    71 71 71    
   
Other Income 
(SPF, Rebates, etc) 30.00 30.00 30.00    30.00 30.00 30.00    
   Transformation Intervention 1 27.27 27.27 27.27    27.27 27.27 27.27    
   Transformation Intervention 3 10.24 10.24 10.24    10.24 10.24 10.24    
   Transformation Intervention 5 3.59 3.59 3.59    3.59 3.59 3.59    
 Operating costs (R/ton) 962.83 789.89 401.48 962.83 789.89 401.48 491.66 403.35 205.01 491.66 403.35 205.01 
  Harvesting (incl. contractors) 87.89 87.89  87.89 87.89  44.88 44.88  44.88 44.88  
  Haulage and transport 239.97 239.97 239.97 239.97 239.97 239.97 122.54 122.54 122.54 122.54 122.54 122.54 
  Fertiliser 161.50 161.50 161.50 161.50 161.50 161.50 82.47 82.47 82.47 82.47 82.47 82.47 
  Chemicals 80.14 80.14  80.14 80.14  40.92 40.92  40.92 40.92  
  Planting 172.94   172.94   88.31   88.31   
  Sundry expenses 220.39 220.39  220.39 220.39  112.54 112.54  112.54 112.54  
 Net R/ton -491.51 -318.57 69.84 -327.72 -154.78 233.63 -20.34 67.97 266.31 143.45 231.76 430.10 
  R/1 ha -11,796 -7,646 1,676 -7,865 -3,719 5,607 -488 1,631 6,391 3,443 5,562 10,322 
  R/2 ha -23,593 -15,29 3,353 -15,731 -7,430 11,214 -976 3,263 12,783 6,886 11,124 20,645 
  R/3 ha -35,389 -22,937 5,029 -23,596 -11,144 16,822 -1,464 4,894 19,175 10,328 16,687 30,967 
  R/4 ha -47,185 -30,583 6,705 -31,462 -14,859 22,429 -1,952 6,525 25,566 13,771 22,249 41,290 
  R/5 ha -58,981 -38,229 8,381 -39,327 -18,574 28,036 -2,441 8,157 31,957 17,214 27,811 51,612 
 
A similar dynamic is evident in irrigated budgets, albeit with potential returns much higher. Here, 
under current pricing and subsidy conditions, an irrigated SSG with poor yields would make a loss of 
approximately R8,578/ha upon establishment, and a marginal R973/ha for a fully costed ratoon. 
However, even decent yields of 71 t/ha would witness a loss of approximately R293/ha upon 
establishment. Returns from good yield ratoon cuttings would be significant, at R9,257/ha fully 
costed and nearly R16,000/ha utilizing family labour alone. However, at local market pricing, these 
returns would be surpassed under even low yield conditions, and high yields would provide even 
more significant returns at approximately R23,700/ha and R30,400/ha respectively. Clearly, these 
returns would offer a stronger foundation for irrigated producers to face questions of how to re-
establish cane, pay for group irrigation infrastructure, or surrender productivity premiums to project 
managers and debtors. Although at substantially different levels of returns, irrigated SSGs would 
enjoy far more latitude in either allowing quality-incentivised contractors to manage production 
entirely (enjoying a relatively passive income while pursuing other opportunities) or for skilled 
growers without other prospects to claim these from their own-labour – amounting in the cases of 
larger areas to approximate full-time job equivalents. At seven hectares, under good yield 









Table 22 Estimation of returns to irrigated SSGs under current levels of subsidy and local market pricing conditions, and 
under poor and good yield scenarios 
 Irrigated - low yield Irrigated - higher yield 
Assumed RV% 12.50% 12.50% 
Assumed yield (t/ha) 55 71 
RV - Local Market 5,773.76 5,773.76 
RV - current 3,573.41 3,573.41 
Scenario 
































Gross income 518 518 518 722 722 722 518 518 518 722 722 722 
  Revenue from cane 447 447 447 722 722 722 447 447 447 722 722 722 
  Subsidy 71 71 71    71 71 71    
   
Other Income  
(SPF, Rebates, etc) 30 30 30    30 30 30    
   Transformation Intervention 1 27 27 27    27 27 27    
   Transformation Intervention 3 10 10 10    10 10 10    
   Transformation Intervention 5 4 4 4    4 4 4    
 Operating costs 674 500 378 674 500 378 522 387 293 522 387 293 
  Harvesting (incl. contractors) 42 42  42 42  33 33  33 33  
  Haulage and transport 211 211 211 211 211 211 164 164 164 164 164 164 
  Fertiliser 90 90 90 90 90 90 69 69 69 69 69 69 
  Chemicals 70 70 70 70 70 70 54 54 54 54 54 54 
  Planting 174  - 174  - 135  - 135  - 
  Levies 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
  Sundry expenses 80 80  80 80  62 62  62 62  
 Net Per ton -156 18 140 48 222 343 -4 130 225 200 334 429 
  1 ha - 8,578 973 7,674 2,639 12,190 18,891 -293 9,257 15,958 14,187 23,737 30,438 
  2 ha -17,156 1,946 15,348 5,278 24,380 37,782 -587 18,515 31,917 28,373 47,475 60,877 
  3 ha -25,734 2,919 23,022 7,917 36,570 56,673 -880 27,772 47,875 42,560 71,212 91,315 
  4 ha -34,312 3,892 30,696 10,556 48,760 75,564 -1,174 37,030 63,834 56,746 94,950 121,754 
  5 ha -42,890 4,865 38,370 13,195 60,950 94,454 -1,467 46,287 79,792 70,933 118,687 152,192 
6.4 Sugar-tax funds to subsidize ‘green’-harvesting’ for improved health and labour conditions in 
cane 
A under-considered question in this report is the position of cane-labour. Indeed, as sugarcane 
labour is often highly casualized and vulnerable (often comprised of foreign migrants and women on 
both LSG and SSG farms) and not represented in the industry structure, the position of cane workers 
is a highly neglected aspect of sugarcane production in general. At the same-time, labour costs (both 
direct wages and overheads in sourcing/oversight) represent one of the most difficult areas for LSGs 
and SSGs. With SSGs almost categorically unable to pay minimum wages rates, the low returns and 
danger of work act as a major disincentive to local youth and others to seek casual employment in 
cane. For LSGs, while the level of compliance is unknown and historical tendencies for wage 
adjustment slow, barriers to productivity raising mechanization measures, and general cane-price 
pressures would certainly act as an incentive not to do so where possible or retrench workers - with 
53% in a recent SACGA survey having claimed to have done so (Nicholson 2018). In both cases, this 
limits the local employment ‘multipliers’ in cane employment (Dubb 2016, Woodhouse & James, 
Visser & Ferrer 2015, O’Laughlin 2017, Lazzarini 2017).  
Burning cane is consequently a wide-spread practice that generally reduces the cost of harvest, 
primarily by improved rates of cutting, including by the elimination of pests, but also contributes to 
soil degradation and is a considerable health and safety risk to workers directly, as well as to the air 
quality of those in the vicinity of cane production. Moreover, for SSGs in particular, cane-burning 
increases the risks of accidental and ‘runaway’ fires, whether actual or staged (for purposes of 
gaining preferential delivery access). For millers, burnt cane also improves the efficiency of crushing 
cane as there is less fibrous material and fewer propensities for breakdowns/stoppages (Bundaberg 
CaneGrowers N.D., Graham et al 2001, Dubb 2015, Muir et al 2009, Pierossi et al 2016).  
An alternative to burning is manually or mechanically harvesting and topping ‘green’ (unburnt) cane. 
The leaves and tops of unburnt cane have several potential benefits. In the first instance, tops and 
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leaves can be left in the field to contribute to the maintenance of soil health (Graham et al 2001) and 
reduction in weeds and evaporation (Bundaberg CaneGrowers N.D). Secondly, in principle, 
sugarcane tops are potentially valuable as animal feeds. The FAO estimating that approximately 21 
tons of cane are needed to generate sufficient tops to maintain 1 large livestock unit (LU); or 
approximately 2-3 LU per hectare given large-scale rain-fed yields (Naseeven N.D). For small-scale 
growers, for whom cane production often comes at the expense of grazing lands, the potential for 
sugarcane to contribute to livestock production is an under-researched area. Thirdly, Pierossi et al 
(2016) note that tops and leaves represent approximately a third of sugarcane weight but have the 
same energy content as the rest; consequently about a third of energy potential is not utilized. Tops 
represent about 2-5% of combined leaves and tops. 
In general, but particularly in the absence of clear downstream processing of leaves and tops into 
other products (whether electricity or animal feeds), and an amendment to the RV pricing system 
this would imply, the prime barrier to ‘green’ harvesting remains the additional labour costs involved 
– whether direct in wages or indirect in loss of productivity premiums. It is not clear from this study 
whether the sale of tops for animal-feed manufacture, possibly by millers, would provide sufficient 
revenue to cover raised labour costs thereto.  
Subsidizing ‘green’ cane, however, may provide another avenue to encourage this less-detrimental 
labour practice – as an unconditional end in itself, but also possibly encouraging a critical mass that 
other processing opportunities become more feasible. Even if not, however, incentives to green 
harvesting could be useful to encouraging on-farm synergies between cane and cattle production, a 
particular concern with SSGs.  
The form of subsidy might occur within the industry should feed processing become durable, for 
example including ‘tops’ in the RV system of payment, but another avenue may be to utilize the 
revenues generated from the HPL, particularly owing to the health and environmental benefits of 
reducing annual cane burning. To date, the HPL has generated approximately, R2.5bn in revenue; 
assuming even a 20% allocation of R500m toward the subsidization of green cane, and assuming 
even a total uptake for 19mt of cane, this would amount to an approximate R26.32 per ton subsidy, 
highly significant given existing estimates of rainfed labour costs of around R140/ton on LSG farms, 
and nearly equal the SPF/rebate subsidies on SSG farms (Dlamini et al 2018). Presuming a low SSG 
yield of 24 t/ha, this would translate to R631/ha, and form a significant subsidy to a (CPI adjusted) 
2010 labour-cost estimate of R3,101.56 per ratooned hectare (Dubb 2015).  
6.5 Integrating SSG support with Land-Reform policy 
The sugar industry has been renowned for its pro-active approach to land reform since its inception. 
This included, most notably, the redistribution of millers’ estate lands to large and medium-scale 
black growers, the establishment of the Inkezo Land Company to facilitate ‘willing-buyer, willing-
seller’ market-based land redistribution, and on-going efforts to effect large restitution claims, often 
complex, protracted and involving many beneficiaries  without prejudicing land under cane. 
Less commonly discussed, however, has been how these land reform initiatives have come at the 
expense of visions of expanding SSG production, and the difficulties faced by the industry in adapting 
to an ever-changing field of wider land reform policy. Land reform initiatives largely occurred in the 
aftermath of the reform of the DoP and the consolidation of the two-pools pricing system. This 
undermined millers’ incentive in advancing SSG cane, as well as the economic sustainability of SSG 
production itself. Consequently, the movement to establish independent black commercial farmers 
was borne of a dual pressure to conform to government’s emerging vision of establishing 
economically specialized and independent black agriculturalists amidst the mounting decline of SSG 
production. The movement to the PLAS programme has largely undermined these initiatives, and 
indeed heralded the closure of Inkezo. In the meanwhile, although the extent is not clear, on-going 
SSG support mechanisms are being utilized to support the incomes of many beneficiaries of effected 
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but often complex and conflictual restitution schemes, most of whom are not directly involved in 
cane production.  
Should the mechanisms to support SSGs be adopted, these would form a significant boon to existing 
restitution schemes and incentivise millers to advance the resolution of outstanding claims. In this 
sense, a SSG-focused support programme would go some way to inverting the current standing of 
restitution as a threat to cane supply of mills towards a differential opportunity. If SSG production 
receives domestic prices, and supports are given to administrating the cane production on SSG land, 
the accelerated settlement of restitution would offer enhanced incomes for beneficiaries and bolster 
the sugar incomes of millers whose cane supply has been most ‘transformed’. 
In regard to redistribution, it is clear that, in the absence of preferential support to SSGs, that the 
thrust of policy would need to remain on encouraging the establishment of large-scale black growers 
in rainfed areas, although in irrigated areas smaller farms (by area) are far more economical. This is 
owing largely to the reality that returns to cane are simply too small in rainfed areas to replace the 
combined multiple livelihoods strategies SSGs draw upon in order to survive, except at substantial 
levels of scale. Moreover, even where large tracts of land are acquired, the substantial levels of 
capital required and technical and managerial knowledge necessary to run a large-scale farm place 
beneficiaries in a position of considerable risk. This is particularly true of SSGs, many whom are 
elderly and under-educated, and accentuated by a general context of consolidation of large-scale 
cane production and the drop-out of many large-scale commercial farmers (both ‘white’ and NFG). 
While one of the central constraints to SSG production is land area, a defining feature of their 
‘smallness’, achieving ‘economic’ scales through redistributive land reform, targeting under-
capacitated SSGs for effective relocation from their existing livelihood networks to manage large 
commercial enterprises under unfavourable economic conditions would be a recipe for disaster, and 
no doubt require large levels of on-going government funding to maintain at all. Even with capable 
black commercial farmers, the now suspended RADP-programme has been a necessary intervention 
to maintain commercial production. 
However, should the previous recommendations be accepted, the shift in proceeds to SSGs and the 
incentives to expand SSG production that accompany them would provide ample opportunity to 
leverage existing land reform structures, the industry’s own institutional experiences, and the 
uneven capacities of SSGs themselves, to advance a broad-based redistributive policy. Rather than 
envisioning a ‘shock’ shift in scale and location, the PLAS programme could be leveraged to acquire 
areas bordering and/or in close proximity to existing SSG supply areas, and road infrastructure 
extended with government funding. New lands in proximity to SSG supply areas could be focused on 
five-fold principles: 
1) Providing land at median levels for settlement to community lineages with little or no access 
to land, wherein land for cropping (and differentially sugarcane) would be included;  
2) Providing land at median levels for settlement with households with insufficient lands for 
unemployed children and (independently) landless parents, wherein land for cropping (and 
differentially sugarcane) would be included;  
3) Providing larger plots of land for settlement to ‘accumulating’ growers facing barriers to 
expansion on their current plots, with the expectation that portions of their existing lands 
would be surrendered to neighbours at a given ratio (e.g. 1.5 hectares of new land for the 
surrender of 1 hectare of existing land);  
4) Providing areas to be committed to the communal grazing for livestock of new residents; 
5) Providing direct permanent rights of settlement and use to new residents, alienable by sale 




A simple illustration of the basic principle is in Figure 59. The benefits of such a policy would be 
several fold. In the first instance, it would obviate substantial risks associated with ‘sudden’ 
management of large tracts of land against existing multiple livelihood activities and the social 
networks in which they are embedded.  
Secondly, while planting sugarcane would be an option for beneficiaries, it would not be a necessity. 
This would allow sugarcane production to expand at distances to mills that remain economical, but if 
not lessen the pressures on existing sugarcane lands posed by other cropping and livestock activities. 
‘Rationalization’ of existing SSG cane lands would hence proceed according to the shifting capacities 
of SSGs themselves.   
Thirdly, it would reduce feelings of relative neglect or prejudice, as new lands would be provided at 
levels that already pertain, and to those who are relatively (and in rural areas, hence, especially) 
deprived, and connect with established social mores of needs-based allocation.  
Fourth, this would obviate the risk of manipulation by traditional authorities with substantial tracts 
of land already.  
Fifth, and relatedly, it would provide an avenue for nascent ‘accumulators’ committed to cane to 
expand their land under cane while reducing pressure on less advantaged neighbours – similarly 
enabled to expand their land undercane.  
Sixth, the close relationship between relative accumulation in cane and contracting would encourage 
such accumulators to also provide a base for contracting services to other settled growers, 
particularly if new lands were at distances judged uneconomical by miller and grower ‘development’ 
companies.  
Seventh, as there would be no condition for lands to be placed undercane, the failure of sugar in a 
particular area would not be tied to rights to land. 
Eighth,  the simultaneous acceptance for ‘vernacular’ markets in land with proscription of using land 
for debt-financing would allow households to differentially ‘exit/reduce’ their involvement in 
agriculture if desirable to the benefit of those who are more invested, without alienating 
redistributed lands under the circumstances of broader economic/livelihood shocks. The state would 
hence remain the effective ‘owner’ of redistributed lands without encumbering market relations or 
security of tenure. 
Ninth, the policy would not come at the expense of either restitution projects or willing-buyer, 












Figure 59 Illustration of pro-poor land redistribution agenda for areas neighbouring SSG supply areas 
   Redistributed land          Beneficiary register     






ha   
                1A 1 2 3   
                2A 2 2 4   
                3A 2 2 4   
                1B 1 2 3   
                2B 3 (-2) 4 5   
                1C 2 2 4   
                2C 3(-1) 2 4   
                3C 3(-1) 2 4   
                4C 11(-4) 8 15   
                Total 28(-8) 26 46   
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               Community B: Some land 
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preference 
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                 = Redistributed area   
                      
                      
                      
        2C       Community C: Some land poor,  accumulators 
cede land to neighbours 
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        4C              
                      
                      
                      
                      
6.6 The estimated employment benefits of a SSG – centred reform of the sugar industry 
It is perhaps worthwhile to review, however schematically, the potential employment benefits of 
these proposals. 
Figure 60 illustrates the how the Division of Proceeds would be altered to accommodate the new 
pricing regime most optimistically, that is, inclusive of a fixed mill-retail price spread of 25%. This 
alone, it should be noted, would increase RV prices significantly, including for LSGs. Here, similar to 
the ‘cost-based’ division of proceeds, a provision of deductions for SSG service management is 
provided as a ‘first-charge’ deduction from gross proceeds(here estimated at approximately 
R445/ton of SSG RV), along with other SASA and industry obligations. Then, payments on SSG sugar 
are allocated at returns from direct sale rates, and allocated between millers and growers according 
to the DoP.  The remainder of proceeds are then allocated according to the DoP between large-scale 
growers and millers. SSG and LSG prices are further inflated by the proposed HPL ‘green’ harvest 
subsidy, with SSGs also continue to receive their VAT and diesel rebate, and potential ‘FairTrade’ 







Figure 60 Proposed accelerated transformation SSG-centred Division of Proceeds 
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R/ton 3,749  
MOLASSES 
R0.73bn  
                                  
                 
        
GROSS proceeds 
R15.93bn  
[2.18 mt]        
                        
LESS: Industry charges 
-General R0.83bn  
-SSG service management R0.085 bn 
(@ R445 per SSG ton/RV) 
                   
             
                 
   
Fair Trade 
premium    
NET proceeds 
R15.02bn        
                 
       
First allocation: SSG direct market 
premiums       
       SSG   Miller       
      
R1.4bn  
RV R/ton: 7,342 64.37% 
R2.17bn  
[190,400 tons] 35.63% 
R0.77bn  
R/ton: 4,064      
      R/ton cane: 822           
VAT & diesel rebate 
     R/ton:15           
     R/ton: 90 
Second allocation: LSG shared 
market       
      R/ton: 26           
      Final R/ton: 938           




     
R8.27bn  







     
            
      R/ton cane: 467           
      R/ton: 26           
      Final R/ton: 493           
                 
 
The combination of all measures can be illustrated in Figure 61, below. Here we can see that in the 
first scenario (S1) that the current RV and subsidy structure would greatly be enhanced by the labour 
subsidy and FairTrade premium, if pursued. Gains to around R600/ton, however, would be 
surpassed in Scenario 2 (S2) by local market RV pricing alone, particularly if augmented by labour 
subsidy, rebates and FairTrade premium, to near R800/ ton. Direct marketing prices, however, 
undoubtedly garner the most substantial return, of over R800/ton on RV prices alone, and up to 
R938 with the rebates, labour subsidy and FairTrade premium.  
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Figure 61 Comparison of returns to cane under different RV and subsidy scenarios 
 
*Assumes an RV composition of 11.2% 
It is important to try and place these differentials into the broad perspective of SSG incomes. As 
observed, the diversity of production regimes and shifting rainfall conditions makes generalization 
difficult, but in Figure 62 and Figure 63 estimate net returns for rain-fed and irrigated SSGs by 
integrating these different price scenarios, and using the cost estimates utilized previously. Also 
illustrated are the thresholds for annual values of the Child Support Grant, Old Age Grant, and recent 
R3,500/month minimum wage.  
Under S3, the potential benefit to SSGs is, of course, most significant. Presuming decent yields, a 
rainfed SSG contracting out labour entirely would still garner more than the value of an additional 
old-age grant for each hectare placed under production. Given that SSG households are often old, 
and dependant on grants for food and other purchases, this is highly significant. However, also clear 
is that a capable and knowledgeable SSG that provided their own-labour commitments, would be 
able to achieve minimum wage returns at around every 1.19ha harvested. Low yields dramatically 
change the circumstance, however, with fully contracted ratoons only approaching the value of a 
child-support grant, and full labour commitments only returning the value of just over two child 
support grants. As rainfed growers have historically exhibited a median land size of around two 
hectares, however, these values all carry the potential of at least doubling for the majority of rainfed 
SSGs. 
Figure 62 Estimated net returns to rain-fed SSGs under differential yield, pricing and labour commitment scenarios 
 
*Co-ordinates of Old-age grant (OAG), Child support grant (CSG) and minimum wage not exact. 
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Irrigated SSGs, of course, exhibit even more substantial returns. Under S3, a grower fully paying and 
contracting for all labour processes would nearly achieve returns equalling the minimum wage per 
hectare, even under only medium yield conditions, and surpassing it if they adopted labour-
processes directly. As irrigated growers historically carried an average 5ha, these returns would 
together garner the income of a significant full-time job of over R200,000. 
Figure 63 Estimated net returns to irrigated SSGs under differential yield, pricing and labour commitment scenarios 
 
*Co-ordinates of Old-age grant (OAG), Child support grant (CSG) and minimum wage not exact. 
** Assumed OAG = R1,780 per month (R21,360 p.a), CSG = R430 (R 5,160 p.a), and minimum wage = R3,500 per month (R42,000 p.a) 
 
In these most optimistic scenarios, SSG returns are assumed to be inflated by own-labour 
commitments substituting for the bulk of labour purchases. This is not a currently representative 
assumption, however increased returns may encourage it becoming more common. Here, net 
returns given full own-labour commitments are also utilized for the purposes of establishing a broad 
estimate of the extent to which SSG production would contribute to employment under the raised 
price conditions of S3.  
In Table 22 estimated prospective net returns under high and low yield circumstances for rainfed 
and irrigated growers are divided by the minimum wage. Resulting ‘minimum wage equivalents’ 
provide some estimation of the value available to be distributed, although in practice may remain 
within the SSG household. Nonetheless, as employment is generally low in the communal areas, and 
in SSG households, this remains significant. Here we can see that net returns would garner a rainfed 
and irrigated growers an average of 0.28-0.75 and 0.68-1 minimum wage equivalents per hectare. 
Although not directly comparable, this appears, at worst, competitive with SASA’s estimate of 133 
permanent jobs and 210 seasonal jobs per 1,000ha of large-scale cane, i.e. around 0.343 jobs per 
hectare. In per SSG terms, (assuming a median two hectares under cane), S3 would garner rainfed 
growers with approximately 0.56-1.5 minimum wage equivalents, with irrigated SSG (assuming a 
median five hectares under cane) garnering an even greater 3.39-5.01 in minimum wage 
equivalents. Depending on yield conditions, S3 would hence broadly provide a range of 13,000-
31,000 minimum wage equivalents given aggregate SSG figures (although this does not account for 
‘group’ schemes under SSG codes). Moreover, if SSG numbers doubled (near their historical peak), 
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Table 23 Broad estimate of minimum wage equivalents generated by Scenario 3 pricing under medium and low yield 
conditions for rain-fed and irrigated SSGs. 
   Rainfed Irrigated 
N  Numbers of growers registered 17,779 905 
Item Estimation  Low yield 
Medium 
yield Low yield 
Medium 
yield 
A S3, own-labour Net return (R/ha) 13,343 35,364 32,035 47,389 
B A X (8/9) less establishment year  (R/ha) 11,860 31,435 28,476 42,124 
C B/42,000 Estimated min wage equivalent p/ha 0.28 0.75 0.68 1.00 
D B X est. median  land size Net return per grower 23,721 62,869 142,378 210,619 
E C X median land size Estimated min wage equivalent per grower 0.56 1.50 3.39 5.01 
F E X N Total estimated min wage equivalents 10,041 26,613 3,068 4,538 
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